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CEPS on 20-21 June 2005. This was the second in a series of two 
conferences, the first having been held in October 2004 at Stanford 
University in California, where it was organised by the Center for 
Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL). A companion 
volume consisting of other papers submitted to these two conferences is 
being published by Stanford University. Whereas the present book is 
mainly concerned with current developments along the two major front-
lines of democratisation in the European neighbourhood – states of the 
former Soviet Union to the east and Arab Mediterranean states to the south, 
and EU policies in this wide region – the companion volume addresses a 
more global perspective and provides more detailed accounts of both EU 
and US policies.  
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INTRODUCTION1 
MICHAEL EMERSON 
In the space of one year, the outlook for democracy in the wider European 
neighbourhood has been transformed. Until recently there was a pervasive 
pessimism over whether either the states of the former Soviet Union in 
Eastern Europe or the Arab/Muslim states in the Mediterranean and 
Middle East might in the foreseeable future engage in genuine democratic 
reform. The East European states of the former Soviet Union seemed 
completely stuck in conditions of phoney democracy, i.e. regimes that had 
the shape and form of democracy, but where corrupted parties of power 
made a mockery of democratic norms and values. As for the Arab/Muslim 
neighbourhood, many states were hardly pretending to be democracies, 
lacking basic electoral processes, constitutional provisions and institutional 
structures – arguing often that Islam and democracy were incompatible.  
The Rose, Orange and Cedar Revolutions have changed that. These 
revolutions have surely not yet have translated into smooth new 
democratic systems, yet still these dramatic developments seem to have 
witnessed breakthroughs, with newly empowered street democracy 
throwing out rotten regimes, with a will to do better.     
This book has two parts, the first of which analyses the current 
experiences of the democracy front-line states of the European 
neighbourhood, both to the east in the states of the former Soviet Union 
and to the south with the Arab Mediterranean states. The second part 
analyses what the European Union itself has been doing, and not doing, to 
                                                      
1 This chapter summarises the essence of the papers that follow. The language of 
the authors is liberally adopted, but quotation marks are used only sparingly, to 
avoid unduly cluttering the present text. 2 | MICHAEL EMERSON 
 
promote democratic reform in this wide region. This ordering underlines 
from the start that democratisation has to be seen first and foremost as a 
home-grown process. The gravitational forces of influence and incentives 
emanating from the European Union, pulling these states into democracy, 
are themselves important themes of this book, but still ones that have to 
take second place behind the domestic driving forces for political reform.   
A chronicle of current democratisation processes in the European 
neighbourhood can nonetheless begin with the experience of countries 
approaching membership of the European Union. Alina Mungui-Pippidi 
engages in a critical analysis of the common assumption that the process of 
negotiating accession to the European Union virtually guarantees 
successful transformation of political and judicial systems, to the point of 
meeting high European standards of democracy. The Copenhagen political 
criteria are themselves quite explicit: 
Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved 
stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, 
human rights and respect for and protection of minorities. 
 The author considers that the power of the enlargement process as 
an incentive is overwhelmingly proven. Yet the qualifications are 
considerable too. The main critique is that the process may lead only to a 
superficial Europeanisation, with actions taken by candidate states 
sufficient for the Commission to make ticks on its checklist of formal 
requirements. Evidence is also given to support the view that the incentive 
effect only really works while the issue of accession is still open for 
negotiation, and that after accession there is a tendency to relax reform 
efforts. 
Mungui-Pippidi takes apart the main components of the democracy 
basket, and examines in each case how far the negotiation process really 
bites down on the substantive problems. The EU’s influence has been 
powerful in terms of legislative action, but much less so in securing 
institutional performance. As regards electoral processes, the Commission 
has neglected to criticise widespread tendencies of so-called ‘parties of 
power’ to exploit their positions and media capture. The ‘Regular Reports’ 
of the Commission on candidate states have been tremendously important 
in determining the course of judicial reform, but many states are operating 
without a coherent theory of judicial independence. Corruption is the most 
difficult nut to crack, but it is not impossible, as the Bulgarian case shows. 
According to the author, none of these criticisms should be taken as INTRODUCTION | 3 
 
denying the positive effects of the enlargement process, yet the process has 
shown its limits.   
Georgia has the honour of having led the current episodes of 
democratic revolutions with the Rose Revolution of early 2004. It created a 
fresh brand of revolution, which others quickly sought to emulate. Scholars 
must look at these developments objectively, not the least because public 
relations agencies have at times been heavily involved in mediatic aspects.2 
Ghia Nodia therefore confronts the question whether we have really been 
observing democratic revolutions, and how these are to be defined. Nodia 
speaks of ‘revolution’ in opposition to something else, notably ‘reform’, 
‘coup’ or ‘transition’. In a post-communist context, as in Georgia, 
revolution now implies mental emancipation from the communist past. It 
was the communists who glorified revolution, so anti-communists have 
been extremely cautious in using the term, and so in this context the 
concept of transition was invented. However, in transition the stress is on 
bargaining among the political elites, with results seen in pacts that define 
agreed procedures and steps. Revolutions are resolved through a victory of 
one party and definitive defeat of the other, in which the masses of the 
population are involved. For Nodia, the ‘colour revolutions’ are about 
calling the bluff of the managed or phoney democracies that succeeded to 
the collapsed communist regimes. 
The Georgian Rose Revolution has passed the first test of revolution, 
in that people power was decisive in overthrowing Eduard 
Shevardnardze’s regime of managed democracy, which had relied on 
manipulating and cheating the people. But has the Rose Revolution created 
real democracy? For the author, no conclusive answer can yet be given. The 
new government is not a dictatorship, but nor is it a triumph of democracy. 
Georgia may become a kind of banana republic, where every ruler is 
accused of authoritarianism, to be removed through a ‘revolution’ by 
another ruler who then recreates the system in a somewhat different style. 
But this does not mean that nothing has changed. For a start the previous 
revolution was a bloody enterprise that led to dismemberment of the 
                                                      
2 For example, a Lebanese friend has suggested that their Cedar Revolution of early 
2005 should have been called the Saatchi Revolution, given the many cedar flags 
suddenly appearing in the streets of Beirut. These had been produced beforehand 
under contract from the late Rafik Hariri to prepare for the elections, which he 
became tragically unable to contest.   4 | MICHAEL EMERSON 
 
country, whereas the Rose Revolution was entirely peaceful. A new elite 
has taken over, who ‘speak English and computers’, and who are 
modernisers belonging to the paradigm of the Young Turks. The main 
result of the Rose Revolution may be that Georgia has a new confidence 
and holds itself to higher standards. By erecting the flag of the EU on his 
inauguration day and proclaiming membership of Europe (including 
NATO) to be the utmost strategic goal, Mikheil Saakashvili has handed to 
the Europeans a very strong constraining power against his own 
authoritarian instincts. For Nodia, it is now up to the Europeans to use this 
constraining power skilfully.  
And so on into the Orange Revolution of Ukraine in the months of 
October to December 2004, analysed by Hryhoriy Nemyria. Like Nodia’s 
Georgia, Nemyria’s Ukraine is a story of overthrow of the first post-
communist political regime, and the differentiation of the post-Soviet 
space. Under Leonid Kuchma, the leadership of Ukraine had become a 
strange mix of the old nomenklatura and red directors with a twist of 
national democrats and oligarchs. This marriage of apparachiks and 
dissidents gave birth to the independent Ukrainian state. Yet the old 
system was destroyed from above before civil society was strong enough to 
challenge it from below. It took time to grow up and develop a taste for 
democracy. Meanwhile the European political mainstream had succumbed 
to ‘Ukraine fatigue’. While disdainful towards Kuchma’s foreign policy 
strategy of ‘milking two cows’ (the West and Russia), the EU had also 
become comfortably reconciled to the increasing institutionalisation of 
Ukraine’s peripheral status as a country muddling through on the margins 
of Europe. 
For Nemyria the Orange Revolution has overthrown this pattern of 
thinking. Ukraine is not Soviet anymore. Among the developments within 
Ukraine that may have the largest impact regionally are the dynamics of 
the judiciary and legal reform, and constitutional reform (decentralisation, 
election of governors, rebalancing of the powers of the presidency in favour 
of parliament and political parties). He sees the Orange Revolution as 
generating healthy political dynamism, able to reinvigorate not only 
Ukraine itself, and neighbouring Belarus and Russia, but also a broader 
Black Sea region and former Soviet space in general. For this author, this is 
the real strategic meaning of the Orange Revolution. The transformative 
power of the Orange Revolution should be fully utilised in this sense, as 
there are evident links between the new quality of democracy in Ukraine INTRODUCTION | 5 
 
and the necessary quality of bilateral and regional cooperation, which in 
turn could have a decisive impact on the quality of regional security. 
Ukraine is at the intersection of overlapping, at times complementary 
yet often conflicting interests of the EU, US and Russia. This is why the 
major challenge for the West and for Russia is to successfully manage these 
overlapping integration spaces. Paradoxically it is a new post-revolutionary 
Ukraine that is better positioned than any other country to contribute to a 
much-needed rethinking of the EU’s approach to Putin’s Russia – a country 
that increasingly speaks and behaves with a neo-authoritarian accent. 
Ukraine can regain recognition as a constructive factor in fine-tuning the 
pan-European vision and strategy towards Russia. Yet the coming two 
years will still be critical for the long-term positioning of Ukraine 
strategically and for the sustainability of its democratic breakthrough.   
Given these two spectacular developments in former Soviet states, 
the inevitable next question in everyone’s mind is whether something 
similar can be foreseen in mother Russia, or at least whether there are 
prospects of reversing the de-democratising trend under the leadership of 
President Vladimir Putin. Nikolay Petrov has become more optimistic for 
Russian democracy since Ukraine’s Orange Revolution and considers that 
the idea of extreme passivism of Russians is over. His reasons are threefold. 
Some of the regions are far more democratic than the centre. The younger 
generation is becoming more actively interested in democracy. Finally, 
Putin’s system of ‘managed democracy’ will have to become more flexible 
if it is not to collapse completely. 
Putin’s regime relies on a control system over political actors, 
institutions and the rules of the game. Its basic elements are, first, a 
strengthened presidency alongside the weakening of all other institutions, 
including both houses of parliament, the judiciary and regional bodies; 
second, state control over the media; and third, control over elections, 
turning them from the means of empowerment of the people into the 
means of legitimisation of decisions made by the elite. Petrov comments 
that this would all be rather amusing if it were not so terribly dangerous. 
The president’s approval ratings continue to fall, yet he is the only basis for 
political stability. The author considers it a matter of life and death that the 
authorities increase the flexible stability of the political system by 
decentralising and re-federalising it. It has to break the giant monolith of 
the ‘vertical power’ into three sets of flexible, connected ‘horizontal power’ 
at the federal, regional and local levels. The Kremlin also needs to open 6 | MICHAEL EMERSON 
 
Russia’s legislature to the political opposition at all levels in order to direct 
the energy of social protest into parliamentary channels, but the Kremlin 
continues mindlessly in precisely the opposite direction. It may be noted 
that Petrov’s comparative optimism is based on his extremely negative 
assessment of Putin’s regime, which must somehow give way in due 
course to something more democratic, if it is not to collapse. Other 
participants at our conference did not disagree with Petrov’s diagnosis, yet 
found it difficult to qualify this as relative optimism.  
While Russia has perhaps become a vulnerable ‘managed 
democracy’, the case of Belarus is Europe’s only remaining five-star 
dictatorship. Will this small state’s direct proximity to new member states 
of the European Union translate into increasing pressures for regime 
overthrow or collapse? For Uvladzimir Rouda, the chances of democratic 
revolution are rather high. Belarus possesses all the necessary structural 
conditions for democratic transition. By the late 1980s, it had the highest 
rate of GDP per capita in the USSR, and the highest educational levels. In 
spite of his barbarian administrative methods, President Alexander 
Lukashenko has managed to preserve the industrial potential of the 
country. Industrial and urbanised society creates conditions that are 
incompatible with authoritarianism. In addition Belarus is a largely mono-
cultural society, which also favours the formation of a democratic political 
culture, compared to societies burdened with inter-ethnic tensions. 
The  homo sovieticus mentality of the president is in glaring 
contradiction with the current values of a large part of the Belarus 
population. Opinion polls show a substantially higher percentage of the 
Belarus population preferring accession to the EU, compared to Russians 
and even Ukrainians. Rouda compares Ukraine’s Orange Revolution to the 
fall of the Berlin Wall, symbolising now that Russian domination is no 
longer inevitable, just as the GDR managed to escape from control by the 
USSR in 1989. The main impediment to democracy, beyond the oppressive 
Lukashenko regime, is the weak development and organisation of civil 
society. Compared to Ukraine’s civil society, which triggered the Orange 
Revolution, Belarusian democratic NGOs and parties look colourless and 
unconvincing, with weak leadership. The solution has to lie in a radical 
institutional reform of the whole Belarus civil society, with a single 
decentralised democratic movement and a joint leader. The leader’s policy 
should be openly pro-European but at the same time not anti-Russian. In 
Rouda’s view, most of the problems of weakness of Belarus’ civil society INTRODUCTION | 7 
 
are nonetheless subjective ones that could be solved by leaders of political 
parties, NGOs, free trade unions and independent media. Their solution 
depends on the knowledge, desires and will of the people. Any 
replacement of Lukashenko arranged by Russia will only see a new 
dictatorial regime more deeply integrated into Russia. Thus any democratic 
revolution has to be the task of the Belarus people themselves.     
Notwithstanding their differences, these four analyses of the 
prospects for democracy in post-Soviet European states are all conducted in 
terms of the same references or paradigms – those of Western liberal 
democracy, or of the European social-democratic tradition. All discuss the 
prospects for convergence – be they distant still or already happening – on 
more or less understood models.  
It is here that the primary distinction arises with the politics of the 
Arab and Muslim states of the European neighbourhood – the politics of 
Islam. Bassam Tibi confronts this issue, citing Saad Eddin Ibrahim’s phrase 
for the predicament of Arab societies being squeezed between autocrats 
and theocrats. The universality of democracy is questioned. Yet could 
rising political Islam close the gap between the autocrats and theocrats? 
Tibi takes as his prime reference for political Islam the writings of Yusuf 
Qaradawi, who contrasts imported solutions with authentic Islamic 
solutions. For Tibi the honouring of cultural peculiarities must have its 
limits. Islam needs to be restricted to the ethics of democracy, but never 
elevated to a Shari’a-based rule. Islam can be viewed as a distinctive system 
of democracy only if reconciled with modernity. For a scholar of Islamic 
law, it is a matter of textual interpretation how to see Islam. But for a social 
scientist there are social facts in the Durkheimian sense rather than divine 
texts, which have to be the point of departure.  
The core question for Tibi is: Is Islam to be democratised, or is 
democracy to be Islamised? His answer is that the de-politicisation of Islam 
is an essential part of the needed democratisation of the Islamic world. The 
first issues to be addressed are the human rights to freedom of expression 
and assembly, and the required safeguards to ensure these freedoms. On 
the other hand, there can be no democratisation and no democracy without 
engaging an Islamic discourse on these issues. How to proceed practically? 
Islamism has two directions: institutionalist and jihadist. Institutional 
Islamists are prepared to work in democratic institutions at least for tactical 
reasons, and to dispense with jihadist violent actions. By contrast Islamist 8 | MICHAEL EMERSON 
 
jihadists believe in global jihad/Islamic world revolutions as the only means 
to restore Islamic global supremacy. 
What is needed is a double strategy. It is democratic to include 
institutional Islamists in the processes of democracy, while watching out to 
ensure that democratisation is not undermined in the name of democracy. 
As regards the jihadists, the only approach, for Tibi, is security, because for 
the jihadists the ‘action directe’ of violence is the method.  The Islamisation 
of politics in the Arab world is not the right avenue for introducing a civil 
Islam that is consonant with democracy. In a discussion at the conference, a 
nuanced view of Turkey’s experience with Islamic parties was alluded to, 
noting the democratic normalisation of such parties that can occur through 
their inclusion in the responsibilities of government. 
The most important front-line case in the Arab world for possible 
democratic reform is now Egypt. The fast-moving political landscape there 
is reviewed by Emad El-Din Shahin. Some of the factors that would make 
a good case for democratic transformation are rapidly converging: the 
formation of a wide spectrum of discontented segments of society; the 
mushrooming of pro-reform grass-roots movements that agree on a clear 
list of short-term demands; and a sympathetic international context. With 
presidential and parliamentary elections due respectively in September and 
November 2005, Shahin asks whether Egypt will finally experience its 
democratic spring. The answer seems still uncertain. 
The reform movement faces numerous challenges. It risks being 
sidelined by an agreement between the regime and external actors for the 
sake of ensuring stability and containing change. Repression of the reform 
movements is conceivable. But so also is the possible radicalisation of the 
movement itself, leading to the eruptio n  o f  v i o l e n c e  o r  c h a o s .  S t r i k i n g  
developments in the last year have included the strong stands taken by 
judges over the need to regularise and reform the electoral process in the 
context of the forthcoming elections. Their stands have been supported by 
the Egyptian Movement for Change, known as ‘Kifaya’ [‘Enough’], which 
was born in August 2004, and has seen rapid growth and proliferation with 
allied movements for change by intellectuals, writers, journalists, doctors, 
engineers, lawyers, youth, mothers, etc.  These movements are 
accompanied by a consolidated National Rally for Democratic Transition, 
which has given itself the task of drafting a new constitution. 
The Muslim Brotherhood, the main and oldest Islamist opposition 
movement, is also observed to have made a change of strategy in early INTRODUCTION | 9 
 
2005. The Brotherhood defied the government’s ban of their pro-reform 
rallies, and despite the arrest of hundreds of their followers, they refused to 
relent, and followed up with the organisation of numerous ‘surprise’ rallies 
outwitting the security services. Shahin comments that the ability of the 
Brotherhood to organise these demonstrations despite government 
harassment attests to its organisational skills and popular influence. Most 
likely, according to Shahin, the Mubarak regime will continue for a term or 
less. The pro-reform movement should continue to push for dismantling 
the structures of authoritarianism. The existing constitution, state 
structures and political culture in Egypt “would turn the most idealist of 
democrats into a repressive dictator”. A successful transition requires an 
agreement on basic political practices and processes, which could be 
enshrined in a national charter for political action or a new constitution.    
The case of Palestine is analysed by Nathalie Tocci both for the 
democratic developments in the post-Arafat era and for the role of the EU 
in seeking to influence the governance of the Palestinian Authority (PA) 
over a considerably longer period. Under Chairman Arafat, the PA was a 
bizarre polity: not legally a state in international law and lacking a proper 
constitution, subject to authoritarian and clan leadership, with an absence 
of meaningful parliamentary and judicial control, and a chaotic 
organisation of multiple security services. Yet the international community 
has made high demands for a reformed governance structure as a 
prerequisite for negotiating a peace settlement with Israel, and for 
obtaining final recognition of statehood. During this period the EU 
exercised a role that sought to influence internal political developments 
more substantially than in any other its partners. Indeed the EU’s 
Neighbourhood Action Plan for the Palestinian Authority is more precisely 
demanding, and grants more financial assistance per capita than for any of 
the regular neighbourhood states. In this and other respects, notably its 
conflict resolution and reconstruction aspects, the PA case bears some 
comparison with the post-conflict Balkan protectorates of Bosnia and 
Kosovo, albeit here with a conflict that is not yet resolved. 
Given the EU’s pivotal role in Palestine, Tocci seeks to clarify what 
the EU should be trying to do there, pleading for a focus on three factors: 
domestic actors, incentives and conditionality. On the first point Tocci 
argues for a more nuanced understanding of the intricacies within the 
Islamic bloc, i.e. between armed groups, political parties and civil society 
actors, and draws attention to the merits and drawbacks of involvement in 10 | MICHAEL EMERSON 
 
intra-factional dialogue. On incentives she calls upon the EU to aid the PA 
achieve full fiscal autonomy and WTO membership. On conditionality she 
calls for a finer categorisation to be made between those conditions for 
which the PA can be reasonably held accountable for itself, compared to 
those conditions, which, while also desirable, are more dependent on 
actions by Israel or the international community. 
In the post-Arafat period the PA achieved a first remarkable success 
in electing ‘freely and fairly’ Mahmood Abbas as its new president. Yet in 
the subsequent period Palestine has become one of the most delicate testing 
grounds for the struggle for power between the secular and democratic 
parties on the one hand and radical Islam on the other. With the growing 
chances of electoral success of the radical Islamist Hamas, internationally 
branded as a terrorist organisation, the external powers appeared to have 
encouraged the postponement of the parliamentary election due to have 
been held in July 2005. The ambiguities of democracy-promotion 
diplomacy surface yet again.  
While the former Soviet Union and Arab worlds may be thought of as 
worlds apart, Madalena Resende and Hendrik Kraetzschmar bring them 
together through the prism of political party structures, and through the 
‘party of power’ phenomenon in particular. Their argument is that with 
political parties as the backbone of any functioning democracy, the 
ideological weakness of parties of power and their dependence on the state 
is both a symptom and cause of the failure of democratic consolidation. 
Both Egypt and Ukraine have been examples. In Ukraine the Orange 
Revolution was indeed a revolt against a highly corrupt party of power, yet 
the consolidation of democracy under Viktor Yushchenko is far from 
assured, and could yet come to be remembered as an unfulfilled promise. 
In Egypt the pressures for change are certainly building up, yet the ruling 
elite has not so far yielded to allow a real political pluralism. For 
democracy to take hold in either eastern or southern neighbourhoods of the 
EU, it is crucial that the logic of parties of power be replaced by one 
structured around autonomous and ideologically cohesive parties. The 
authors draw conclusions for Western policy-makers in the sense that they 
should support the formations of such parties. Equally parties should be 
encouraged to translate ideological precepts into coherent policy positions, 
so as to achieve in the long run the shift in loyalties from clientelistic 
practices to programmatic principles.     INTRODUCTION | 11 
 
Finally, the European Union’s performance as promoter of 
democracy in its European and Mediterranean neighbourhood is analysed 
by Michael Emerson, Senem Aydın, Gergana Noutcheva, Nathalie Tocci, 
Marius Vahl and Richard Youngs. In its discourse the EU places 
democracy and the rule of law as number one. The authors examine how 
far the EU is a coherent actor in pursuing this goal in practice, notably in its 
wider neighbourhood, with case studies covering the Balkans, Turkey, 
Russia, Ukraine, Maghreb and Israel-Palestine. This paper was stimulated 
by a previous study about US democracy promotion policy, which 
dissected the sharp inter-agency differences and contradictions in 
Washington, notably between hard-power security realists versus soft-
power diplomats. The EU also reveals fairly profound divergences and 
ambiguity of priorities in relation to democracy promotion. These 
divergences are different, however, from those found in the US. The 
individual member states of the EU are naturally inclined to give priority to 
neighbours that they are closest to geographically. This dictum also often 
relates to historical experiences that resonate in the foreign policy reflexes 
of national capitals. Thus France, Spain and Italy always put the 
Mediterranean high on the agenda; Germany, the Baltic and Central 
European states are most interested in their northern neighbours, while the 
UK still looks across the Atlantic. 
Nevertheless, these obvious interests flowing from geographical, 
historical and cultural proximities provide no simple indicator of whether 
the member states in question will be harder or softer, or more or less 
vigorous in democracy promotion in various areas of the neighbourhood. 
The historical colour of these close relationships has to be brought into 
play. Former colonial powers tend to be hesitant to intervene politically in 
their former colonies, as in the case of France and Spain in the Maghreb. 
The legacy of World War II makes Germany very reluctant to see the EU 
take a strong position towards Israel over issues of international law, and 
this may also partly explain a rather soft line towards Putin’s de-
democratising Russia. On the other hand, the Baltic and Central European 
states, having been occupied by the Soviet Union, reveal the opposite logic, 
with a much greater inclination to make points of political principle 
towards Russia. Different world views of the EU’s two permanent UN 
Security Council members may also come into play at times. Certainly it 
was in evidence over Iraq, with some collateral impact on relations with 12 | MICHAEL EMERSON 
 
Russia, when France and Germany made common cause with Russia 
against the US and the UK.  
A primary distinction is made in EU policies between the 
enlargement-related sphere, which is an extension of EU internal policies, 
and the foreign policy sphere beyond. In the enlargement process the EU 
has worked powerfully as promoter of democracy both through its 
gravitational attraction and explicit political conditionality. It is above all in 
the foreign policy sphere that a complex set of institutional and historical 
inhibitions and partly conflicting priorities muffle the outcome for 
democracy promotion. However these two spheres, the internal and the 
external, are in practice overlapping. The EU’s official neighbourhood 
policy is subject to ambiguous interpretations, between the EU that claims 
it is a foreign policy, and various partner states that view it as a pre-
accession strategy. Recent developments see new dynamics. On the one 
hand, the EU’s internal crisis brought about by the failures to ratify the 
Constitution will shatter some pre-accession illusions. On the other hand, 
this may drive the EU to give greater substance to its neighbourhood 
policy, in order to mitigate discouragement. Moreover in the neighbouring 
regions from the former Soviet Union states to the north and the Arab 
world to the south there develops a fresh momentum to the democratic 
transition, with apparent contagion of ideas and revolutionary behaviour, 
in which 2004-05 may mark the beginning of something reminiscent even 
of major historical episodes in the advance of political liberalism on the 
European continent such as 1789, 1948 and 1989. These developments may 
be signalling a need for various actors within the EU to make important 
changes in mental categories, in particular modifying the view that the 
EU’s politico-normative influence should not be expected to extend beyond 
the outer frontiers of the enlargement process. This chapter, entitled “The 
Reluctant Debutante”, is suggesting therefore that the EU may indeed now 
be moving into a new stage of its policy development, with more intense 
involvement in the affairs of non-candidate neighbouring states.   
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The EU as a promoter of democracy 
There is no doubt that EU enlargement has been a remarkable success. 
Even the disappointing French and Dutch referenda on the Constitution 
cannot blur the perception of the extraordinary performance of the EU as a 
democratising agent for the eastern part of the continent. First, the ‘return 
to Europe’ myth, as shaped by intellectuals such as Milan Kundera, turned 
into a powerful anti-communist device following the 1975 Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe in Helsinki.1 This device was all the 
more powerful as it seemed to be about identity and not a counter-
ideology. Second, the attraction of the Common Market and the political 
union it generated has acted as a crucial incentive for Eastern European 
countries, prompting them to engage in what has since been called a 
‘regatta’ – a race to be the first country to join the EU. In the early 1990s, not 
only did the race precipitate the reforms that were indispensable for the 
transformation of these countries, but since it enjoyed large popular 
support it also enticed post-communist parties (the strongest in the region) 
into becoming genuinely pro-EU parties. Overall, this experience justifies 
the EU being viewed as a “gravity model…according to which fast and 
deep democratisation is explained to a significant degree by the proximity 
and possibility of anchorage and integration with a major world centre of 
                                                      
1 The Final Act of the Conference, known as the Helsinki Accords, sets forth a 
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democracy”.2 Transitions with an EU prospect seem to be the best: they 
lead to democracy and prosperity earlier and with fewer uncertainties and 
risks than any others known so far. 
Democratisation is a notion describing the political transformation 
process of the initiation and deepening of democracy in a polity that was 
previously authoritarian. Democratisation is a gradual process; countries 
achieving free elections are usually considered democratic, although 
becoming a fully fledged liberal democracy requires a considerably 
lengthier process. As some authors argue, however, far more than just free 
elections is needed for a democracy to also enjoy ‘quality’:3 civil liberties, 
the rule of law, independent judiciaries and effective, horizontally 
accountable institutions, an open and pluralistic civic society (including 
media) and civilian control over the military.4 Europeanisation is also used 
to describe a process of transformation, notably the emergence and 
development of policy networks at the EU level specialising in the creation 
of authoritative EU rules,5 “an incremental process re-orienting the 
direction and shape of politics to the degree that European Community 
political and economic dynamics become part of the organisational logic of 
national politics and policy-making”.6 Despite its many definitions, 
Europeanisation is universally perceived as related to the penetration of the 
EU dimension into national arenas of politics and policy-making and 
                                                      
2 M. Emerson and G. Noutcheva, Europeanisation as a Gravity Model of 
Democratisation, CEPS Working Document No. 214, CEPS, Brussels, November 
2004. 
3 L. Diamond and L. Morlino, The Quality of Democracy, Working Paper, Center for 
Democracy and the Rule of Law and Stanford Institute of International Studies, 
September 2004 (retrieved from http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/20729/ 
Diamond-Morlino.QoD.intro(book).drft1.pdf). 
4 L. Diamond and M.F. Plattner, “Introduction” in L. Diamond and M.F. Plattner 
(eds),  The Global Divergence of Democracies, Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2001, p. xi. 
5 T. Risse, M. Green Cowles and J. Caporaso, “Europeanization and Domestic 
Change: Introduction” in T. Risse, M. Green Cowles and J. Caporaso (eds), 
Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change, Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2001, pp. 1-20. 
6 R. Ladrech, “Europeanization of domestic politics and institutions: The case of 
France”, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 32, No. 1, 1994, pp. 69-88. EU ENLARGEMENT AND DEMOCRACY PROGRESS | 17 
 
therefore some overlap between democratisation and Europeanisation is 
possible. It is even desirable – among the conditions in the Copenhagen 
criteria that the EU spells out for the new entrants is an official reference to 
democracy: 
Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability 
of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights 
and respect for and protection of minorities.7 
Countries are invited to join once they fulfil the above-mentioned 
Copenhagen political criteria. The process of accession on their side and of 
EU enlargement on the other only starts after an assessment that certifies 
the fulfilment of political criteria. There is no instrument to diagnose or 
monitor the level of democratisation these countries have achieved, nor did 
one exist in previous EU enlargements that could provide a template for 
the more recent ones.  
The relation between EU accession and democratisation is therefore 
not a simple one. It is generally considered that the influence of the EU over 
democratising the neighbouring countries can act through either 
conditionality or socialisation, or a mixture of the two. Conditionality 
implies that the EU is phasing assistance, ranging from economic, political 
and institutional incentives to full membership on the condition that 
political and economic objectives are met. Socialisation implies that the EU 
does not pursue a forceful policy, but engages its neighbours in multiple 
personal and institutional contacts and joint activities, offering a model for 
successful transformation.8 In practice, the two processes are closely 
intertwined,9 to the extent that in the western Balkans one cannot presently 
tell them apart. 
As the last wave of enlargement was the first to require that 
applicants adopt the full previous legal acquis, ‘Europeanisation’ largely 
came to be seen as the acceptance and internalisation of the common EU 
legislation. The steps of the last waves of enlargement, as summarised by 
                                                      
7 European Council, Presidency Conclusions of the Copenhagen European Council, 
21-22 June 1993, SN 180/1/93, REV1, 1993. 
8 See the previous chapter by M. Emerson et al. in this book, “The Reluctant 
Debutante: European Union as Promoter of Democracy in its Neighbourhood”. 
9 T. Boerzel and T. Risse, “When Europe Hits Home: Europeanization and 
Domestic Change”, European Integration Online Papers, Vol. 4, No. 15, 2000 
(retrieved from http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2000/015.htm).  18 | ALINA MUNGIU-PIPPIDI 
 
Christopher Preston,10 are illustrative of the technical character of the whole 
process and the focus on convergence: 
1.  Applicants must accept the acquis  communautaire in full. No 
permanent opt-outs are available. 
2.  Accession negotiations focus exclusively on the practicalities of the 
applicants taking on the acquis. 
3.  The problems arising from the increased diversity of an enlarged 
Community are addressed by creating new policy instruments to 
overlay existing ones, rather than by fundamental reform of the 
existing instruments’ inadequacies. 
4.  New members are integrated into the EU’s institutional structures on 
the basis of limited adaptation, facilitated by the promise of a more 
fundamental review after enlargement. 
5.  The Community prefers to negotiate with groups of states that have 
close relations with each other. 
6.  Existing member states use the enlargement process to pursue their 
own interests and collectively to externalise internal problems. 
The negotiations of the last wave of enlargement have therefore been 
little more than a process of checking off a massive and essentially non-
negotiable list of EU laws and regulations, chapter by chapter. During this 
process, some monitoring and coaching have been undertaken only in 
adjoined areas of democracy, such as civil service reform or reform of the 
judiciary, guided mostly by the goal of increasing performance. 
Individually, some country officers in the EU’s Enlargement Directorate-
General do strive to promote best democratic practices in the accession 
countries, but as this is not part of the mainstream process, their efforts 
remain minor in the business of enlargement. Previous and influential 
democracy promoters, such as the Council of Europe or NATO, are 
completely marginal by this time, first because it is assumed that their task 
has been reached once the respective country has engaged in negotiations 
and second because it is understood that the European Commission’s 
Regular Report will take over further monitoring on democracy. 
The power of the EU and EU enlargement as incentive-setters is 
overwhelmingly proven.11 What  do es not  see m  to be so  o bv iou s is how 
                                                      
10 C. Preston, Enlargement and Integration in the European Union, London: Routledge, 
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much the process of enlargement itself influences further positive 
developments of democracy in the accession countries. Does this 
distinction matter? It should. If enlargement tools bring about a deepening 
of democracy, then these could be employed in countries that are not yet 
ready to become full members in order to accelerate their journeys. If, on 
the other hand, these instruments do not produce such outcomes, then 
other factors have to be relied upon to bring progress to those countries, 
and pushing enlargement as the only solution may be a diversion. 
Enlargement was invoked for the western Balkan countries as well as 
Ukraine and Moldova. Although everybody agrees these countries are far 
from ready, there has been some recent consideration of the idea to initiate 
some enlargement procedures. For instance, the EU’s Wider Europe 
strategy paper invokes the possibility that countries with a distant EU 
prospect, such as Ukraine, might consider adopting parts of the acquis 
immediately.  
A reality check 
To solve this dilemma we suggest a very simple exercise. For the region we 
do have an instrument of measuring democracy, not just in basic 
procedural terms, but also in its substantive, qualitative aspects. This 
instrument is the Freedom House Nations in Transit (NIT) survey, which 
rates democracy across the post-communist world. Table 1 summarises the 
difference in scores between the year a country embarked on the accession 
process and the year it concluded negotiations and signed an accession 
treaty. The table covers accession countries, and for illustrative purposes, 
also Albania – a post-communist country that, having been spared by civil 
wars and secessions, can compare better than former Soviet or Yugoslav 
countries despite an initial start in transition far behind most of the others.  
Scores represent the difference between the initially granted score at 
time zero (the start of the accession process) to the final moment (the 
conclusion of enlargement). Freedom House NIT scores range from 0 as the 
best performance to 7 as the worst, but to facilitate reading the signs are 
changed in this table and progress is marked with a plus sign and 
regression with a minus sign. Since we compare progress, we choose to 
ignore the starting points, which are very different in the cases of Albania 
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and say, Poland. The starting points are more telling for the specific 
historical legacy of each country, such as hardships of the communist 
regime, the transition mode and performance in the early transition, all 
prior to the start of negotiations, so they are unrelated to enlargement. The 
intervals measured differ, as Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, 
Hungary and Estonia were first invited to start negotiations at the 
Luxembourg EU Council in 1997, which they began in 1998. The rest, 
including Romania and Bulgaria, being considerably less developed on all 
counts, received the invitation at the Helsinki summit in 1999.  
Table 1. Progress on democracy during the EU negotiation process  
Countries Average 
change 
Electoral 
process 
Civil 
society 
Independent 
media 
Governance Judiciary 
Albania (non-
accession) 
0.85  0.75  0.75  1.00  0.75  1.00 
Bulgaria 0.40  0.50  1.00  0  0.25  0.25 
Czech 
Republic 
-0.60 -0.75  0  -1.00  -0.25  -1.00 
Estonia 0.25  0.25  0.25  0.25  0  0.50 
Hungary -0.30  0  0  -0.75  -0.75  0 
Latvia  0.15 0 0.25 0.25  0.25  0 
Lithuania 0.15  0  0.50  0  0  0.25 
Poland -0.15  -0.25  0  -0.25  -0.25  0 
Romania 0.15  0  0.75  -0.5  0.25  0.25 
Slovakia 0.65  1.00  1.00  0  0.75  0.50 
Slovenia 0.25  0.50  0.50  0  0.50  -0.25 
Average 
(accession 
countries 
only) 
–- 0.13  0.43 -0.20  -0.08 0.05 
Source: Freedom House, Nations in Transit, Freedom House, Washington, D.C., 1998-2005 
(retrieved from http://www.freedomhouse.org/nit/). 
The first 10 groups of countries became EU members in 2004; 
Romania and Bulgaria signed their accession treaties in 2005. As for 
Albania, the comparison country in this panel, we have only recorded 
performance for the interval 1998-2004, as for the Central European 
countries, while for the rest the differences are shown for 1999 and 2004 or 
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ratings, except for Albania, which is viewed as partly free. In the NIT 
ratings, which are more demanding on the quality of democracy, Bulgaria 
and especially Romania are on the threshold between consolidated and 
incomplete democracy and Albania is of course lower down the scale. 
The experiment offers some interesting results. The most significant 
progress has been recorded by Albania (which is of course not negotiating 
with the EU, being still in the partly free zone), followed by Slovakia 
(showing moderate improvement, having made huge gains immediately 
after the loss of power of Vladimir Mečiar and before the start of 
negotiations) and Bulgaria. Slovenia and Estonia make up the next group, 
but their progress has been modest at just 0.25 (Freedom House scores are 
evaluated by quarter points, so 0.25 is a minimal gain). Latvia, Lithuania 
and Romania follow with 0.15, half a unit of progress. Poland, Hungary 
and the Czech Republic, with scores of -0.15, -0.30 and -0.60 respectively, 
have actually regressed on democracy – not progressed – during 
enlargement negotiations. Although initial differences between the 
countries are strong, once again performances up to 1997 are not 
attributable to enlargement, but to other factors. The regression of Poland, 
Hungary and the Czech Republic may also mark the end of the positive 
bias analysts have towards these countries, as it has gradually become clear 
that they share more of the negative legacies of communism that are 
prevalent in the rest of the region than it originally seemed. 
Now if we look at each category of ratings we discover that accession 
countries on average have recorded progress of 0.13 in the electoral process 
(Albania had 0.75), 0.43 on civil society (Albania jumped to 0.75), but they 
regressed on freedom of the media and governance while Albania moved 
ahead and they stagnated on the judiciary while Albania improved (0.05 to 
1.00). Again, this does not mean that the Albanian judicial system is not 
inferior to that of Central and East European countries (CEECs), it just 
means that after the transition phase was finished and enlargement 
negotiations started, the accession countries stagnated, while non-accession 
candidate Albania strode past. The important positive achievements of the 
CEECs date from before the start of negotiations with the EU, which is 
generally not that surprising, given that so far the EU has not invited 
countries to join that were not already considered democratic. Romania and 
Bulgaria (and to some extent Slovakia) were the borderline cases. 
This is, of course, only an illustrative exercise and one can criticise 
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assess progress – we could, for instance, compare progress until 
negotiations with advances afterwards for each accession country – the 
results are the same. Enlargement has little or no bearing on the quality of 
democracy. True, it is not supposed to deal with the media, civil society or 
elections at all. Paradoxically, civil society tends to progress the most 
(although it is unconcerned with enlargement), the media tends to regress 
the most and the electoral process stagnates. But the areas of governance 
and judicial reform do relate to enlargement, and here, despite impressive 
developments on paper, developments on the ground are modest to nil. Why 
is that? 
The next section advances a few explanations and some examples. In 
areas such as governance, judicial reform and anti-corruption measures, we 
must first establish that lack of progress is not owing to targets being 
already attained. Regular European Commission reports do check on the 
main aspects of democracy year after year and strongly demand 
improvements in these areas, and the European Parliament also has its own 
reporting system, often producing more critical views on democratic 
progress than the Commission. Accession countries might be more 
advanced than Albania, but evidence that the pace slows down during 
negotiations should not be controversial. Certain stagnation in democratic 
reforms is a usual occurrence, which needs explaining. 
Some tentative explanations 
Prior to stagnation, regression should first be explained. Media is the area 
recording the worst performance during accession negotiations. Media 
freedom is taken for granted after the end of transition; once free, it is 
assumed it will just stay so. There is considerable talk about corruption and 
administrative capture and the Commission’s Regular Reports do mention 
the media, but somehow the assumption is that the media, of all things, 
cannot be captured or become corrupted. Nor was it foreseen that, as 
happened in some of these countries, precisely because the media proved 
to be a remarkable force during the early transition years, various interest 
groups would start to acquire media outlets simply to use them as 
bargaining tools in their battle for political and economic influence, 
increasingly squeezing the genuine space for public expression. This media 
capture phenomenon has progressed quite dramatically in accession and 
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Union to high capture in the Balkans and moderate capture in the CEECs. 
Nevertheless, since it is an insidious phenomenon, based on informal 
developments, it has completely escaped attention, so no counter-policy 
has been initiated to protect the media. No government has been asked by 
the Commission in its reports to take decisive steps to make media 
ownership transparent, for instance. In the case of Romania, it was the 
European Parliament that reacted more energetically than the Commission 
when it had become obvious that freedom of the media was under serious 
threat.  
The electoral process is also a descriptive story. It is assumed that 
accession countries have at least achieved fair and free elections. Although 
it is true that countries in the region regularly organise elections that are 
clearly free, numerous procedures could still be improved and the fairness 
of campaigns remains doubtful. For one thing, use of administrative 
resources by parties in power (such as candidates campaigning with 
service cars and gasoline provided by the public office they currently hold) 
is widespread. Further, use of public broadcasting for support of the party 
in power is again common practice and explains why media scores for 
Hungary, the most advanced accession country, receded during 
negotiations. Some specific situations are particularly embarrassing, such 
as the total exclusion of members of the Russian minority from voting in 
Estonia and Latvia, even after democratic consolidation was achieved in 
these states – a fact not even alluded to in the treaties signed with these 
countries. In other words, not only did millions of persons not vote in the 
2004 elections for the European Parliament (not being citizens because of 
their language), but they will also be excluded in the future. 
The Commission tends to understate all election problems. For 
instance, in the 2004 Romanian elections, evidence surfaced of important 
irregularities, influencing between 1% and 2% of the total vote. While 
observers from the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human 
Rights (a miniscule mission that in fact had been intended only for 
ceremonial purposes) were becoming increasingly concerned, DG 
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both political sides infringed regulations, as they had been informed had 
happened, there was no reason for concern.12 
In fact, as negotiations carry tight deadlines and the country directors 
within DG Enlargement are evaluated according to the performance of 
their country, they become promoters of the countries automatically and 
progress over the course of the negotiations becomes the sole indicator of 
government performance. Where a government seriously lags behind, as 
Poland did prior to 2001, a change of government has been welcomed.13 For 
the rest of the countries, elections and changes of government were rather 
seen as necessary but embarrassing, as country teams had come to have a 
vested interest in the continuity of political and bureaucratic elites with 
whom they worked closely and to fear that elections might upset 
negotiations. Strangely enough, while the Commission increasingly sided 
more with governments in accession countries, their local counterparts 
perceived them as promoting a bottom-down and unilateral approach.14 
The Commission was in fact eager to advance the negotiations as far as 
possible without changing the limited terms they had from the European 
Council, from fear that they might unsettle what they knew was a hard-
fought and fragile consensus. So they were committed allies, but within a 
limited framework, which many in the accession countries failed to grasp. 
It is this special framework that led them to become less sensitive to 
democratic issues and completely engulfed in technical ones.  
                                                      
12 Letter from Dirk Lange, country director for Romania, on behalf of DG 
Enlargement, to the author of this paper, as head of the coalition of NGOs entitled 
“Romanian Coalition for a Clean Parliament”. 
13 G. Avery, “The enlargement negotiations”, in F. Cameron (ed.), The Future of 
Europe: Integration and Enlargement, London: Routledge, 2004, p. 52. 
14 See, for instance the paper by M. Klaudijus, Deputy Chief Negotiator and 
Deputy Director-General of the European Committee, “Government of Lithuania 
Methodology of the EU Enlargement: A Critical Appraisal”, European Institute of 
Public Administration (EIPA), Maastricht, 2001 (retrieved from 
http://www.eipa.nl/Topics/Enlargement/maniokas_paper.doc). See also A. 
Moravcsik and M.A. Vachudova, “Bargaining among Unequals: Enlargement and 
the Future of European Integration”, EUSA Review, Vol. 15, No. 4, 2002 and J. 
Hughes, G. Sasse and C. Gordon, EU Enlargement and Power Asymmetries: 
Conditionality and the Commission’s Role in Regionalisation in Central and Eastern 
Europe, Working Paper, London School of Economics and Political Science, 
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The next interesting case is governance. Here the European 
Commission is highly interested that accession country administrations 
become clean and effective, and thus able to absorb EU funds. Indeed, the 
absorption of EU funds is the number one performance indicator during 
the accession process. Corruption is the second important indicator, as the 
Commission fears for good reason that funds may be embezzled unless 
administrative procedures are fair and transparent. In all enlargement 
countries, the Commission has pushed for the adoption of anti-corruption 
legislation to regulate conflicts of interest, disclose the assets of public 
officials and so forth. Furthermore, it has fostered the creation of special 
anti-corruption agencies. As the speed and effectiveness of the judicial 
process in all these countries is less than acceptable, the Commission has 
also insisted on having special anti-corruption courts, which would judge 
cases in a more effectual and expeditious manner. All these measures seem 
very sensible. So why have they not worked, and why have corruption 
scores failed to improve while governance scores have remained 
remarkably stagnant? 
The answer lies in the formality of the whole EU anti-corruption 
approach. Governments are asked to produce comprehensive strategies, 
which look like the old five-year plans, in the sense that nothing is 
prioritised and implementation becomes extremely cumbersome. Some 
institutional tools have been developed to fight corruption during EU 
accession as well as NATO accession, such as compulsory statements of 
assets for dignitaries, civil servants and magistrates. The problems arise 
when putting the formal strategies into practice, as this largely depends on 
understanding how corruption works, who profits from it and who loses 
from it. 
It is known from the onset that we deal with defective judiciaries and 
law enforcement agencies; nevertheless, they are entrusted with the whole 
task of cleaning up the rest of their societies without any previous work on 
cleaning up themselves. As part of the implementing strategies, the 
European Commission (supported by the World Bank) has encouraged 
governments to raise awareness: so grand anti-corruption activities are 
reported on television, as prosecutors start making live arrests. Since these 
are the same incompetent prosecutors as before the measures were 
adopted, however, those arrested are confident to be released by the courts 
the next day. The public witnessing this comedy simply becomes cynical 
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request turn out to be as ineffective as normal courts, for the simple reason 
that what plagues the normal courts affects them as well: they cannot be 
insulated from the general problems of the judicial system. Similarly, 
professions where the traffic of influence is rife are encouraged by these 
strategies to adopt codes of conduct, without any attempt to shake up the 
establishments of these professions that preside over corrupt practices and 
pay lip service to reform. Unsurprisingly, it all leads to nothing but 
disappointment and considerable expense. In one of the worst experiments 
in the area, the Romanian National Anti-corruption Agency spent €13 
million in 2004 alone to secure just a few minor convictions. The cost per 
conviction in total, if we add court expenses, rises to about $150,000 per 
capita, something that a poor country with as many corrupt officials as 
Romania simply cannot afford. The agency was created at the insistence of 
the European Commission and some EU member states (despite Romania 
already having such a unit within the General Prosecutor’s office), only to 
be declared unconstitutional by Romania’s Constitutional Court when it 
tried at last to deal with some of the corrupt politicians at the top. Here the 
story ends, some millions of euros later. 
It is probably unavoidable to some extent during the enlargement 
process for the EU to push societies suffering from informality and a deficit 
of implementation to adopt numerous laws and regulations. Nevertheless, 
the total disregard over who can or cannot be plausible actors for change 
and what can constitute the institutional incentives for real progress is not 
unavoidable. This attitude emerged from the lack of experience of those 
who designed these strategies, as well as their poor grasp of the situation 
on the ground. It is also based on the most common belief of flawed 
transitologists: just give time to any new institution and it will start 
working.  
Corruption is the most difficult nut to crack in post-communist 
societies, as it manifests itself mostly as the widespread discriminate 
distribution of public goods by the state to the benefit of certain groups or 
individuals. These public goods include nearly everything at the beginning 
of transition, as nearly all property belongs to the state and tend diminish 
as privatisation progresses. Influence – and therefore power – is the main 
currency, not cash. Political elites are for most part tempted to see the state 
as the ‘private’ property of themselves and their clients, and elections often 
bring in other privileged groups (although not always) but fail to change 
the system. Some EU companies are attracted into the game: EU firms EU ENLARGEMENT AND DEMOCRACY PROGRESS | 27 
 
engaged in building highways or securing borders in some accession 
countries have come to be investigated by the Commission, as costs seem 
well above those in EU-15 countries.15 
Controlling this process is really difficult as long as things start from 
top of the government and are embedded in the way things work. But it is 
not impossible as the Bulgarian case shows. In the enveloping cynicism of 
the region, Bulgarians are exceptional in perceiving that corruption has 
been going on since the end of the transition. So what happened in Bulgaria 
that did not occur elsewhere? The answer is a massive grassroots 
anticorruption campaign led by civil society, including NGOs acting as 
ombudsmen for local governments, followed by the arrival of a new and 
considerably cleaner government. 
Slovakia and more recently Romania have also seen such attempts by 
civil society. These efforts have not been coordinated by government anti-
corruption strategies agreed with the Commission. They have received 
minor funding, if at all, from EU sources. They have used some of the tools 
provided by accession – such as asset declarations in Romania – but they 
have also created their own tools, promoted freedom of information acts 
and then monitored implementation (which is not part of any acquis). 
This is how civil society scores have improved and governance scores 
have stayed the same. As governance reforms have been entirely oriented 
towards a top-down approach, and outcomes are limited to changes only in 
formal structures, the accession-related rules and procedures have resulted 
in low institutionalisation. This massive import of legislation has failed to 
affect the very substance of the governance process at the domestic level; 
nor has it induced substantial changes to existing patterns of behaviour 
there, being unsupported by respective bottom-up developments. The 
influence of the European Commission is powerful in terms of institutional 
choices, but it fails to determine institutional performance.16 A good 
illustration of this is to be found in civil service reform, largely formal and 
deprived of both incentives for change and the ability to differentiate 
between promoters and opponents of change. Quite the contrary, the civil 
service legislation pushed by the EU to curb politicisation – which is severe 
                                                      
15 See the French weekly Le Point for an investigation on EADS: “EADS-Airbus 
quand Forgeard met le feu”, Le Point, N°1705, 19 May 2005. 
16 G. Atanasova, “Governance through conditionality”, Paper prepared for the 2004 
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indeed – is rapidly becoming an obstacle to encouraging effective civil 
servants and punishing defective ones. 
Also relevant for governance is the state-building prompted by the 
acquis. An area with particularly strong conditionality and thin acquis is 
regional policy. Despite the premise of the accession negotiations of 
accepting ‘differentiation’, a trend for uniformity in EU policy was 
established early on.17 At the Madrid European Council in December 1995, 
EU member states instructed the Commission to draft opinions evaluating 
the future allocation of structural funds for each applicant country. The 
opinions of 1997, for the first time, identified weak ‘regional administrative 
capacity’ as a key problem for enlargement; thereafter in the Regular 
Reports, the Commission has often referred to the problems of weak or 
inadequate administrative capacity at the regional level. 
It appears that from very early stages competing views developed 
within the Commission over whether chapter 21 of the acquis entailed a 
“model of regionalisation” and how it should be implemented by the 
Central and Eastern European countries.18 The issue was political as well as 
technical. All the countries involved were unitary states, many of them 
with historical ethnic minorities. Was regionalisation to be political or 
statistical? Hughes et al. quote a variety of interviews on this combination 
of strong EU conditionality and poorly defined objectives: “We came under 
amazing pressure from the EU because Hungary does not have regions. We 
think there was no real need to set up a regional structure. We have regions 
– the counties...We have been trying to organise at the NUTS 2 level [EU 
statistically defined regions].”19 A high-ranking official at the Estonian 
Mission to the EU explained to Hughes et al. that “they [the Commission] 
saw candidate countries as mice in laboratories...anything could be asked 
of them”. He observed that the pressure to regionalise was “only because of 
EU policy principles and in particular money channels”. He described how 
conditionality works in practice: “Approval of a particular [assistance] 
program is…their way of interference”. While one interviewee accepted 
that it was in Estonia’s national interest to rationalise the division of local 
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authorities, he felt that the question of how many levels to create was not 
one that the Commission should determine.20 
Driven as a mechanical process, the regional adventure stumbled 
from the very beginning. While these countries have embarked on simple 
decentralisation – some quite bravely – devolution of power from the 
centre to newly invented meso-governments, with no tradition and no 
relation to existing territorial units, was bound to be complicated. It was 
also not popular. These unitary states already had unpopular central 
parliaments; adding other regional ones to them seemed to voters as just 
adding to the burden, not increasing democracy. In fact, several other 
options existed to reduce the deficit of accountability that the public 
perceived. But the goal of the EU-driven regions had nothing to do with 
increasing accountability or developing local participation. Romania’s 
government party used infrastructural funds to lure over 50% of Romanian 
mayors to move over to their party between 2001 and 2004 (thus 
completely vitiating the results of local elections), and the European 
Commission barely made a mention of it in its Regular Report. What drove 
regionalisation was the need of the Commission to impose a model they 
thought would facilitate the effective absorption of regional funds, with no 
consideration given to how this will impact the national political systems. 
Indeed, when the Commission gave up it was not because of realising that 
this kind of state-building from the top down could not but fail, but 
because it became clear that these artificial creations could not be entrusted 
to meet the pressing deadlines on spending structural funds. So in early 
2001, the Commission began to proactively stress a clear preference for the 
centralised management of structural funds in the candidate countries. By 
that time Poland had reorganised its whole territorial administration. 
T h e  n e x t  a r e a  o f  i n t e r e s t  i s  r e f o r m  o f  t h e  j u d i c i a l  s y s t e m .  T h e  
Copenhagen criteria do not specifically refer to judicial independence; 
however the political criteria of ensuring “stability of institutions 
guaranteeing...the rule of law” would be inconceivable without an 
independent and impartial judiciary. As part of the EU accession process, 
the Commission has evaluated candidate countries in a wide range of areas 
in the framework of its Regular Reports on the progress of each country. 
The reports followed reform of the judiciary in great detail and although 
the acquis does not cover this field they provided a general roadmap for 
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countries to follow. It is generally acknowledged that judicial reform is one 
of the most difficult areas. As Francis Fukuyama puts it: 
[L]egal systems are low to medium specificity activities with high 
transaction volumes. Establishing a rule of law involves extensive 
construction not just of the legal system, but also of courts, judges, a 
bar and enforcement mechanisms across the entire territory of the 
country. Putting such a system into place is one of the most complex 
administrative tasks that state builders need to accomplish.21 
The Regular Reports of the Commission have been tremendously 
important in determining the course of judicial reform in the accession 
states.22 In the period 2001-04, under pressure from the Commission 
constitutional amendments were passed concerning the status of the 
judicial system in Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania and major legislation 
was adopted in Poland, Bulgaria, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
and Slovenia. Many of these pieces of legislation have tried to change the 
institutional balance of power within the judiciary and among the major 
branches of power as well, with the goal of strengthening the performance 
of the judicial system. Generational issues were of no concern, although 
one 1997 IDEA report on democracy warned that one of the main problems 
of the judiciary was survival of the communist-era conservative 
establishment in the superior courts, taking advantage of seniority 
requirements for such positions.23 
The lack of a coherent theory of judicial independence, and its link to 
the performance of the judicial system as a whole, led the Commission to 
endorse some projects for reform and reject others without clear objective 
grounds for doing so. Thus, in Slovakia the Commission repeatedly 
advocated the abolition of the probationary period for judges (obviously 
with the view to strengthening judicial independence), while in Bulgaria it 
supported a constitutional amendment in 2003 that extended the 
probationary period from three to five years. Strangely enough, the 
government in Slovenia argued that a similar extension of the probationary 
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International Affairs, Vol. 58, No. 1, 2004, pp. 189-202. 
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Judicial Independence” Center for Liberal Strategy, Sofia (forthcoming in 2005). 
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period for judges for up to five years was necessary for EU accession. In 
another example, one of the most critical 2002 reports of the Commission 
concerning Latvia complains about the influence of the ministry of justice 
over the career paths of judges, while a positive report – the one on the 
Czech Republic – contains almost identical language concerning the 
powers of its ministry of justice and yet no criticism or concern over 
judicial independence. It is not clear why something that works in the 
Czech Republic cannot do so in Latvia,24 or more generally whether the 
authors of these reports have ‘graduated from the same school’. In fact, 
they seem to have started backwards – from the angle of poor performance 
– and tried clumsily to explain it by formal institutions rather than by 
power distribution or other informal arrangements, so they quickly arrived 
at the conclusion that the formal institutions are what should be changed. 
A simple comparative look across other countries would have shown the 
same institutions functioning elsewhere and would have suggested that 
they should look in other places for the keys to changing bad practice. 
The Eastern European models of judicial organisation in fact vary 
greatly, but so do those in Western Europe. The issues are generally 
similar, such as the role of the minister of justice in the appointment and 
careers of the judiciary, and the existence and composition of supreme 
judicial councils. Some countries have followed the Latin European model 
of self-governing judiciaries, through the establishment of independent 
judicial councils; others, such as the Czech Republic, have opted for judicial 
administration through the ministry of justice. A similar system existed in 
Slovakia until 2001, when it was replaced (partly under pressure from the 
Commission) with a judicial council model.25 In both Romania and Bulgaria 
the conservatives in the judiciary managed to make use of their 
administrative positions as heads of courts to be elected to the judicial 
council in order to use their office there to oppose substantial reforms to the 
way these judiciaries operate. They were greatly helped by the fact that the 
reform packages assumed that a simple transfer of power from the ministry 
to the council would ensure independence of the judiciary. Quite comically, 
in Romania the entire staff of the ministry of justice, from secretaries of 
state to controllers, deserted their old jobs and jumped to the boat of the 
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council immediately, which continued to perpetuate bad practice under the 
new legislation. 
The only comparative report to date of judiciary reform, arising from 
the EUMAP Project, concludes in its final chapter that the lack of a coherent 
theory of judicial independence, the absence of a uniform EU model and 
the corresponding lack of a consistent scheme of evaluation of the 
performance of different models has led to occasional problems: 
There have been…instances where the Commission has sent mixed 
signals to the candidate states. On occasion, the direction of the 
judicial reforms in different countries has been dependent on expert 
advice from EU member states; in the absence of EU-wide standards, 
pre-accession advisors and representatives of twinning institutions 
have often simply encouraged the adoption of specific solutions 
imported from their own states…Candidate states cannot be 
reasonably expected to bring their judiciaries in line with standards 
that are themselves not defined.26 
Is this so dramatic? After all, it is rather obvious that enlargement 
relies more on art than science and some of the concepts it uses, such as the 
famous ‘functioning market economy’ are supremely ambiguous.27 
Nevertheless, in fields such as judicial reform and anticorruption, it 
mattered greatly, because conditionality here – especially for laggards such 
as Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania – was really tough and threats were 
issued by the European Commission that the whole process could be 
endangered if the countries failed to comply. It also mattered because a 
silent battle for power between former communist establishments and 
challengers has been going on throughout the transition, and good reforms 
pushed through at that time should have been those empowering a new 
generation. In the end, if we accept the Freedom House scores, the results 
have been rather modest. The most positive achievements in the field of the 
judiciary were, again, achieved prior to accession, for instance when 
countries moved to tenure judges, securing them from political removal. It 
may be argued that these reforms have yet to produce outcomes and it is 
too early to tell, but so far it is rather clear that, as in the field of civil service 
reform and governance more generally, the approach of the European 
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Commission has failed to change the operating mode of the judiciary and 
allowed the conservatives to realign themselves. Substantial reform will 
now be far more difficult after accession, for the good reason that its 
opponents can argue that it has already been undertaken. New laws have 
been adopted, new institutions have been created and little has changed. 
The public perceives this and discontent with the judiciary continues to be 
high across the region.  
Conclusions 
None of these criticisms should be seen as denying the positive effects of 
EU enlargement in general, especially its power in providing scope and 
direction to countries. The problem arises in the details, when we go sector 
by sector, and the process itself is rather about details. Problems arise from 
the originally incorrect assumption that Eastern European countries are as 
equally developed and institutionalised as Austria, Sweden and other 
recently integrated countries. This is simply not the case, so instruments 
that worked very well in those countries show their limitations and push 
the state apparatus of post-communist countries to its limits. The risk is not 
failure – as both sides have an interest in calling it a success – but 
superficial Europeanisation, when deeper Europeanisation would have 
been more beneficial for both these countries and the EU as a whole. In the 
words of one Lithuanian negotiator, “this particular process of enlargement 
has become particularly rigid and asymmetrical. The risk is that this 
rigidity may endanger its final results”.28 
After the rocky start of the European Constitution, the EU will be in 
denial for a while and further accessions may be put on hold. But 
enlargement will eventually resume and lessons from the first post-
communist enlargement are crucial for the next ones, simply because the 
countries next in line, except Croatia, have starting points at the level 
Romania and Bulgaria had – or worse. In other words, these countries have 
not yet achieved their transformations. 
Advocates of enlargement for the Balkans argue that enlargement is 
the best transformation tool and that negotiations should start immediately 
with western Balkan countries. It has even been suggested by the 
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International Commission for the Balkans29 that Olli Rehn, the 
Commissioner for Enlargement, should take over from Paddy Ashdown as 
the Bosnian administrator. While on the one hand driven by the justified 
need to offer some certainty to these battered countries (and so increase the 
incentive power) and to facilitate access to more EU funds, on the other 
hand (as funds other than pre-accession ones seem out of the question 
somehow) this proposal overstates the role of enlargement as a 
development tool. Enlargement is no such tool, nor was it designed to be, 
as it was simply carried over with minimal adjustment from previous 
enlargements. DG Enlargement does not have the same mission and staff as 
the World Bank and the twinning advisors do not share one vision on 
transformation and certainly not one vision together  with the European 
Commission, so they turn out to be rather dubious agents of change. 
Furthermore, pre-accession funds suppose tedious state-building, which is 
an unnecessary burden at this stage in some of these countries. What the 
western Balkans need is flexible aid, invested towards empowering pro-
European groups and consolidating them in their societies, not the long-
term creation of structures that might not be necessary by the time they 
accede owing to changes within the EU itself. The European Commission is 
right that they should belong to the EU sooner than later – but it might not 
yet have grasped the best way to achieve this goal. 
One more important conclusion arises. Reform in Central Europe, 
and later in Romania and Bulgaria, as captured in the Freedom House 
scores, has been driven by the EU, but pushed by domestic elites. Its pace 
tends to slow down after negotiations start, partly because the elites 
already consider that they have won the prize from the viewpoint of 
previous achievements, and partly because all the energy goes into 
‘Europeanisation’, which often does not imply deeper reform. Instead it 
creates numerous empty shapes, which will linger around for years waiting 
for the substance to catch up. Embarking on negotiations when local elites 
have not yet done their best could be risky. Of course, elections will be held 
and opportunities to bring in more committed reformers could occur after 
negotiations start. Nevertheless, negotiations cannot provide the best 
background for Orange Revolutions or for achieving transformations. This 
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particular instrument, EU enlargement, has already been pushed to its 
limits. One has either to reform it profoundly in view of the lessons learned 
in order to use it further as a transformation device, or just use other 
transformation devices, equally based on conditionality and socialisation, 
and improve on those. In the particular case of the western Balkans, what 
could work is more development-oriented EU aid and lifting the 
requirements for Schengen visas at least for Macedonia, Serbia and 
Albania, which have the ability to screen people at their borders. Such a 
measure would bring more profit to these countries than the numerous and 
largely ineffectual free trade agreements that have been signed over the last 
few years.  
Amalgamating the benefits of the enlargement process with the 
benefits of EU accession in general is confusing two different phases of 
development. Enlargement should definitely not stop with Romania and 
Bulgaria; clear roadmaps should point towards the future targets for 
accession. Further, the strategies to reach these targets should be guided by 
the logic of transformation, not integration. This approach means that some 
transitory strategies and even institutions might be needed to reach the 
point at which accession can start. Imagining that the process of 
enlargement can solve the unfinished transformations of Ukraine, Albania 
or Serbia runs the risk of discrediting enlargement – as it would not work 
and may also bring more damage than good to these countries. Domestic 
reformers and their foreign advisors should give up the dream of one-size-
fits-all solutions and embark on the tedious work of accomplishing their 
transformations with strategies tailored by country and by sector. The EU 
should remain the arrival point of the regatta, exercising its powerful 
attraction and not become the regatta itself.  
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THE DYNAMICS AND SUSTAINABILITY 
OF THE ROSE REVOLUTION 
GHIA NODIA 
This essay seeks to identify what the case of Georgia – more specifically, 
the Rose Revolution and its aftermath teaches us about the nature of 
revolutions and the prospects for democracy in countries that are, well, like 
Georgia. The phrase ‘countries like Georgia’ refers to countries and political 
regimes that are not democratic, but which cannot be considered classical 
dictatorships either. Such countries have both authoritarian and democratic 
elements in their political systems (and the democratic elements are not just 
a façade), so there are some internal political dynamics that make the 
prospects for the implementation of the democratic project not completely 
hopeless. This description relates to a very large part of the world that is 
often called the ‘grey zone’ – a reflection of mainstream political science’s 
inability to find some kind of acceptable term for it. 
Therefore, this essay is structured according to the conceptual 
problems that exist around the democratisation project in our world – and 
about which the experience of the Rose Revolution in Georgia has 
something to say.  
What ‘revolution’?  
The most popular question about the Rose Revolution is whether it was a 
‘ r e a l ’  r e v o l u t i o n  o r  n o t .  F o r  i n s t a n c e ,  s o m e  p e o p l e  p r e f e r  t o  c a l l  t h i s  a  
regime change or even a change of leadership. This line of thinking 
obviously requires that we define what we mean by ‘revolution’ – and of 
course, definitions vary according to the intellectual tradition one THE DYNAMICS AND SUSTAINABILITY OF THE ROSE REVOLUTION | 39 
 
subscribes to, or more precisely, the context in which the word is used. We 
may speak of revolutions in contrast to something else: revolution rather 
than reform, revolution rather than coup or revolution rather than 
transition. The meaning of revolution often depends on what follows the 
‘rather than’ part.  
Taking the ‘revolution rather than transition’ aspect as a starting 
point, in his famous article, Thomas Carothers wrote about the “end of the 
transition paradigm”.1 There were those (including the author of this essay) 
who criticised his approach in the belief that he himself invented the very 
paradigm he criticised – or at least he could not quote any other well-
known political scientist who had actually formulated that paradigm. But it 
can be argued that the string of ‘revolutions’ of which the Georgian 
revolution was one, has in some sense vindicated him – although not 
exactly in the sense about which he spoke.  
Previously, there was a widely held belief that the change of a 
political regime from an authoritarian (totalitarian) to a democratic one was 
such a profound event that it could not occur without an open struggle 
between the forces for democracy and those of the ancien regime, and this 
struggle deserved the glorious name of ‘revolution’. In the late 20th century, 
however, the concept of revolution went somewhat out of fashion. A 
number of people who considered themselves champions of democracy 
developed a distaste for revolutions, and it was in this context that the 
concept of transition was invented. The founding fathers of ‘transitology’ 
used the word ‘transition’ to replace the word ‘revolution’.  
The concept of democratic transition is similar to that of democratic 
revolution in that it denotes a profound change of a political regime from a 
non-democratic to a (more) democratic one. The difference is that in the 
concept of revolution, the stress is on the fight, in which the masses are 
involved; in the concept of transition, the stress is on bargaining, in which 
elites predominantly are involved. Revolutions are resolved through a 
victory of one party and the definitive defeat of the other (typically ending 
in the guillotine, imprisonment or exile for the losing parties). Transitions 
are resolved in pacts, which define the steps and procedures of transition 
from one (non-democratic) set of rules to another, and where the interests 
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of all parties involved – including representatives of the old power – are 
somehow taken into account.2  
The literature on democratic transitions initially focused on events in 
Latin America and southern Europe in the 1970s and 1980s. Samuel 
Huntington defined this set of political transformations as “the third wave 
of democratization”.3 The break-up of communist rule in 1989-91 was also 
considered part of the third wave and the transition paradigm was 
extended to include it. Much discussion ensued about whether the theory 
of democratic transition as it was formulated for the cases of southern 
Europe and Latin American could be applied to the post-communist 
realm.4 Nevertheless, when political scientists discuss political 
transformations in the post-communist world, they still prefer to speak of 
transitions, rather than revolutions.5 
What was the main reason behind this conceptual change? There are 
at least two factors at play here. One is linked to the traditional association 
of revolutions with violence. In the second half of the 20th century, modern 
man developed a strong aversion to violence. Possibly, it was the 
experience of communism and fascism that dealt a mortal blow to the 
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tradition of celebrating violence, which used to be at the heart of the 
classical revolutionary spirit.   
The second factor was the immense increase in the normative power 
of democracy. After World War II, Western-style liberal democracy 
established itself as a political system that was associated not just with 
goodness – one can argue endlessly about whether democracy is inherently 
good – but also with success and power. That is, liberal democracy proved 
to be not only most suited to human nature as classical liberal philosophers 
thought, but also the most reliable mechanism for delivering security, 
stability and prosperity; thus the democratic world ultimately became more 
powerful in a traditional, military sense of the word. As a result, a strong 
consensus developed in favour of liberal democracy being the best political 
order – at least in that part of the world strongly influenced by Western 
political and intellectual traditions. This trend undermined the will for 
openly resisting democratic principles. What was such resistance to be 
based upon – the divine right of kings? ‘Non-democratic’ began to mean 
something like uncivilised, backward and weak.  
Under these conditions, non-democratic rulers have found it 
increasingly difficult to maintain things as they are. Many of them have 
begun to believe that the tide of democracy is unstoppable or that they 
need to concede at least some space to democratic principles. Under these 
new circumstances, it has become easier to negotiate a way towards 
democratic order.   
What, then, is meant by the return of the word ‘revolution’ to popular 
discourse? In a post-communist country like Georgia, it may imply a 
certain mental emancipation from its communist past. For the first post-
communist generation, the term revolution was far too closely connected 
with the communist ideology: given that it was the communists who 
glorified revolution, anti-communists were extremely cautious about using 
the word. The new generation – having been socialised after communism – 
does not have any qualms about it.  
This matter is one of social psychology and not just the choice of 
words. The more important thing is the political background against which 
the colour revolutions were sparked. If these events are described as 
revolutions, what was the context or ancien regime against which they 
occurred?  42 | GHIA NODIA 
 
The ancien regime and the power of the people 
The real nature of Georgia’s ancien regime (or the Shevardnadze regime as 
Georgians usually see it) was its inherent ambiguity – the feature that some 
commentators viewed as its façade or Potemkin nature. On the one hand, 
there was official recognition that democracy was the only game in town. 
The general constitutional framework in Georgia was quite democratic and 
there was no ideological objection (coming from the government or the 
opposition) to the idea of democracy. This meant, in particular, that there 
was a parliament that could be rather independent from the executive (or at 
least the constitution allowed it) and that political parties could operate 
freely, the media could become increasingly independent and influential 
and that civil society organisations could be active and conspicuous. On the 
other hand, the leaders assumed that they would have enough levers to 
prevent the most basic process of democracy – a change of government 
through elections – from materialising.  
As his interviews immediately after the revolution revealed, former 
President Eduard Shevardnadze’s project was that of managed democracy, 
whereby the leaders tolerate pluralism, but within limits. This political 
project can also be called one of ‘enlightened oligarchy’ (the term 
‘oligarchy’ here refers to its original meaning of the rule of the few, rather 
than the rule of the rich, which should be termed ‘plutocracy’). This 
framework allows a plurality of interests, but the important issues are 
decided by a small directorate, and the leader – in this case Mr 
Shevardnadze – retains the function of the final arbiter. In other words, the 
ruling directorate led by Mr Shevardnadze had to control 51% of the stock 
in the political enterprise. Other actors were free to act as long as their 
power did not exceed the 49% threshold. Bargaining was possible, but if 
the claims of certain players went further than the threshold suggested, 
they were deemed to be a threat to the system.  
The question for the leadership was how to sustain the system of 
pluralistic oligarchy at the same time as officially maintaining a generally 
democratic framework. The history of recent revolutions demonstrates that 
this is extremely difficult. On the conceptual side, the paradigm of 
“Potemkin democracy” – the metaphor Charles King used with regard to 
Georgia6 – proved to be vulnerable. He might have been right in implying 
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that Mr Shevardnadze had intended the elements of pluralism he tolerated 
to be kept like Potemkin villages for deceiving Western visitors (or rather 
for helping those visitors to save face when they talked of the progress of 
democracy in Georgia). But that does not mean that the free media, the 
active NGOs and the network of political parties that were accustomed to 
acting freely were just Potemkin villages in practice. Rather, the metaphor 
of a genie that cannot be controlled once it is let out of the bottle is more 
appropriate here. When Mr Shevardnadze began to understand his 
miscalculation, it was too late. For example, in 2001, when he tried to cut 
the wings of the most popular independent television station, Rustavi-2 (by 
sending in security services to investigate alleged tax abuses), the popular 
backlash was too strong: protest actions linked to the raid against Rustavi-2 
led to the resignation of the entire cabinet and proved to be nothing less 
than the grand rehearsal for the Rose Revolution.  
N e x t  w e  t u r n  t o  t h e  m o s t  i m p o r t a n t  f a c t o r :  t h a t  o f  p o w e r  o f  t h e  
people. Success or failure of the managed democracy project depends on 
the government’s ability to manipulate people. The official democratic 
ideology claims that people own 100% of the stock of the political 
enterprise, while in reality ‘the people’ (that is, everyone beyond the ruling 
oligarchy) have to content themselves with a maximum of 49%. This 
situation can only be achieved through cheating. Such cheating takes many 
forms but the opportunity to rig elections is the most important. Mr 
Shevardnadze was under the misapprehension that he could cheat and 
manipulate the people indefinitely. Yet even the measured democratic 
freedoms he tolerated also allowed alternative political players to mobilise 
public support against the political regime.  
This is probably why the concept of revolution is so important. 
‘Revolution’ here means the exercise of people power. The aim of the 
various colour revolutions is to call the bluff of managed democracies. 
People are pushing their leaders to the point where they either have to shed 
any democratic pretence and manage without democracy (that is, reveal 
themselves as bloody dictators) or they have to concede defeat and 
succumb to the people’s will. This tactic is a gamble of course, but it has 
proved beneficial for Georgia and certain other countries. 
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Democracy and stateness  
Whether a revolution is a ‘real’ one can be judged by both its process and 
its outcome. The Georgian revolution withstood the first test in as much as 
people power was the decisive element, but the outcome is less clear. Was 
it a change from managed democracy (that is, semi-democracy or quasi-
democracy) to a real democracy? Did the nature of the political regime 
change as a result of the revolution? Presumably, this is what most people 
have in mind when they ask whether this was a genuine revolution.  
It is argued here that as yet no conclusive answer can be given to this 
question. Of course, the fact that a government reacts to a democratic 
impulse is no guarantee that it will create a democratic system of 
governance. The Rose Revolution did express the strength of the normative 
idea of democracy in Georgia, along with the increased skills of societal 
players in defending it. Nevertheless, the outcome is still open: it may be a 
success or a failure.  
There have been many criticisms of the government of President 
Mikheil Saakashvili, who came into power as a result of the Rose 
Revolution. The most important one relates to changing the constitution 
from an American-style separation of powers between parliament and the 
president, to a super-presidentialist system with a very weak parliament, 
which is quite typical of semi-authoritarian, post-Soviet countries. There 
are other reasons for concern: many actions of the new government – which 
it has justified on the grounds of fighting corruption – have been rather 
dubious from the position of the rule of law; judges have rarely dared to 
contradict prosecutors; the political opposition has become extremely 
weak; the media has become strangely tame on many subjects; and NGOs 
have become less assertive. The government may not be responsible for all 
these developments and the new government is certainly not a dictatorship 
– Georgia is still a pluralistic country. But the picture so far does not 
correspond to a triumph of democracy. Moreover, if we specifically 
measure civil freedoms and democratic balance, any progress as compared 
with Shevardnadze’s regime is far from evident.  
A cynical assessment is that the new government is made up of a 
bunch of clever demagogues who skilfully manipulated popular discontent 
with the old government and used it for capturing power. Further, this 
government will have learned lessons from the demise of former President 
Shevardnadze and will not tolerate the level of democratic freedoms that THE DYNAMICS AND SUSTAINABILITY OF THE ROSE REVOLUTION | 45 
 
even he accepted, because they appreciate how dangerous it is. They know 
which levers they used in order to bring him down and will not allow 
others to do the same.  
Another pessimistic assessment is that the Rose Revolution 
demonstrated that Georgia is in a cycle of non-constitutional transfer of 
power: the previous President, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, was also forced out 
of office. So, it seems as though Georgia is becoming a kind of banana 
republic, in which every leader is accused of authoritarianism only to be 
removed through a ‘revolution’ and replaced with another leader who 
recreates the authoritarian system in a somewhat different style.  
These concerns are legitimate and negative scenarios are worth 
considering. About a year and a half of experience with the new 
government allows us to observe that the new political regime is again a 
mixture of democratic and authoritarian elements. The same could be said 
of the two previous political regimes of Messrs Gamsakhurdia and 
Shevardnadze. Georgia has yet to develop stable and democratic political 
institutions. All of these leaders came to power as democratic 
representatives and were later accused of authoritarianism. This repetition 
begs the question of whether there is some structural problem at work.  
But that is not to say that nothing has changed and the Rose 
Revolution is just another turn in a vicious circle of unstable Georgian 
institutions. Changes do occur. To state the most obvious, the previous 
revolution (which was also called a rebellion for democracy) was a bloody 
enterprise that led to a situation of anarchy and dismemberment of the 
country. The Rose Revolution was peaceful; the new order has quickly 
consolidated and led to a strengthened rather than weakened state.  
The main issue here is that traditional approaches to democratisation 
take stateness and nationhood for granted, and focus on democratic 
institutions per se. Even if such an approach was justified in other cases 
(which can possibly be challenged), it is conspicuously inappropriate for a 
country like Georgia, where most basic tasks of state- and nation-building 
are incomplete. Therefore, democracy-building can only be sensibly 
discussed against the backdrop of, and in conjunction with, those of nation-
building and state-building. 
For the rest of the world, and the majority of the Georgian people, the 
main problem with Georgia has been that it has not been democratic 
enough: it has been a ‘failing state’ or – in a kinder formulation – a ‘weak 
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to who is part of the Georgian political nation – noting the separatist 
regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. There was also the bizarre semi-
separatist case of Ajaria, and – as many have feared – potential separatist 
communities of Armenian and Azeri minorities, most of whom do not 
speak Georgian, the only official language of the country. Other indicators 
of state weakness have been the difficulties the state has had in controlling 
violence, the extremely high level of corruption and the prevalence of the 
shadow economy (both of which imply the utter disconnect between the 
citizen and the state), the very low level of public revenues, etc. Even 
within the post-Soviet space, in which the problem of state weakness is 
widespread, Georgia can be especially singled out (probably second only to 
Tajikistan in weakness indicators).  
Mr Shevardnadze’s government presided over a very weak state 
indeed. It is notable that in the early 1990s he made important progress in 
this area – he turned Georgia from a failed state into a weak one.7 In the last 
years of his presidency, however, it became clear that his capabilities were 
limited. He appeared able to maintain his political survival, but not to 
achieve anything. Arguably, this sense of political impotence led to his 
near-total loss of credibility among the people. Georgians wanted the new 
government to be functional and specifically to work for the public, and 
this is what the people expected.  
Those of a democratic disposition do not like to speak of the strength 
of the state as a positive value, because they are afraid that a strong state 
may be repressive. They are also reluctant to play the game of autocrats, 
because autocrats use the idea of a strong state as an excuse for anti-
democratic tactics. Whether we (democrats) like it or not, in a logical 
sequence of tasks, state- and nation-building precede the creation of 
democratic institutions. In other words, there can be no democratic 
institutions unless there is some sort of functional state and some basic 
consensus as to whose state it is (that is, who represents the nation or 
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political community behind it). Yet there can also be an undemocratic 
state.8  
When President Saakashvili’s government speaks of its achievements 
– and it has genuine, important achievements – these are predominantly 
about nation- and state-building. The new government solved the problem 
of Ajarian semi-separatism, apparently for good. It has dramatically 
increased public revenues. For the first time in the history of independent 
Georgia, the government has started paying salaries to public servants (not 
all of them yet, but the first steps have been taken). Corruption is still rife, 
of course, but there has been success in fighting it in some key areas (such 
as the police force). The government has launched some ambitious projects 
to improve public infrastructure, for example building roads. It has started 
to formulate a more inclusive notion of what the Georgian nation is – 
which is important for a country with a diverse population. It has changed 
the symbols of state and made Georgia much more popular. When Mr 
Saakashvili lists his accomplishments (which he loves doing) he never 
forgets to add that the Georgian people have begun to love their national 
hymn and can actually sing it – and he is right to be proud of this. A cynical 
attitude towards the state (and the public sphere in general) has been part 
of Georgia’s mentality, and shifting this attitude has to be the government’s 
priority.  
Whether the new government’s efforts to build a stronger state are 
sustainable is up for discussion, but that is not the point here. The issue 
here is that it has clearly made state-building its priority. Is that right or 
w r o n g ?  I t  c a n  b e  a r g u e d  t h a t  i t  i s  r i g h t .  Y e t  h e r e  i s  t h e  p a r a d o x :  i f  a  
notoriously weak state is the starting point, then developing the state is the 
necessary precondition for creating functional democratic institutions. On 
the other hand, can strengthening the state occur without a relative 
weakening of those institutions that create the necessary balance of power?  
There is discussion that the media or civil society organisations have 
become weaker in Georgia. This trend can, however, be considered from 
another point of view: Georgian civil society has appeared strong in 
contrast with a very weak, ineffective state. Dealing with a strong state sets 
                                                      
8 Francis Fukuyama argues convincingly as to why state-building is important in 
State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century, Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2004. 48 | GHIA NODIA 
 
higher standards. Perhaps strengthening the state did not weaken civil 
society – rather it exposed its pre-existing frailty.   
The new elites and new confidence  
Another criterion by which the Rose Revolution can be identified as an 
authentic one is that it brought a new elite to power. Let us call this the 
‘Pareto criterion’. Some time around 2000, Shalva Ramishvili, owner of the 
television station (202) that created a series of satirical cartoons about 
former President Shevardnadze, said in one public gathering that he 
wanted the new president of Georgia to know English and computers. This 
qualification was often used in job advertisements and became a metaphor 
for the skills required for jobs in the organisations and businesses that were 
created after independence. The new elite that came to power can be 
metaphorically described as those who speak English and work with 
computers. These are individuals who were largely socialised after 
independence and do not have links to the Soviet past – when the 
communist system began to dismantle, they were university students at 
best. On the other hand, these are persons whose social advancement is in 
one way or another linked to the skills acquired for contacts with Western 
institutions: they have either been educated in the West or travelled there 
extensively, worked in international organisations or Western-funded 
NGOs, or run Western-style businesses. They represent a contrast to Mr 
Shevardnadze’s crowd, or at least those who stayed with him to the very 
end: many of the Shevardnadze regime might have also been young, but 
their social advancement was based on participation in local rather than 
international networks.  
The view that the revolution brought new elites to power somewhat 
conceals the fact that the most prominent leaders of the revolution had 
started their political careers under former President Shevardnadze and 
were known as part of the ‘reformist wing’ within the government. So, it is 
sometimes argued that the revolution did not bring a change of the elite; on 
the contrary, some members of the new government simply came on board 
from the ranks of the opposition. This assertion is formally true, as Mr 
Shevardnadze had indeed promoted individuals who later deposed him. 
Nevertheless, he never allowed ‘the reformers’ to play a central role: he 
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point, however, is not a political biography of the leaders, but the attitudes 
of different social networks.  
Mr Shevardnadze’s outlook – and that of many people around him – 
was partly defined by an extreme scepticism of Georgia’s ability to be a real 
state, and especially of the capacity of the Georgian people to create such a 
state. They were used to the idea that Georgians are essentially parasitic 
creatures who can take advantage of some system of order and find their 
own niche within it, but some external actor is necessary to take care of the 
general framework. Georgia had to have a powerful patron. One could call 
this a ‘post-colonial mentality’. While Mr Shevardnadze had lived most of 
his life in a Georgia that was part of the former Soviet Union, he might 
have lived comfortably under Russian patronage. But political 
circumstances pushed him towards patronage by the West and the US in 
particular. He understood his political role primarily as securing favours 
from this patron, and being ready to pay the patron with loyalty. The goal 
of this relationship was survival: survival of Georgia as a state and survival 
of the Shevardnadze regime. For instance, to the former president, building 
the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline was the project of a lifetime, because the 
pipeline would link the interests of Georgia’s patron (the US) to itself. But 
he did not appear to believe that Georgia could be transformed into a 
Western-style country. Rather his aim was related to being a good client to 
a patron, by providing territory for the transit of oil. He neither believed 
that Georgia could become like its patron nor relate to it as an equal.   
The attitude to corruption – the defining slogans of the Rose 
Revolution (‘Georgia without Shevardnadze’ and ‘Georgia without 
corruption’ were used interchangeably) – followed from this. As a young 
man in early 1970s, he tried to fight corruption (which is how he started his 
career as a communist leader in Georgia). Perhaps he believed he could 
achieve something. He failed, however, and probably gave up on this 
objective. He was not a corrupt person, as even opponents such as 
President Saakashvili would say, but he thought corruption was endemic 
in Georgia and had to be manipulated to sustain power. 
The new generation is more Westernised and more confident about 
Westernising Georgia in general. It is not enough for them to ensure the 
survival of the country, they want to change it – they are modernisers. They 
belong to the paradigm of the Young Turks. They sincerely believe that 
Georgia can become a Western country at least in the sense that post-
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can happen soon. They are impatient. Yet a vigorous effort is needed. They 
call it ‘political will’. This distinction is the main one they ascribe to the 
new government as compared with the old one: Mr Shevardnadze’s crowd 
did not have the political will to achieve anything, they simply wanted to 
retain power; the new government has political will and they want to 
achieve something. Where Mr Shevardnadze was process-oriented, the 
new government is results-oriented. For Mr Shevardnadze, the political 
process was about balancing different interests against each other and 
making sure he maintained the position of final arbiter. For the new crowd, 
the political process is about a continual fight for their own agenda and the 
mobilisation of resources for overcoming the resistance that their agenda 
generates. 
Although they have general confidence in Georgia and the Georgian 
people, they also think that at present the Georgian people are ailing – 
because of the heritage of Soviet traditions and, prior to that, life in the 
Russian Empire. Prejudicial and corrupt practices rooted in that past are 
expressions of the ailment. Therefore, the young, motivated and 
progressive elite believe the ailment can be cured with harsh, unpleasant 
measures. Revolution did not end in toppling former President 
Shevardnadze – it continues as a more profound revolution about fighting 
those deeply entrenched social practices (‘corruption’ is just a code name 
for them) that Mr Shevardnadze personified. Nobody uses the term 
‘cultural revolution’ for describing this agenda, but in the end, that’s what 
it is.  
The model for development is of course the West. Nevertheless, the 
new elites are less subservient towards the West. Because they consider 
themselves Western and Georgia as an essentially Western country, the 
new elites are also more confident about arguing with Westerners about 
what ‘Western’ entails. They are cheeky. President Shevardnadze felt 
comfortable about cheating the West – making promises and breaking them 
(every client cheats on a patron when the latter is looking the other way) or 
looking for excuses in his weakness, but he would not dare to argue with 
Westerners on essential issues. The new government may of course play 
the old tricks as well. Yet when Mr Saakashvili took issue with the 
statement made by Secretary-General of the Council of Europe Walter 
Schwimmer, the president did not say that Mr Schwimmer was 
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something an old-style leader would have done. Instead he implied that Mr 
Schwimmer was not a good European.  
At least two inferences follow from all this. The main result of the 
Rose Revolution may be that Georgia has new confidence and holds itself 
to a higher standard. The very fact that the revolution occurred, that the 
Georgian people could accomplish it in such good style, helped to 
overcome the loser syndrome that Georgians had had after the wars and 
turmoil of the early 1990s and the mess that followed. But it also means that 
Georgian citizens hold themselves and their government to higher 
standards. The young and activist government that is happy to continue to 
raise expectations (which are often unrealistic) even after coming into 
power also encourages people to demand more from their government. 
High expectations are of course dangerous and may prove destabilising in 
the long run. But they also create motivation for achievement.  
Authoritarian modernisation and external European constraints   
The agenda of fast modernisation with its built-in tasks of cultural 
revolution, in combination with a weak civil society (including the political 
opposition) and the absence of any social players who are strong enough to 
counterbalance the activist government, also look like a recipe for 
authoritarianism. There are many historical precedents of autocratic 
modernisers, particularly in Georgia’s neighbourhood (both to the north 
and south), and some of these have been less successful than others. What 
elements or actors can serve as constraints?  
A ‘real’ consolidated democracy involves a system of separations (not 
just in terms of the separation of power) and then a balancing among the 
separate branches and actors.9 Unless such a system exists – and its creation 
takes time – there can be no strong guarantees that a government will be 
restrained. Therefore, until such time as this is in place, there will always be 
a fertile ground for authoritarianism. As the aftermath of the Rose 
Revolution has shown, Georgia still lacks independent social actors who 
are strong enough to effectively stand up to an activist and motivated 
government. There is already a social experience of collective mobilisation 
against an autocratic government, if that government trespasses some line 
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that is hard to define but nevertheless exists. Georgian liberal elites, a.k.a. 
‘civil society’, also gained some skills in defending their rights or privileges. 
Although this is much better than nothing, it may not be sufficient in itself.  
Against this backdrop, the Georgian project of unilateral integration 
with the EU may be serving as the strongest constraint against an 
inherently authoritarian trend of accelerated modernisation. By erecting the 
flag of the EU on his inauguration day and proclaiming that joining the EU 
(and NATO, of course) is the government’s most strategic goal, Mr 
Saakashvili offered the EU a very strong restraining power against his own 
authoritarian instincts. It is up to the EU to use this constraining power 
skilfully.  
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THE ORANGE REVOLUTION: 
EXPLAINING THE UNEXPECTED 
HRYHORIY NEMYRIA 
Very few experts predicted Ukraine’s Orange Revolution. Nonetheless the 
unexpected happened. Therefore the first question to ask is: What are the 
underlying sources and causes of Ukraine's breakthrough to democracy? The 
answer would bring us to a more vital question of how does one sustain 
healthy domestic political change. We then try to assess the potential of a 
wider impact of the Orange Revolution which has to do not just with 
Ukraine's immediate neighbours but also relates to the phenomena of 
overlapping integration spaces,1 including partnership and cooperation with 
the European Union, the Euro-Atlantic agenda and developments within the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). 
It is clear that there was no single cause that triggered the Orange 
Revolution. It came as a result of interaction between various factors, the most 
important being the role of civil society, national identity, the nature of 
political institutions and modes of external pressures. 
Needless to say, it would be misleading to concentrate only on the 
political process before and during the presidential elections in 2004. There are 
different ways to explain the revolution depending on how deep one wants to 
dig. I would suggest that there were three distinctive periods in the genesis of 
the Orange Revolution: i) 1991-2001: maturation, ii) 2002-03: incubation, and 
iii) 2004: breakthrough. Basically these 14 years since the break-up of the 
Soviet Union and Ukraine's newly obtained independence [from above] 
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witnessed a very gradual and uneven process of growing differentiation in the 
initially rather homogeneous post-Soviet space which was best [described at 
the beginning as a ‘legacy paradigm’.] 
Let us not forget that most of the activists of the PORA civic campaign 
(the avant-garde of Ukraine’s democratic revolution)  and similar networks are 
only 18-20 years old. Born after 1985, all of them in fact are children of 
perestroika and independence. 
As Linz and Stepan put it, “civil society by itself can destroy a non-
democratic regime, but democratic consolidation must involve political 
society”.2 It is true. It seems to be equally important, however to constructively 
engage civil society after revolution to ensure the sustainability of democratic 
change. A slogan establishing an open and just society can acquire a 
normative power. The challenge of separating legitimate private and public 
interests is the other important task for the new government especially when 
it deals with the issue of property rights. 
A defining element of the external framework throughout this period 
has been the absence of any strong economic, political or security anchor that 
would firmly connect Ukraine with the West. In other words, EU and NATO 
enlargements, which have proven to be immensely successful foreign policy 
and security instruments with democratic and all other kinds of 
conditionality attached, did not extend to Ukraine. OSCE and the Council of 
Europe (1995) memberships did play some role, but they were not sufficiently 
compelling to decisively influence the process. The bilateral framework was 
even less efficient, the notable exception being Ukraine’s relations with the 
United States, which had relatively stronger leverage. Furthermore it is worth 
recalling that the dominant focus of the outside actors dealing with Ukraine in 
1991-94 was not on democratisation but rather on de-nuclearisation (given that 
the country possesses the third largest nuclear arsenal in the world!). 
Compensatory surrogates such as the Commonwealth of Independent 
States and its satellite structures, which were designed initially to ensure a 
civilised divorce of the former Soviet republics and eventually assigned by the 
Russian Federation – as an aspiring hegemonic power – increasingly (re-) 
integrative functions, were ill-born, overloaded with institutions and not 
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attractive for Ukraine. Of course, it was unthinkable to expect these 
institutions to become agents of promotion of human rights and democratic 
freedoms in the newly independent states. On a bilateral level Russia did play 
a stronger role due to, first of all, Ukraine's energy dependency. It was during 
this period of time that Russia developed the main elements of its policy 
towards Ukraine as a ‘low-hanging fruit’. This policy finally collapsed in 2004, 
when the Kremlin even tried to shake the tree in a desperate effort to get (o) 
Orange. 
Ukraine’s unfinished departure from the USSR in the early 1990s 
produced an extremely unhealthy continuity of the elites. The Ukrainian 
leadership became a strange mixture of old nomenklatura and red directors with 
a twist of national democrats and oligarchs. This marriage of apparatchiks and 
dissidents gave birth to the Ukrainian independent state. The old system was 
destroyed from the top before the civil society became strong enough to 
challenge the system from below. It took some time for it to grow up and 
develop a taste for democracy.3 
Legacies of the past – periphery of empires, ‘junior brother’ complex, 
Soviet political culture, Chernobyl trauma – battled with some very 
meaningful achievements of the present – avoided ethnic violence, 
peacefully solved Crimean problem, liberal language policy and a 
strengthened civic component of national identity. A civil society with a 
growing potential for effective organisation and solidarity has emerged, as 
well as a previously unknown phenomenon of the young middle class 
willing and able to defend its interests. 
Outgoing President Kuchma's choice of Viktor Yanukovych, 
Ukraine's Prime Minister, as his successor was a move in support of the 
status-quo.  The foreign policy expression of the status quo  was the so-
called ‘multi-vector policy’, which was effectively a product of Kuchma's 
successful ‘milking two cows’ – the West and Russia – strategy. In his turn, 
the presidential candidate – to ensure his electoral victory – invented what 
might be called the ‘Yanukovych cocktail’, which consisted of three major 
ingredients: one, administrative resources; two, the harassment of NGOs, 
                                                      
3 See Hryhoriy Nemyria, “Ukraine and the European Union: A Fresh Start?”, in 
Joerg Forbrig and Robin Shepherd (eds), Ukraine after the Orange Revolution: 
Strengthening European and Transatlantic Commitments, German Marshall Fund of the 
United States and Heinrich Böll Foundation, and the HBS, 2005, pp. 33-48. 56 | HRYHORIY NEMYRIA 
 
the media and the opposition; and three – and this is where Putin comes 
in – Russia's shoulder. 
President Putin with his awkward gestures of premature recognition 
of Viktor Yanukovych overestimated the attractiveness of his own 
personality and the weight of the Russia's shoulder for Ukrainian voters. 
And, even more importantly, he heavily underestimated two other factors: 
the ability of the West – the EU and the United States – to respond with one 
voice, quickly and coherently and, last but not least, the maturity of 
Ukrainian civil society.4 Not incidentally, the Ukrainian Orange Revolution 
gave a new push for a civil society concept that was about to become 
unfashionable. 
The deeper view could reveal further differences in the very fabric of 
the society. Firstly, neo-imperial feelings, fuelled by nostalgia, are absent in 
Ukraine, while in the Russian Federation those sentiments remain a crucial 
part of Putin’s nation-building project, as well as the domination of Russia 
in its ‘near abroad’. Secondly, Ukraine does not engage in the security 
versus democracy discourse, heated by the Chechnya syndrome. 
Democratic values have never been sacrificed in the minds of Ukrainians to 
the artificially securitised political agenda of the state. Thirdly, trust in political 
competition is much stronger in Ukraine. Unexpected results of the 
Parliamentary elections of 2002 were an early indicator of the existence of the 
democratic opposition able to exercise leadership. A united societal response to 
the ‘Tuzla crisis’, the passion and scope of the people’s movement known as 
‘Ukraine without Kuchma’ and the tragic ‘Gongadze case’ have all been signs 
of the healthy developments, strengthened national identity and growing 
solidarity within Ukraine's civil society. 
Ukraine was the only post-Soviet country where the referendum 
initiated by the incumbent and designed to be used as a pseudo-democratic 
tool to strengthen the president's powers failed to be implemented. It indicates 
that a deeper change occurred in the nature of political institutions and new 
democratic practices which in the end contributed to a peaceful, non-violent 
character of the regime change in Ukraine. Real political competition with 
strong opposition and relevant maturity of – otherwise still fragile – 
                                                      
4 Civil society successfully passed in 1991-2000 the stage of imitation which is 
common in both colonial and transitional states. See Sudipta Kaviraj, “ln Search of 
Civil Society”, in Sudipta Kaviraj and Sunil Khilnani (eds), Civil Society: History and 
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institutions, most notably the Parliament and, as it became evident in the 
crucial moment of political crisis, the Supreme Court, are all examples in sharp 
contrast to the managed democracy machinery and autocratic practices in 
Russia. One could also add to the list the different roles that ‘siloviki’ – army, 
police and, especially, security forces – have chosen to play in Russia and 
Ukraine. 
Thus, Huntington's famous thesis has b ee n  d efe a t ed  o nc e  m or e :  thi s 
time – in Ukraine. It is not the clash of civilisations that matters. It is rather the 
clash of misperceptions. While the European debate on Turkey was centred 
around the concern that it was "too big, too poor and too Muslim to 
integrate", Ukraine's problem was its image of a country that is too big in the 
sense that Ukraine is larger in geography then France, and is the fifth largest 
country in Europe by population; too poor in the sense that GDP per capita is 
just slightly more than a third of the average of the ten new EU members; 
and, of course, too Soviet to elicit serious consideration of its chances of 
becoming part of the European Union. 
Not incidentally, therefore, until recently attitudes towards Ukraine's 
future ranged from those seeing in the country the potential for a ‘strategic 
partnership’, through those that thought about it in terms of a ‘buffer zone’, to 
outright indifference. Ukraine has occupied a firmly peripheral place in the 
mental map of the EU bureaucracy, which succumbed to ‘Ukraine's fatigue’. 
The European political mainstream, in general, became comfortably 
reconciled to the increasing institutionalisation of Ukraine's peripheral status 
as a country ‘muddling through’ on the margin's of Europe. 
The Orange Revolution undermined this pattern of thinking, which is 
now totally irrelevant. While still big and still relevantly poor, Ukraine is not 
Soviet anymore. Furthermore it generates healthy dynamism able to 
reinvigorate not just itself, and neighbouring Belarus and Russia, but also a 
broader Black Sea region and former Soviet space in general. This is the real 
strategic meaning of the Orange Revolution.5 One of the unintended 
consequences might be an eventual change in philosophy and modification of 
the instruments of the EU European Neighbourhood Policy. Old labels that 
resonate with old geography should not prevent us from doing innovative 
                                                      
5 See Ronald D. Asmus, “Redrawing (Again) the Map of Europe: A Strategy for 
Integrating Ukraine into the West”, in Joerg Forbrig and Robin Shepherd (eds), op. cit, 
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work with new geographies taking into account the growing internal diversity 
of the region. 
The transformative power of the Orange Revolution should be fully 
utilised as there are evident links  between the new quality of democracy in 
Ukraine and the necessary quality of the bilateral and regional cooperation that 
could have a decisive impact on the quality of regional security at large. Progress 
in solving the Transdnistrian conflict with a new contribution from Ukraine is 
the first test down the road. 
The new Ukrainian government will need to strengthen the social drive 
and momentum of healthy domestic political change. Towards those ends, it 
must undertake a sustained effort to further the rule of law, fight corruption 
and speed up the modernisation of the economy in parallel with the painful 
overhaul of the government and the uncertain pace of the Constitutional 
reform in the year of upcoming parliamentary elections. 
The formula of integrating into the EU and NATO and forming a 
strategic partnership with Russia will be the centrepiece of Ukraine's foreign 
policy strategy. This long-awaited final abandoning of Ukraine's 
counterproductive ‘multi-vector’ foreign and security policy will require the 
elaboration of active and consistent policies, based on the fresh ideas, both 
towards the EU, the Euro-Atlantic community and the Russian Federation. 
Ukraine lies at the intersection of overlapping, complementary and 
frequently conflicting interests of the EU (soft security/Russia, energy 
security, ‘ring of friends’ stable neighbourhood), the US (global interests, 
partnership in fight against terrorism, strategic corridor to the Greater Black 
Sea area and further to the Greater Middle East) and Russia (crucial part of its 
‘near abroad’ domain and Putin's nation-building project and therefore his 
own legitimacy inside Russia, and last but not least a comfortable destination 
for the expansion of the Russian shadow capital). That is why, the major 
challenge for the West, Ukraine and Russia is to successfully manage the 
overlapping integration spaces, which involve 1) the EU and NATO, 2) Russia, 
the CIS and the Single Economic Space and 3) the re-defined Black Sea region. 
The coming two to three years will be critical for the long-term positioning of 
Ukraine and the sustainability of its democratic breakthrough. 
One of the by-products of the Orange Revolution was an effectively 
seized opportunity by the ‘core’ EU countries, the United States and the new 
EU members to contribute to the joint efforts of the improvement of the 
transatlantic relations. In this way, it has already helped a little bit to 
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helped the EU to exercise its ‘soft power’ in a timely, inclusive and effective 
manner. It was the EU that finally played the leading role in the international 
mediation of Ukraine's political crisis in concert with other legitimate actors, 
including the OSCE, the United States, Poland, Lithuania and, reluctantly 
Russia. Actually, it was one of the very rare successes of the EU common 
foreign policy. 
Paradoxically, it is a new post-revolutionary Ukraine that is better 
positioned than any other country in the region to contribute to a much-
needed constructive rethinking of the EU’s approach towards Putin's Russia as 
a country that increasingly speaks and behaves with a neo-authoritarian 
accent. For a long time, Ukraine has been perceived, especially by France and 
Germany, as a negative, rather then positive factor in the EU’s vision of Russia 
and its place in Europe. The negativism is partially due to the rightfully failed 
haphazard efforts of the Ukrainian leadership in the early 1990s to position 
Ukraine as a bulwark of the West against Russia. Also this has to do with the 
predominant perception of Russia in the West as a country that is too close to 
neglect and too nuclear and too oil-and-gas-reached to irritate. 
Therefore, in the new environment of the positive and peaceful domestic 
political change, Ukraine has every chance to re-gain a value-added 
recognition as a constructive, rather then destructive factor in fine-tuning the 
pan-European vision and strategy towards Russia. In this sense, the best 
formula for developing the bilateral Ukrainian-Russian relationship of 
strategic partnership could be ‘democratic, prosperous Ukraine and great 
Russia’, as long as the ‘greatness’ does not include a veto power on the foreign 
policy choice of the neighbours. Obviously, under such conditions, the 
Ukrainian-Russian relationship will become a natural complementary factor, if 
not an element, of the strategic partnership between the EU and Russia for the 
next decade. For the future progress of Europe, an indispensable condition 
will be the closest possible degree of cooperation between Ukraine and Russia. 
Successful renewal of the Ukrainian-Russian cooperation would be very much 
in the national interests of Ukraine, Russia, as well as France and Germany. 
Failure would be a disaster for Ukraine and the EU, and a catastrophe for 
Russia. 
And of course, this new Ukraine-Russia relationship is a step towards a 
new start in the Ukrainian-EU relationship. When there is a lack of internal 
dynamics in bilateral relations, catalytic events such as the Orange Revolution 
and, sometimes, personalities may either reduce or increase the prospects of 
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It was evident from the very beginning that the EU was reluctant to 
formulate a detailed position towards Ukraine, which would be either too 
promising or too rigid and restrict the room for manoeuvre in the future. On 
the other hand, paradoxically, it met the interests of Ukraine, which has 
repeatedly suffered from asking for far too much. It has been dangerous not 
only politically, but also psychologically. Normally, the possibility of any 
country outside the European Union to influence EU decisions and actions is 
very limited. If the problem cannot be solved now, the solution should be 
postponed. With additional efforts, conditions for its solution in the future 
should be created, and if possible, on better terms and at the right time. It 
seems that the Ukrainian Orange Revolution is creating such conditions for 
deepening relationships. It calls for a more pro-active EU role in the 
institutional consolidation of the democratic change in Ukraine. 
In any event, one should not neglect the role of the emerging new 
regional environment. What could be the function and consequences of 
applying the instrument of reinforced regional cooperation within the 
European Neighbourhood? 
Encouragement for reinforced regional cooperation is constantly and 
rightfully emphasised by the EU within the Northern Dimension, the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership, and, especially, the Stabilisation and Association 
process for Balkan countries. Elements o f  s u c h  a n  a p p r o a c h  e x i s t  i n  t h e  
European Neighbourhood Policy. 
In general, while justified as an instrument for achieving stability, 
growth and security, this principle may have its unintended consequences 
if applied in practice in different regions. For example, for the Western 
Balkan countries, this instrument, together with the prospects of accession to 
the EU, has a critically important function in providing the only exit from the 
chaos of wars and conflicts of the end of the 20th century. However, if the field 
of its application in Eastern Europe were to be limited to three countries 
(Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova) or defined by the formula ‘3+1 (Russia)’, then, 
given the current differences in geo-strategic orientations and foreign policy 
objectives of these countries and an absence of the prospect of accession to the 
EU for Ukraine and Moldova, it will contribute to the preservation of the 
status quo and the familiar set of problems arising from the lack of 
systemic political and economic reforms in the region and the lack of self-
sustainable momentum for democratic change inside Russia. 
How then will two dominating and overlapping dynamics – the 
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Common European Economic Space will not require full incorporation of the 
acquis communautaire. The Eurasian Economic Community, to which Ukraine 
has been intensively invited by Russia, already has its own acquis, which has 
not much in common with the acquis communautaire. 
The Single Economic Space (SES), the same as the CIS, can hardly be 
considered an entity that will facilitate the europeanisation of Ukraine, 
Moldova, Georgia or Armenia in the same sense that the EU has facilitated 
modernisation of Spain, Portugal and Ireland and is facilitating modernisation 
of the countries from Central and Eastern Europe. It is worth recalling, that 
Spain and Portugal became really good neighbours only after they both joined 
the EU. Apparently, Eurasian integration, contrary to the European variant, 
does not require compliance with democratic values as a pre-condition for 
participation in the process. Not incidentally, there was not reference to 
democratic values in the Agreement on the Single Economic Space (Russia, 
Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine) signed in Yalta in September 2003. 
Furthermore while in post-revolution Ukraine, ‘europeanisation’, 
‘modernisation’ and ‘European and Euro-Atlantic integration’ are 
synonymous, it is not the case in Russia, which is keen to look for a ‘special’, 
‘unique’ type of modernisation. 
That is why a narrow approach should be avoided. All available formats 
of multilateral regional cooperation should be explored, including the ‘4+1’ 
mechanism (Visegrad countries and Ukraine), reinvented GUAM (Georgia, 
Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova), Black Sea Economic Cooperation and 
others, including trilateral arrangements (Ukraine-Moldova-Romania or 
Poland-Ukraine-Lithuania, etc.). It should be emphasised in each case that it 
is regional cooperation and transborder relations within European 
regions that are the instruments, complementing European integration but 
not acting as a substitute for it. 
Among the developments inside Ukraine that may have the largest 
impact regionally are the dynamics of judicial and legal reform, and, certainly, 
Constitutional reform (decentralisation, the election of governors, rebalancing 
the powers with the weakening of the previously almighty presidency and 
strengthening the legislature and political parties). If successful, it will 
generate a new democratic pattern – as an important institutional antidote to 
the otherwise dominant pattern of strengthening the president's powers at the 
expense of the legislature and regional governments coupled with the crying 
lack of the independent court system. 62 | HRYHORIY NEMYRIA 
 
Finally, revolution in the media – strengthening its independence and 
professionalism – is an equally important point of reference for the region, 
particularly for such a large population of a young people. 
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QUID RUSSIAN DEMOCRACY? 
NICOLAY PETROV 
The year 2004 was marked by a whole set of failures by President Vladimir 
Putin’s regime. Continuation of the anti-federal reform, electoral reform 
and intensified pressure on civil society should be mentioned in this 
respect. It was the first year of a purely Putin political regime and one that 
has proven it to be extremely ineffective.  
Nevertheless, during the period from late 2004 to early 2005, the 
Orange Revolution in Ukraine and the mass protest movement caused by 
the monetary reform gave room for much more optimism with regard to 
the prospects of democracy in Russia. Although the glass is still “half full 
and leaking” to use Michael McFaul’s image,1 the end of the leaking is 
clearly in sight because the glass will either be repaired or replaced in a 
relatively short while. 
Since last January, the idea of extreme passivism on the part of the 
Russian public as a whole and especially among the youth is over, as well 
as the notion of stagnation under Mr Putin with absolute certainty and 
predictability. 
Russian democracy is in better shape than one could imagine if 
looking from the outside at what has been going on in the country over the 
last few years. Indeed, Mr Putin has weakened all the democratic 
institutions except for the presidency, and last year brought further 
changes in the direction of authoritarianism. Thus the evaluation by 
                                                      
1 See the article by M. McFaul, “Russia’s Glass is Half Full and Leaking”, Radio 
Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 15 March, 2001 (retrieved from http://www.rferl.org/ 
specials/russianelection/article/2004/3/BB502CAD-7235-455C-99E3-
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Freedom House reflects the grim state of democracy in Russia. There are, 
however, at least three reasons to be more optimistic with regard to the 
future of Russian democracy: 1) the regions, which in some cases are much 
more democratic than the centre; 2) Russia’s youth, who are much more 
active and interested in keeping and promoting democracy than has until 
recently been recognised – indeed, experts are underestimating the impact 
of the whole shift of the voters’ generation, which has been taking place 
since the late 1980s;2 and finally, as explained below, 3) the machinery of 
managed-democracy (MD). 
Managed democracy in contemporary Russia 
The managed democracy developed in President Putin’s Russia is a 
complex echeloned system, which makes it possible for the authorities to 
avoid the outright control of society while maintaining the vision of 
democratic procedures. In this context, it is possible to speak of a triple 
control system, consisting of control over actors, institutions and the rules 
of the game. The basic MD elements are:  
•  a strong presidential system of state management along with the 
weakening of all other institutions, including both houses of 
parliament, the judiciary, business and regional elites; 
•  state control over the media, which is used in order to mete out 
information in doses, and to shape and govern public opinion; and  
•  control over elections, which converts them from being a tool to 
express the will of the people into a means of legitimising the 
decisions made by the elites. 
Weakened institutions can no longer fulfil their functions in the 
system and are being replaced by substitutes that are absolutely dependent 
on the president and do not have an independent foundation. The resulting 
reductionist system is lacking in flexibility with regard to a changing 
environment and the capability for self-development.  
Managing democracy in elections is the most technically refined and 
considered ingredient of the MD model. It includes an electoral system 
strewn with mines,3 forbiddingly high thresholds for participation, the 
                                                      
2 The first post-Soviet generation will be eligible to vote in the 2007-08 elections. 
3 The mines buried in the system (which can be set off discriminately) are the 
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possibility to identify/select the candidates, mechanisms of control for 
sticking to the rules, along with the tracking of violations and operative 
reactions by election commissions that are controlled by the centre, by law 
enforcement agencies and by courts – all in one process.  
As MD applied in elections is followed by MD afterwards, which is 
key to understanding the overall (in)effectiveness of electoral MD, its 
purpose is geared more towards preventing negative results than 
generating positive ones – if only to circumvent any unaffordable options. 
The recent gubernatorial elections are a case in point, where the victory for 
the Kremlin was not necessarily connected with any particular candidate 
that it backed. The Kremlin’s strategy does not have to be linear and is thus 
more flexible, suppressing different options except perhaps one or two in 
particular. Thus, when experts draw conclusions based on pre-MD logics 
such as a ‘win-lose’ game, they can be mistaken. 
Negative selection by President Putin is, generally speaking, cheaper 
than its positive counterpart (that is, cheaper for those who manage the 
situation – not for society), although more damaging because it eliminates 
competition as such, instead of providing even the artificial benefits of 
competition. 
The technical/procedural side of elections and their meaning/role 
connected with the importance of elective offices and the influence of 
elections over the further development of a country work together. In 
Russia’s case, the gap between the two is increasing, which makes elections 
far more vulnerable to general political development than the object of 
procedural improvements.  
                                                                                                                                       
property holdings by candidates, the declaring of the volume and technicalities of 
campaign financing and the rules of agitation. By way of illustration, there is a 
sideshow at Petrodvorets in the outskirts of Saint Petersburg, where children run 
around a paved area. A jet of water can spurt up anytime under any of the bricks, 
yet nobody knows when or where. An old man sits aside unnoticed, knowingly 
switching on this or that fountain jet from time to time. Something similar is going 
on with the electoral mines mentioned above: the rules are established in such a 
way that each candidate inevitably violates them here or there. The authorities can 
turn a blind eye towards these violations, but anytime they are ready to punish a 
disagreeable candidate they can do so absolutely legally. Thus, it is about the 
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In situations where voting occurs more or less freely – which does 
exist in a lot of regions – elections look like a balanced system with all the 
elements interconnected. A kind of ‘law of conservation’ (developed as a 
corollary to Newton’s second law of motion) has taken hold in the 
background of democratic procedures and institutions that had become 
relatively well developed during the last decade. Accordingly, the act of 
managing democracy results in negative side-effects for the authorities. 
With regard to elections, these effects involve growing protest sentiment 
and actions in the form of absenteeism, negativism and voting for protest 
forces.  
The basic MD conflict, between the predetermined results of elections 
and keeping their democratic decorum is unsolvable. It makes the MD 
system unstable and its transformation towards either management or 
democracy inevitable. In other words, to improve the MD model (which 
has shown itself to be insufficient), authorities need to add either more 
manageability or more democracy. 
Managing democracy from a single centre with almost no 
differentiation by region provokes a rather different reaction across 
regional societies, which can lead to desirable consequences in some cases 
and undesirable ones in others. This facet leads to another serious 
contradiction in the MD model – the one between undivided authority and 
rigid centralism in management and the varying reactions of society, which 
differ a great deal along regional, ‘urban-rural’, ethnic, status and other 
lines. 
Further, there is a functional contradiction within the electoral MD 
model, which results from the fact that among the elites, the task of 
management is split along federal and regional as well as departmental 
lines. There are pronounced conflicts of interest between the different elite 
sections, with each one seeking to demonstrate its loyalty and effectiveness 
rather than achieve a common result. Moreover, the increased strength of 
the federal elite, including the greater presence of siloviki [‘men of force’]4 in 
the regions (who represent federal interests), has stimulated efforts by the 
regional elite; a confrontation within the MD system seems inevitable.  
                                                      
4 A silovik is a Russian politician from the old security or military services who 
have come into power through the teams of former President Boris Yeltsin or Mr 
Putin and tend to favour a statist ideology at the expense of individual rights and 
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The Russian federal elections of 2003-04 were the first held in the 
framework of a developed MD model and offer a broad impression of its 
general outlook and method of operation. Yet in that instance its 
capabilities were not fully demonstrated because the situation at the time 
was generally favourable for the party in power, which did not need to use 
all the levers and technological possibilities available under the MD 
framework. The overall result of this test can be summarised as follows: the 
MD model worked well but did not look so good. 
The MD has continuously been tried/tested in different elections and 
is capable of self-adjustment and self-improvement. The feedback 
mechanism works, which entails the ability to gather information about 
how a campaign is going and prompt an operative reaction if needed. As 
such, the MD model can be adjusted and modified while a campaign is 
underway. 
An MD system does not maintain itself. It requires hands-on 
management and constant intervention. Combining the disadvantages of 
both command and democratic systems, it needs a huge and complicated 
infrastructure for oversight. Otherwise, there is strong temptation for the 
medium-level elite to over-manage elections and manipulate existing 
opportunities in their favour. 
A reform to end all elections 
The second election reform under President Putin is practically complete. 
The president has signed the new law on electing State Duma deputies. In 
addition, a new set of amendments to a long list of laws related to elections 
has begun to move through the Duma. 
The essence of this reform is to distance citizens from real 
participation in the electoral process and, more broadly, from any kind of 
governmental decision-making. It will further reduce the amount of the 
feedback the authorities receive from the people and lead to the further 
centralisation of the political system. 
The first set of reforms a few years ago brought about the wholesale 
revision of election legislation in order to increase the Kremlin’s control 
over the electoral process. Now, the authorities have changed more than 
procedure. They have dismantled whole sections of the electoral system. 
The public no longer elects governors or – in the majority of instances – 
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A party now has to win at least 7% to make it into the Duma and 
parties cannot form electoral blocs. Along with last year’s changes to the 
law on political parties – which raised the minimum number of members to 
50,000 and requires parties to have organisations in at least half of the 
country’s regions – this change will allow the authorities to disqualify 
almost any political party on completely legal grounds. It has also become 
nearly impossible to hold a referendum, unless the government supports it. 
The institution of election observers has suffered a particularly heavy 
blow. Now, only observers from the parties participating in an election are 
allowed to watch the polls. Independent observers are not allowed at all. 
The Kremlin learned its lesson from recent revolutions and has tightened 
its control over elections at all levels, while not getting rid of them 
altogether. 
The so-called ‘technical improvements’ the authorities are making to 
the electoral system fall into two categories. First, the Kremlin is making it 
easier to disqualify undesirable candidates and parties by using biased 
courts and election commissions beholden to the centre. An example of this 
is the increasingly strict approach to the signatures needed to register a 
candidate. This was one of the ways the authorities got rid of candidates in 
the past, but now it has become even easier.  
Second, the Kremlin is trying to get rid of all the ways that voters can 
have a direct effect on elections, whether it is by voting with their feet and 
staying away from the polls or voting ‘against all’. It is merely a matter of 
time before they eliminate the against-all option, but even now, although it 
will still appear on ballots, it no longer functions as it once did. 
There are three main myths surrounding election reform. The first is 
that this reform has a direct connection to the troublesome presidential 
election in 2008 and that reform will kick in immediately before. The next 
myth is that election reform will increase the Kremlin’s control over 
political life and make democracy more manageable. Finally, the third 
myth is that the Kremlin is flexible and will adjust its plans as it goes, 
including possibly restoring certain democratic elements that had 
previously been eliminated. 
Yet election reform will have an immediate effect, not only on 
gubernatorial and mayoral elections and on referendums, all of which have 
been practically outlawed, but also on the seemingly distant State Duma 
elections coming up in 2007. The elimination of single-mandate districts 
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election in these districts. They will not depend on their governor or 
constituents to obtain a Duma seat. They will depend on the Kremlin. 
Refusing to allow smaller parties to form blocs is also a profoundly 
significant move. These blocs did very well against United Russia in 
regional legislative elections. 
One would think that managed democracy had thus become even 
more managed and even less democratic. The Kremlin seems to think that 
elections are only good for the opposition and that the fewer options 
available on the ballot, the better. Undoubtedly, democracy is not perfect, 
and direct election, as one of its most important institutions, is no 
exception. Nevertheless, Winston Churchill’s famous assertion that 
democracy was still better than anything humanity has managed to come 
up with applies not just to humanity in general, but also to the leaders in 
the Kremlin. They have done more than block all the possibilities for 
opposition members to take part in government decision-making. They 
have also plugged up all the outlets for the public to let off steam. The 
Kremlin is turning the political system into a pressure cooker. At the same 
time, the authorities continue to dismantle the last traces of the system that 
protect the public from the corrupt and incompetent. They keep turning up 
the heat underneath the cooker by instituting badly planned and badly 
executed reforms with unpredictable consequences. 
The re-democratisation myth springs from a recent statement by the 
president that it may be appropriate to adjust the system of appointing 
regional leaders by allowing the parties that won regional legislative 
elections to nominate candidates for governor. The president also called for 
broader rights for Duma factions.  
These elements of so-called ‘political liberalism’ that the president 
included in his annual state of the nation address are made utterly 
pointless by the election reform on the one hand, and on the other, without 
election reform they would not have been brought up by Mr Putin. In other 
words, first the Kremlin will build a fence keeping undesirables out of the 
Duma and regional legislatures, and only then will the government 
volunteer to expand the rights of those who are already on the inside. 
This would all be rather amusing, if it were not so terribly dangerous. 
The president’s approval rating continues to fall, and this is the only 
basis of political stability at the moment. It is a matter of life and death that 
the authorities increase the flexibility and stability of the political system by 
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communication with the public and break the giant monolith of vertical 
power into three flexibly connected ‘horizontal powers’ at the federal, 
regional and local levels.  
The Kremlin also needs to open Russia’s legislatures to the political 
opposition at all levels in order to send the energy of social protest flowing 
into parliamentary channels. It needs to shore up the democratic 
institutions that have been undermined by five years of the Putin regime. 
These institutions include the representative branch of government and the 
electoral process. Otherwise, the risk that the political system will collapse 
completely will become too great. 
The Kremlin, however, continues to roll mindlessly in precisely the 
opposite direction. Russia’s leaders keep throwing up new barriers barring 
opposition parties from the Duma. They have turned the elections that 
remain into a farce. 
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PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY IN BELARUS 
ULADZIMIR ROUDA 
Belarus is a country in which democratic revolution has not yet taken place, 
but this essay argues that its chances are rather high. This conclusion is 
related in some paradoxical way to one of the main shortcomings of 
Belarus at present in comparison with pre-revolutionary Georgia and 
Ukraine: the character of the current political regime in the country. A 
semi-sultanistic political system with its low level of institutionalisation, 
high fusion of the ‘public’ and ‘private’, and the concentration of all power 
in the hands of the head of state, leaves very limited opportunities for any 
other forms of democratic transition connected with reforms from above or 
bargaining by elites. As Larry Diamond has stressed, “when authoritarian 
rule has been highly personalistic and decadent…the real impetus for 
democratic change tends to originate outside of the regime in the 
mobilization of civil society”.1 The nature of the power – personal rather 
than organisational – makes it difficult for opponents within the regime to 
oust the ruler and also makes it unlikely that such opponents would exist 
in any significant numbers or the strength necessary for initiating reforms 
from above. In other words, the rapid transformation of President 
Alexander Lukashenka’s power into a neo-patrimonial one simultaneously 
portends its movement towards an inescapable collapse in the form of 
“replacement” in Samuel Huntington’s words or “ruptura” in Juan Linz’s 
definition of this phenomenon.2 
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The historical experience of other nations has demonstrated that 
tyrants can be replaced through coups d’etat, peoples’ uprisings, ‘stunning 
elections’ that are arranged and sponsored by the authoritarian rulers but 
which lead to their defeat, and a combination of stunning elections with a 
civil society-led mobilisation of the population. Usually, coups d’etat only 
substitute one form of authoritarian rule for another. All other forms are 
related to contemporary democratic revolutions, which as a rule are non-
violent. It is difficult to predict the chances of success of a revolutionary 
scenario under current Belarusian conditions. They depend not only on the 
extent of repression from above, but also, most importantly, on the level of 
consolidation of Belarusian civil society from below and the understanding 
of its leaders that different forms of ‘replacement’ are the only real 
alternative to the protracted authoritarian stagnation. 
* * * 
According to Francis Fukuyama, all contemporary, strong 
authoritarian powers inevitably have to face objective trends that are 
dangerous for their position and will sooner or later lead to inescapable 
collapse. At present, this applies to Belarus as well. It is necessary to stress, 
however, that Belarus has a number of advantages in relation to the 
ripeness of many objective prerequisites for democracy in comparison with 
Russia or countries in Central Asia or the Caucasus. 
First, Belarus possesses all the necessary structural conditions for 
democratic transition. Structural conditions in this sense refer to the extent of 
social and economic modernisation in society, which do not directly lead to 
democracy, but makes its appearance rather possible there. In this field, 
Belarus is the leader among the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS), including Ukraine. By the late 1980s, the Belarusian Soviet Socialist 
Republic (BSSR) had the highest rates of per capita GDP, labour 
productivity and growth in the former USSR. In spite of the barbarian 
administrative methods used in his economic policy, President Lukashenka 
has managed to preserve the industrial potential of the economy in the 
second half of the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s. As is well known, 
an industrial economy generates an urbanised society (more than 70% of 
Belarusian citizens live in urban areas), a contemporary social structure and 
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new values among the population, which may involve perspectives that are 
incompatible with authoritarian ones. 
Second, Belarusian society is also rather educated. More than 11% of 
the population have university diplomas. According to statistics of the 
United Nations Development Programme, Belarus ranks first among CIS 
countries and 53rd in the world in the development and accessibility of 
higher education. Many researchers in the area of democratic transitions 
give attention to the strong correlation between the development of 
education and democratic values of the people. 
Finally, we borrow from Samuel Huntington an integral variable for 
the structural conditions of democratisation, the level of GDP per capita, 
with indicative levels ranging from $300-$500 to $500-$1000.3 In countries 
that fall below this threshold transition is less likely; countries above this 
level usually live under a democratic system. The level of GDP per capita is 
about the same in Belarus and Russia (at $2,200 and $2,300 respectively, 
according to World Bank statistics for 1999/2000).4 This means that the 
socio-economic conditions in Belarus fit the standards of transition 
countries. Of course the Belarusian economy is not a market one, and this 
fact will create additional difficulties connected with ‘parallel transitions’: 
the development of democratic institutions in the political sphere and 
market relationships in the economic sphere at the stage of democratic 
consolidation. But there are no objective social or economic barriers to the 
democratic replacement of the present authoritarian regime. 
It is necessary to add that Belarus is a monocultural country without 
serious ethnic or religious conflicts. According to the last census (conducted 
in 1999), 79% of the population identified themselves as Belarusians. Robert 
Dahl thinks that the appearance of democratic institutions is more likely in 
countries with a low level or total disappearance of inter-cultural conflicts. 
Therefore, Belarusian society possesses very important cultural 
characteristics, making the formation of a truly democratic political culture 
easier in the future.   
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Thus, we now face a rather paradoxical situation. Prepared in general 
for a market-democratic transformation, the Belarusian economy and 
society have to live under the strict control of the most backward, semi-
sultanistic political system in Europe. This situation generates a number of 
important clashes for the Lukashenka regime. 
First, further economic development and especially progress of the 
post-industrial and increasingly globalised sectors have been artificially 
restrained by the authorities. Unfortunately, no important structural 
economic reforms have been carried out during recent years. After 
President Lukashenka was elected on an anticorruption platform, the new 
government adopted a populist approach to economic policy, based on an 
emphasis on production, price controls a n d  d i r e c t  c r e d i t  t o  s t a t e - o w n e d  
enterprises. Simultaneously, market-oriented reforms have been stopped. 
According to research by the World Bank, the level of development of 
private businesses in Belarus considerably lags behind all neighbouring 
countries in both their numbers and their sustainability. 
On the other hand, the World Bank recognises that the economic 
targets set by Belarusian authorities in the middle of the 1990s were met by 
the year 2000, with the exception of capital investment and agricultural 
production. As stated in its 2002 report, “Perhaps uniquely among the 
more advanced former socialist economies of Europe, the GDP growth in 
Belarus has not been accompanied by private sector growth”.5 Economic 
development made it possible for Mr Lukashenka to continue his populist 
policy: the direct financing of favoured sectors and selected enterprises. 
The underlying reasons for the ‘Belarusian economic miracle’ are 
related to the high level of inflation. In 1999 it was about 250%, and 
recently, in spite of its substantial reduction, the annual growth of 
consumer prices is approximately twice as high as in the Russian 
Federation. But the most important factor of the unreformed economic 
development in Belarus is the help of Russia. It is well known that in March 
1996 the president obtained the write-off of $1 billion of debt to Russia in 
exchange for permission to leave Russian military bases on Belarusian 
territory. A year later, after signing the allied treaty, Belarus gained 
unlimited access to the Russian market as well as the opportunity to receive 
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oil and gas at the same prices as Russian consumers. The customs union 
between the two countries has given Belarus control over 70% of all 
Russian exports and imports to and from the West that pass through its 
territory. Even more essential preferences have been associated with barter 
trade with Russia. The annual sum Russia granted to the Belarusian 
economy during 1997-98 can be estimated at $1.5 to $2 billion. President 
Vladimir Putin’s administration continues to provide Belarus with 
substantial economic benefits. According to the 2002 World Bank report, 
“Belarus has received very large energy subsides, which [are] estimated to 
[be] around 10% of GDP, and it has enjoyed an open border providing easy 
access to the Russian markets together with generous provisions for barter 
trading”.6 
A unilateral orientation on the cheap raw materials, energy resources 
and large market of Russia has made it possible for the Lukashenka 
government to solve the short-term economic problems, but has 
simultaneously generated grave problems for Belarusian society in the 
longer term. These relate not only to the dangerous economic dependence 
of Belarus upon Russia, but are also connected to the isolation of Belarusian 
enterprises from the most-developed Western technologies and the foreign 
investment that is extremely necessary. The forecasts of many Belarusian 
and Western analysts, that the economic integration of Belarus with Russia 
would stimulate market reforms in Belarus, have proven to be invalid. On 
the contrary, the ineffective command economic model has managed to survive 
owing to the substantial Russian support. Nevertheless, the dominating 
administrative methods in Belarus have demonstrated their incompatibility 
with the country’s strategic economic interests. The present government is 
absolutely unprepared for vitally important market reforms, because a 
command economy is one of the most significant foundations of sultanistic 
rule, with its high fusion of public and private domains. 
Sometimes the relative economic success of Belarusian authorities is 
viewed as a guarantee against any political revolution in the country. This 
point of view can be rather misleading. According to Huntington, there is 
no direct connection between economic development and political stability:  
In American thinking the causal chain was: economic assistance 
promotes economic development, economic development promotes 
political stability. This dogma was enshrined in legislation and, 
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perhaps more important, it was ingrained in the thinking of officials 
in AID and other agencies concerned with the foreign assistance 
programs…In fact economic development and political stability are 
two independent goals and progress toward one has no necessary 
connection with progress toward the other. In some instances 
programs of economic development may promote political stability; 
in other instances they may seriously undermine such stability.7 
At the same time, Huntington has demonstrated that there is a causal 
link between the level of political institutionalisation and political stability. 
Taking into account that a personalistic political system is the least 
institutionalised one, the Belarusian ‘economic miracle’ under semi-
sultanistic power may generate serious problems. The rise of social 
mobilisation and new expectations of different social groups are not 
matched by an adequate flow of opportunities provided by the system. In 
turn, the inescapable social frustration will lead to increased demands on 
the government and the expansion of non-organised political participation 
to enforce those demands. The Orange Revolution in Ukraine has occurred 
in an authoritarian polity, in which the government has achieved the 
highest economic growth in an independent period of development. This 
fact once again proves the validity of Huntington’s theory.  
Second, President Lukashenka has gained the most support from less 
educated persons, inhabitants of villages and small towns, and older 
persons, i.e. from those social groups that are afraid of liberal and 
democratic reforms and would like to keep the ancien regime, which they 
find more suitable for them. By contrast, the least amount of support is to 
be found among the most educated segments of society, inhabitants of 
large cities and young persons. This situation is common for many post-
communist countries. Yet in Ukraine, Russia, Georgia and lots of other 
nations adherents to the old regime form the social base for left-wing 
opposition to the more or less reform-minded governments. In Belarus, the 
situation is the opposite: its government is the most active defender of the 
old regime. That means that Belarusian authorities are voluntarily 
assuming the role of a politically conservative force, trying to prevent 
‘dangerous’ trends of any progressive or future-oriented development. 
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At the same time, the ‘Homo Sovieticus’ mentality of the president is 
in glaring contradiction with the current values of the substantial part of 
the Belarusian nation. For instance, in spite of anti-Western propaganda by 
the Belarusian state media, many Belarusian citizens look at the European 
Union as a positive and winning case for them. It is interesting to mention 
in this context the results of comparative sociological research, conducted 
in spring 2004 by VCIOM (Russia), the NOVAK Laboratory (Belarus) and 
independent Ukrainian sociologists from Donetsk in the three post-Soviet 
Slavic countries. There are many more Belarusians than Russians or 
Ukrainians who support the idea of joining the EU. When answering the 
question of where they would prefer to live, 28% of Belarusians (and only 
11% of Russians and 15% of Ukrainians) named the EU. Only 15% of 
Belarusians (19% of Russians and 19% of Ukrainians) would like to live in 
the former USSR. Finally, 28% of Belarusians (51% of Russians and 32% of 
Ukrainians) said that they prefer to live in their independent states.8 The 
rather low support of respondents for independent Belarus as a place to 
live can be explained by their scepticism about the possibilities of real 
economic and political reform in this country in the immediate future. 
These figures demonstrate that there is a substantial value gap between the 
Belarusian government and the rest of the population (principally its 
younger and more educated segments). 
Third, analysis of the development of political systems of most post-
Soviet countries in the 1990s and 2000s makes it possible to conclude that 
the Republic of Belarus is the only country in the region where the social 
populist policy of the ruling elite prevails. Japanese researcher Kimitaka 
Matsuzato called Belarus “an isolated island of populism, surrounded by 
waters of the ocean of clan policy”. Social populism allows Mr Lukashenka 
to maintain a substantial level of internal legitimacy, concentrate all power 
in his hands and control the bureaucracy. On the other hand, populism is 
always limited and suffers from the ineffectiveness of the policy. It keeps 
the leader in a rather narrow framework. The leader is unable, for instance, 
to make necessary and timely decisions for maintaining a healthy economy, 
because they are not popular. Reserves of any populism are limited and 
they will inevitably run out. 
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The opportunities for the continuation of a social-populist policy 
have substantially declined in today’s Belarus. In 2002-03, President 
Lukashenka encountered a serious crisis of confidence within the country. 
His projected electoral rating halved from 55% to 25-27%. According to 
data from the Baltic Gallup Service, in August 2003 only 36% of the 
population said that they would vote for the supporters of Mr Lukashenka 
in elections to the parliament and 45% would support his opponents. A 
significant share of the ‘new Lukashenka opponents’ consists of those who 
are disappointed with regard to their social and economic expectations. 
Only the inability of the opposition to use this situation prevented the 
Belarusian regime from facing a serious political crisis. This trends means 
that the epoch of social populism in Belarus is slowly coming to an end and 
Mr Lukashenka’s popularity is coming to a critical point alongside it. 
Parliamentary elections and the referendum in 2004 have completely 
confirmed this conclusion. For the first time since 1994, President 
Lukashenka needed mass falsifications not to embellish his real victory but 
to survive in his post. In spite of all the propaganda and nomenclature 
employed to guarantee the necessary political result, he received only 48% 
of the eligible votes instead of the 50% that is required for Constitutional 
change.9 Actually, it was the first real political defeat for the Belarusian 
leader in the last decade. But as before, lack of any coordinated and 
effective activities on the part of the opposition in relation to their 
mobilisation of the protest electorate helped Mr Lukashenka avoid a 
political eruption. 
Fourth, a protracted policy of populism has resulted in the 
deconsolidation of the power elite in Belarus, in spite of Mr Lukashenka’s total 
control over the bureaucracy. The ruling class is not only divided into those 
having advantages (the so-called ‘Mogilev clan’10) and the disadvantaged 
outsiders, but nobody in the current top infrastructure is immune from 
being discharged, arrested or overturned because of the ‘outrage of the 
crowd’. Frequent replacements of officials and permanent scandals have 
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become one of the distinguishing features of Mr Lukashenka’s rule during 
the last 10 years. This in turn has had a significant negative impact on the 
initiatives and professionalism of public servants, as well as on the stability 
of the vertical executive system created by the leader. 
At the same time, there are two important objective characteristics of 
Belarusian society that have helped President Lukashenka to maintain his 
control the situation: the weak national identity of the Belarusian people and 
the Russian factor. As articulated by Rodger Potocki, 
[I]f Belarus was one of the most economically advanced republics, it 
was also the most backward in terms of national and civic identity. 
Today, although more than three-quarters of the country’s population 
is ethnically Belarusian, most people speak Russian most of the time. 
Belarus was the most Sovietized and conservative of the USSR’s 
republics.11  
The policy of ‘Sovietisation’ and ‘Russification’ has continued in the 
era of independent countries. This phenomenon can be explained by Mr 
Lukashenka’s interest in mass reproduction of the main social basis of his 
power – denationalised and fragmented adherents. 
On the other hand, probably to Mr Lukashenka’s great surprise and 
that of many analysts in the East and West, Belarus has managed to survive 
as an independent state for a rather long time. These conditions are 
influencing and changing the consciousness of its population. The majority 
of people identify themselves with Belarus as a nation, not with an abstract 
Union of Belarus and Russia or the CIS. According to recent poll data 
gathered by the Independent Institute of Social-Economic and Political 
Studies (IISEPS), the number of supporters of complete unification of 
Belarus with Russia has decreased by almost two-fold (from 21.2% in 2002 
to 11.6% in 2004) over the last two years. In spite of state media 
propaganda in favour of the Union of Belarus and Russia, the number of its 
opponents has risen by 1.6% since 2002. The popularity of integration with 
the EU (90%) substantially exceeds the popularity of integration with 
Russia (10%) among the so-called ‘leaders of public opinion’.12 Thus, in 
spite of its Russian language, the population of Belarus has distinguished 
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itself from the Russian people. A new pro-independent consciousness is 
disseminating especially rapidly among the younger generations. The 
survival of Belarus as an independent state means that this country 
possesses the most important prerequisite for democratic transition.  
Replacement of the present political regime by democratic forces has 
become much easier after the victory of democratic revolution in Ukraine, 
which substantially weakened the Russian factor – the last important pillar 
of the semi-sultanistic system in Belarus. President Putin’s administration 
is probably ready to pay more to the Belarusian dictatorship in order to 
ensure Russia’s strategic and political influence in the region. Therefore it is 
difficult to foresee any serious risks for Mr Lukashenka originating from 
the Kremlin. Nevertheless, the democratic revolution in Ukraine is a lesson 
for many post-Soviet autocrats, showing that their support from Moscow 
and dependence on Russia is not enough to guarantee a serene future. 
The Orange Revolution has demonstrated the anti-democratic nature 
of the foreign policy emanating from Mr Putin’s government to rest of the 
world. Far more important, however, is that Russia’s open interference in 
the internal affairs of an independent state to save an authoritarian pro-
Russian government has resulted in total failure. Sometimes the revolution 
in Ukraine is compared with the fall of the Berlin wall. As in 1989, when the 
non-violent uprising by the people of the German Democratic Republic 
symbolised the end of the cold war and the final liberation of Eastern 
European nations from the dominance of the USSR, which collapsed 
shortly afterwards, for the people of post-Soviet countries the Orange 
Revolution in 2004 means that Russian dominance is neither absolute nor 
effective.  
The Ukrainian events are having an affect on contemporary Belarus 
in several ways. The isolation of Mr Lukashenka’s regime will increase. He 
will probably seek additional aid from Moscow as the ‘last true advocate of 
Russian interests’ in the region. The success of both economic reforms and 
a pro-European foreign policy of Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko’s 
government may have important demonstration effects for ordinary people 
in Belarus, who have a close affiliation with the Ukrainians. Civil society 
organisations could gain nice opportunities for study along with benefiting 
from the experience of the PORA! [It’s Time!] movement and other 
Ukrainian organisations with the kind of national conditions present in 
Belarus. There is also an opportunity to include ‘the Ukrainian factor’ in the PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY IN BELARUS | 81 
 
strategy of the Belarusian opposition, such as the development of common 
proposals with Ukrainian authorities dealing with Russia and the EU. 
* * * 
Thus, strong autocratic power in Belarus has a lot of weaknesses and 
shortcomings that undermine its stability and prospects for survival in the 
long run. In such circumstances the key becomes the internal factors of the 
development of Belarusian civil society, its consolidation and ability to use 
the weak features of the regime in its favour. 
In spite of pressure from the government, NGOs have managed to 
survive in Belarus during the last decade. In the beginning of 2004, 2,214 
public associations were registered (among these, 1,245 were local, 734 
were national and 235 were international).13 More than 500 NGOs are 
members of the Assembly of Pro-Democratic Non-Governmental 
Organisations, including both registered and non-registered associations, 
making the Assembly the biggest coalition of democratic NGOs in Belarus. 
In Eastern Europe, only Belarus and Slovakia have managed to create 
united national coalitions of democratic NGOs. They have to develop their 
activities in a highly unfavourable legal, political and economic 
environment, which prevents the growth of the associations. It is necessary 
to stress that the present number of registered NGOs is less than it was in 
1999 (when there were 2,500 organisations), which was prior to the re-
registration campaign carried out by the authorities. In an index of the 
number of NGOs per 10,000 persons, Belarus yields to all neighbouring 
countries besides Russia; yet not long ago it was ahead of Ukraine. 
Belarusian civil society consists not only of NGOs, but also of 
oppositional political parties, independent media and free trade unions. 
There are now 17 political parties registered with the ministry of justice. 
Only seven of them represent the opposition. Since the end of the 1990s, 
democratic political parties have been gradually forced out by the 
government into the sector of NGOs. The latest parliamentary elections 
provided the opportunity for Mr Lukashenka to remove the last opposition 
members from parliament through mechanisms that totally falsified the 
voting. In the 1990s, Belarusian democratic parties were active in 
organising mass protests. But since 2001, youth NGOs such as the Young 
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Front and Zubr [Bison] have played a more significant role than other 
parties in this field. So, civic education, cultural revival and human rights 
advocacy have become more important tasks for the opposition than the 
struggle for power. The latter has not ceased, but is becoming increasingly 
marginal on the agenda of the political parties. 
One of the biggest problems of the opposition is its split into various 
organisations and the lack of effective cooperation among them. There are 
now two coalitions of Belarusian democratic parties: Pyaciorka+ [Five+] and 
the European Coalition of Free Belarus. The first one consists of the 
Belarusian Popular Front (led by Vincuk Viachorka), the United Civic 
Party, the Belarusian Social-Democratic Hramada [Union], the Labour Party 
(liquidated not long ago by the authorities) and the Party of Communists 
(led by Siarhiej Kaliakin). The second one unites the Belarusian Social-
Democratic Party (the People’s Hramada) and the Belarusian Women’s 
Party,  Nadzeya [Hope]. The Belarusian Conservative Christian Party–
Popular Front (led by Zianon Pazniak) does not participate in any coalition. 
No opposition party has had a poll rating higher than 5% since the end of 
the 1990s. Currently representatives of the first coalition are trying to 
expand their structure with other organisations and transform it into 
Desyatka+ [Ten+]. It is difficult to predict their chances of success, taking 
into account all the previous negative experience. 
In 2000, there were 1,110 periodical editions registered in Belarus. 
About 70% of them were independent, but only one-quarter of 
independent newspapers have been published on a regular basis. From the 
very beginning, President Lukashenka established his total control over 
electronic media. The situation of the independent press has worsened 
since the president was re-elected. The government has taken a tougher 
line with its pressure on independent editions, which has led to a reduction 
of their circulation and even the closure of the most popular papers. For 
instance, in 2003 alone five independent newspapers across the country 
were shut down. As Rodger Potocki stressed, “the independent press, 
whose total print run is only 6% of that produced by the state-run papers, 
could not make up the gap”.14 
Today, there are four non-governmental trade unions in Belarus. 
Unfortunately, the labour movement, as in most other post-communist 
nations, is restrained by the dependence of the workers on their 
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enterprises. In uncertain economic times, labourers are interested first of all 
in the preservation of their workplace rather than the struggle for economic 
and political rights. This focus sharpened after the introduction of the so-
called ‘contract system’ in 2004, expanding the rights of the administration 
in the ‘struggle for high discipline’ with regard to state enterprises. On 
other hand, the country has active entrepreneurs’ unions, which have 
arranged many effective strikes in the 1990s and 2000s. 
Thus, Belarusian civil society, which has managed to survive 
governmental repressions, is rather small and isolated from ‘greater 
society’. Nevertheless, it has experience (positive and negative) in adapting 
to an unfavourable political environment. NGOs and political parties are 
proficient in various ways of coalition-building for facilitating this task. 
Civil society is also politicised, as a result of both processes: the forcing out 
of the political parties in the non-governmental sector and the better 
understanding by the NGO community that in order to realise their 
missions, grass-roots organisations should be ready to effectively withstand 
an authoritarian regime. In some senses, the present situation looks like the 
return to the initial stage of the formation of civil society organisations in 
Belarus in the second half of the 1980s, when they had political 
confrontations with communist authorities. In any case, eliminating the 
borders between civil and political societies (as can now be observed in 
Belarus) is a valid step against non-democratic political regimes, and one 
that, as Larry Diamond pointed out, is helpful for preparing for the 
elimination of the regime itself.15 
It is common among many contemporary analyses of Belarus to 
discuss the weakness of Belarusian civil society and political opposition. 
Democratic revolution in Ukraine once again confirmed the 
appropriateness of this conclusion. Strong and popular opposition together 
with effective civil society organisations were crucial for the success of the 
Orange Revolution. Against this bright background, democratic NGOs and 
parties in Belarus look colourless and unconvincing. What are the reasons 
for such large differences between the civil society structures of two such 
close peoples and nations? 
The explanations usually deal with differences in the non-democratic 
political regimes of the two countries, the greater dependence of Belarus on 
Russia and the lesser preparation of Belarusian society for democracy in 
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comparison with Ukraine. A lot has been said about the ‘weakness of the 
strong power’ in Belarus and the permanent inability of the opposition to 
use it to de-legitimise the regime. Of course, on the one hand, there is the 
economic and political dependence of Belarus on Russia. On the other 
hand, it is not Belarus but Ukraine that occupies the key geo-strategic 
position in the region. The latter can explain the attempts of Mr Putin’s 
administration to increase Russia’s influence in Ukraine during last year’s 
elections. The failure of these attempts in November-December 2004, along 
with other things, has substantially devalued the significance of the Union 
of Belarus and Russia: without the participation of Ukraine it stands to 
become less politically attractive and more economically expensive for the 
Russian elite. 
It is argued here that internal factors play a more important role in 
explaining the weakness of Belarusian democratic forces, which are 
independent from government repressions and Russia’s policy. For 
example, in the middle of the 1990s, the Belarusian opposition lost the real 
chance to use the anti-communist and anti-establishment populism in its 
favour. Democratic forces should have been ready at that time to bring 
forward anticorruption slogans and transform their economic strategies 
into some kind of ‘social democratic’ programme of reforms to enable them 
t o  c o m e  i n t o  p o w e r .  I n s t e a d ,  t h e  p o litical opposition and civil society 
organisations stressed the necessity of the population’s re-socialisation to 
prepare the electorate for national and liberal values. Lacking proposals for 
a state system of education, media, the economy, etc., this programme was 
condemned to failure. It has resulted in the isolation of opposition and civil 
society organisations from Belarusian society. 
After the presidential elections in 2001, the discourse of the ‘anti-
government populism’ has been restored. This attitude unites rather 
diverse members of society: former adherents of President Lukashenka, 
who are disappointed in the ‘strong man’s’ policy alongside young and 
educated persons, and representatives of various professional groups who 
are disappointed in the opposition. This discourse is probably critical in 
relation to the policy of the political regime. Yet a lack of trust in the head 
of state is accompanied by a lack of confidence in the current opposition, 
which has demonstrated its inability to influence the political situation. 
Sociological research supports these conclusions. While the number of 
President Lukashenka’s opponents has increased in 2002-03 from 28% to 
47%, the ratings of the opposition have hardly changed, fluctuating PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY IN BELARUS | 85 
 
between 1.4% and 5.5%.16 Nevertheless, during the last referendum and the 
parliamentary elections in 2004, representatives of this discourse – without 
any political organisation or coordination – scuppered Mr Lukashenka’s 
plans for ‘pure victory’. In other words, the protest electorate in 
contemporary Belarus is not only affiliated with supporters of the 
opposition. 
This situation may be regarded as both a challenge and a hope for 
civil society. Should the present opposition transform into some kind of 
limited minority, isolated from greater society and not threatening for the 
personalistic power, the situation will likely continue longer term. On the 
other hand, should the democratic parties and NGOs undertake an internal 
reformation and reject internal programme purity in favour of 
demonstrating real abilities to represent the interests of all the protest 
groups, this would provide civil society with a new opportunity to use the 
current wave of populism to de-legitimise the political regime in Belarus. 
The solution to this problem is directly related to the quality of 
leadership in civil society organisations, their capacity to suggest not only a 
programme, but also a personal alternative to authoritarian power. The 
Belarusian opposition has worked out two models of its single candidate 
selection for presidential elections. The first one is focused on the internal 
determination of candidates by parties and NGO coalitions at the first 
stage, and then at the subsequent stage, the election of the joint leader at 
the Congress of Democratic Forces. The second model appeared during the 
presidential elections in 2001: when taking into account the weakness and 
low popularity of political parties and NGOs, it was decided to select an 
independent and moderate representative of the discourse as a single 
candidate of the opposition. Such a figure was acceptable to both the 
Belarusian elite and to the Kremlin. 
It can be argued that neither the first nor the second model fits the 
current political needs of Belarus. Selection of the future democratic leader 
by political parties and NGOs does not consider the fact that the actual and 
potential protest electorate is significantly wider than supporters of the 
opposition. The popularity of political parties has not increased since the 
last presidential campaign. Moreover, internal elections, which are the most 
attractive method for parties seeking to nominate a single candidate, would 
not necessarily satisfy the demands of all democratic leaders or 
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organisations, which may lead to further conflicts and cleavages among the 
democratic forces. 
Further, a repetition of the 2001 scenario and nomination of a new 
representative of the opposition does not take into account the substantial 
differences between the recent and previous political conditions. Mr 
Lukashenka has demonstrated the matrix of future presidential elections 
during last year’s referendum. A recent poll by the IISEPS revealed that 
about 33% of respondents were ready to vote for a ‘worthy alternative’ to 
President Lukashenka at the next election (28% would still vote for Mr 
Lukashenka); but at the same time, 76% of respondents believed that the 
authorities will falsify the results of the future elections.17 Thus, the most 
important factor in 2006 will be the mobilisation of the protest electorate 
and the development of an effective, non-violent, mass campaign, at least 
in Minsk. Certainly, none of the current bureaucratic candidates are suited 
to the role of a charismatic popular leader, who could manage to mobilise 
the youth, entrepreneurs, workers and other citizens of the Belarusian 
capital for a decisive and protracted political struggle. Unfortunately, based 
on the results demonstrated by the political opposition, its chances are little 
better. Since 2001, its mobilisation potential has reduced to an average of 
1,000 to 5,000 participants for mass actions, which is absolutely insufficient 
for the realisation of a ‘Ukrainian scenario’ in Belarus by split parties and 
NGOs. 
The solution to the leadership problem should be seen as inseparable 
from a radical institutional reformation of the whole of Belarusian civil 
society. In other words, the future Congress of Democratic Forces should 
be able to declare the creation of a single and decentralised democratic 
movement, consisting of oppositional political parties, democratic NGOs, 
independent media and free trade unions, to develop and approve its 
political programme and focus on the replacement of the authoritarian 
regime. Only after such a step is it reasonable to elect a joint leader – an 
independent politician or well-known public figure – drawn from outside 
the present opposition. This last condition is highly important for the 
restoration of public confidence in the democratic forces, the formation of a 
new positive image and the prevention of further splits. The crucial factor 
for the selection of such a person should not be his/her popularity among 
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the 5 to 10% of the democratic electorate, but some objective data, for 
instance, his/her rating among the general public. 
What about the acceptability of the single candidate to the Kremlin 
and the establishment? Taking into account that it is rather difficult to hope 
for a cardinal change to the pro-Lukashenka position of Mr Putin’s 
administration, the future leader of the democratic movement should be 
openly pro-European, but at the same time not anti-Russian. Being 
dependent and passive, the Belarusian establishment will support the 
opposition and its leader only after the balance of forces in society change 
dramatically in its favour. Therefore, to ensure its neutrality in the crucial 
phase of political struggle, it would be reasonable to provide the 
bureaucracy with guarantees from future lustrations. The same would be 
appropriate in relation to military and police forces. 
One of the most important problems of Belarusian civil society is the 
lack of confidence among organisations – a  lack of so-called ‘social capital’. 
According to Robert Putnam,  
[W]hereas physical capital refers to physical objects and human 
capital refers to the properties of individuals, social capital refers to 
connections among individuals – social networks and the norms of 
reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them. In that sense 
social capital is closely related to what some have called ‘civic virtue’. 
The difference is that ‘social capital’ calls attention to the fact that civic 
virtue is most powerful when embedded in a sense of a network of 
reciprocal social relations. A society of many virtuous but isolated 
individuals is not necessarily rich in social capital.18 
In other words, in order to produce social capital in civil society 
structures, we need to establish a balance between their closeness and 
openness, integration and linkage, human abilities and social capacities. In 
the second half of the 1990s, the basic prerequisites for maintaining such a 
balance were formed in the Belarusian NGO community. Large-scale 
democratic organisations and chiefly ‘resource centres’ (closed and vertical 
structures) worked to increase the level of integration and development of 
the human capital of their members, and that of other NGOs with which 
they were connected. By contrast, the Assembly of Pro-Democratic NGOs – 
which at that time was decentralised and provided equal opportunities for 
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all the member organisations to participate in its decision-making (open 
and horizontal structures) – focused on the development of links and social 
capacities within civil society. This balance was destroyed by two 
processes:  
1)  the re-orientation of some donor organisations in support of the 
resource centre model in Belarus instead of the Assembly one, in 
spite of the success of the 1999 ‘SOS campaign’ by this coalition to 
save the NGO community from total obliteration during re-
registration; and 
2)  the introduction of the centralised model of management in the 
Assembly itself at the end of 2000.  
The first process could be explained by the experience of civil society 
development in Western countries and some former communist states in 
Eastern Europe, in which resource centres played a key role in the spread 
of civil society organisations, providing them with necessary human 
capital. Such arguments did not, however, take into account the differences 
in the conditions between the old and new democratic countries, on the one 
hand, nor the open authoritarian regimes, on the other. In Belarus, for 
example, during the first stage it was more important to stimulate 
cooperation among the different democratic organisations and to foster 
their mutual confidence, and then advance the participation of ordinary 
people in their activities in the second stage. Neither resource centres nor 
large-scale organisations have been able to perform these tasks, because 
they are focused on the creation of human versus social capital. In other 
words, the possibility to stimulate social consolidation in Belarus passed its 
optimal level at the end of 1990s and the formation of “unsocial capital”, to 
borrow Seymour Lipset’s term, has increased.19 
As a result, civil society has seen substantial inequalities in the 
distribution of material resources among its actors, the dependence of some 
organisations on others, the flourishing of patron-client relationships and a 
sharp deficit of trust and solidarity. According to sociological research, 64% 
of representatives of the regional NGOs negatively assessed the 
effectiveness of resource centre activity in Belarus.  
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The second process, the introduction of the centralised model of 
management by the Assembly, was connected to the representation of the 
majority of member organisations by a small number of NGOs elected in 
regional and national working groups, without clear accountability of the 
elected to the electors. This step violated one of the basic principles of the 
Assembly as a horizontal structure – the equality of organisations – and 
created barriers for ordinary organisations to impact the decision-making 
process in the coalition. The bureaucratic structures prevented most 
organisations from developing lateral ties, realising important common 
projects and involving ordinary people. Nevertheless, despite 
centralisation, the Assembly has demonstrated its ability to protect the 
rights of member organisations from government repression and to 
promote their survival. The idea of a horizontal coalition is still popular in 
the Belarusian NGO community. Irregardless of the fact that a majority of 
respondents decided that the Assembly has transformed into a formal 
structure in the regions, its negative rating (54%) is less than that of the 
resource centres (64%).20 
Thus, Belarusian civil society currently faces many internal problems 
that prevent it from working effectively and preparing the necessary social 
and political foundations to replace its semi-sultanistic regime. On the 
other hand, most of these problems are subjective ones and could be solved 
by the leaders of political parties, NGOs, free trade unions and 
independent media. The solution depends on the knowledge, desire and 
will of the people. 
* * * 
The democratic revolution in Ukraine is probably the most striking 
illustration of the return of the democratic wave to the post-communist 
world after its reversal in the 1990s. Following the victorious ‘OK 
campaign’ in Slovakia in 1998, the replacement of authoritarian 
governments in Croatia in 1999 and in Serbia in 2000, and the victory of the 
Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2003, the success of the Orange Revolution 
in Ukraine in 2004 is the culmination of democratisation in the region. The 
recent downfall of the corrupt authoritarian government in Kyrgyzstan is 
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additional proof that the wave of democratic revolutions will continue its 
movement through ex-Soviet nations. 
There are no objective barriers to the spread of this wave to Belarus as 
well. The probability of repeating the non-violent uprising in Ukraine 
under the current national conditions in Belarus is rather high, taking into 
account that the next presidential elections are scheduled for 2006 and that 
there is more than enough time for democratic forces to prepare for this 
event. Unfortunately, the subjective barriers are more serious, in relation to 
the ripeness of civil society and the political opposition for carrying out any 
legitimate scenario for replacing the regime. 
To avert the risk that the democratic wave will get bogged down in 
the Palessye Marshes bordering Ukraine and Belarus, it is extremely 
important for civil society forces to reassess their activities and learn the 
lessons from both their own defeats and the victories of their neighbours. In 
other words, political revolution in Belarus should be seen as an outcome 
of a revolution in the consciousness of the democratic elite. This conclusion 
is not new, because all true revolutions begin with a radical overturn in the 
mentality of the best part of the population, some of the reasons for which 
are outlined below. 
First, no revolution could win without popular alternative candidates 
and programmes to the authoritarian government or without a new 
opposition leader, who could mobilise people to participate in protracted, 
non-violent mass actions. The reduced opportunities of Belarusian 
democratic forces to exploit electoral procedures in comparison with their 
Ukrainian counterparts only increase the importance and meaning of these 
factors. 
Second, no revolution is possible without strong opposition. Now is 
the time to carry out a radical institutional reformation of the civil society 
structures in Belarus. Oppositional political parties should consolidate 
themselves into a single sustainable movement – something similar to the 
Popular Front at the end of the 1980s/beginning of the 1990s – with new 
leadership and a more contemporary and pragmatic programme. This step 
would be helpful for the creation of a new positive image of the opposition 
and the recruitment of new supporters. It is important that this movement 
is able to combine internal programme cohesion, in relation to change of 
the current political regime, with maximal organisational decentralisation, 
enabling people of different political views to participate in it (ranging 
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revolution, such a movement would probably transform into independent 
political parties – an important element of any pluralistic political society 
under democracy. 
Third, revolution cannot succeed without trust and solidarity among 
the revolutionaries. This means that Belarusian civil society needs the 
restoration of the balance between vertical and horizontal structures, 
closure and openness, and integration and linkage. In other words, the 
NGO community and principally the Assembly of Democratic NGOs 
should realise the insufficiency of their survival strategy and the acute 
necessity of producing ‘social capital’. The latter is only possible through 
networks with other, similar organisations and the spread of solidarity 
among various NGOs that are engaged in common work with ordinary 
people to gather their support for democratic changes. 
Fourth, revolution would be not authentic without the understanding 
that its realisation is the task of the people themselves. After the Ukrainian 
experience it must be absolutely clear that Russia is not interested in a 
Belarusian democracy, because any serious democratic transformation of 
this country at the present time is impossible without the development of a 
strategy for its European integration and this task, as would be undertaken 
by Belarusian democrats, would contradict the interests of the Russian 
ruling elite. The manifestation of a Russian-imposed scenario for a 
replacement of Alexander Lukashenka will only correspond with the 
establishment of a new dictatorial regime in Belarus, to carry out its further 
incorporation. But recognition of these realities does not mean that any 
future democratic revolution in Belarus must use anti-Russian slogans – 
that would be a repetition of Zenon Pazniak’s mistake in 1993. On the other 
hand, bringing forward pro-Ukrainian slogans by democratic forces is 
absolutely necessary and helpful. 
Finally, democratic revolution in Belarus may not take place in the 
short term without arresting the so-called ‘revolutionary game’ played out 
by the representatives of some political parties and NGOs. It is well known 
that the opposition proclaimed that it was carrying out its own version of 
the ‘Yugoslavian model’ in the last presidential elections in 2001. Yet in 
reality the result became the profanation of this model. In order to prevent 
mere imitation of the ‘Ukrainian model’ in 2006 change, Belarusian 
democrats should first realise the revolution of their own mentalities. 92 | ULADZIMIR ROUDA 
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ISLAM, FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY IN 
THE ARAB WORLD 
BASSAM TIBI 
In addressing the problems related to the introduction of democracy in the 
Arab world, the well-known pro-democracy activist and scholar Saad 
Eddin Ibrahim1 noted at the Madrid International Summit on Safe 
Democracy, Terrorism and Security2 that Arab societies are squeezed 
“between autocrats and theocrats”. This succinct and precise phrase 
touches on the “Arab predicament”3 since the repercussions of the 1967 
war. In that event, all pan-Arab secular regimes were defeated by Israel 
and thus de-legitimised in their rule as autocrats. Their opponents, 
however – the Islamists – are not democrats but rather real theocrats. The 
problem lies not with the Arab culture or Islam in general, but with the 
neo-patriarchy in the Arab world4 and the contemporary phenomenon of 
                                                      
1 See Saad Eddin Ibrahim, Egypt, Islam and Democracy, Cairo: AUC Press, 1996, 
particularly chapter 12 on civil society and the prospects of democratisation in the 
Arab world, pp. 245-66; see also Saad Eddin Ibrahim (ed.), Al-Mujtama’al-Madani 
[Civil Society], Annual Yearbook, 1993. 
2 Club de Madrid, Democracy, Terrorism and Security, brochure for the International 
Summit on Safe Democracy, Terrorism and Security in Madrid, 8-11 March 2005. 
3 Fouad Ajami, The Arab Predicament: Arab Political Thought and Practice since 1967, 
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4 Hisham Sharabi, Arab Neo-Patriarchy: A Theory of Distorted Change in Arab Society, 
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Islamism, resulting from the politicisation of Islam in a time of crisis of 
legitimacy.5 
To be sure, democracy and civil society are related to cultural 
modernity,6 as it has unfolded in the modern history of Europe. Yet both 
democracy and civil society have ancient Greek origins.7 Those Islamists 
who reject democracy, addressing it with contempt as one among the 
“hulul mustawradah” [imported solutions]8 from the West, overlook the fact 
that Islamic civilisation not only encountered and adopted Hellenism long 
before Europe itself,9 but also acted as a mediator in passing on the Greek 
legacy in an Islamic version to the West. Leslie Lipson, the historian of 
civilisations, tells us that “Aristotle crept back into Europe by the side door. 
His return was because of the Arabs, who had become acquainted with 
Greek thinkers”.10 
In view of these historical records the question arises as to why the 
Arabs of our present time cannot embrace the democracy of cultural 
modernity as their ancestors embraced Hellenism, which by then had 
become an essential part of the classical heritage of Islam?11 For a proper 
understanding of the Arab predicament, an overview is needed that covers 
the questions addressing the claim of democracy to universality. To be 
                                                      
5 Michael Hudson, Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy, New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1977, especially pp. 1-30. 
6 For more details, see Juergen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987. 
7 For further information, see John Ehrenberg, Civil Society, New York: New York 
University Press, 1999 and Anthony Birch, The Concepts and Theories of Modern 
Democracy, London: Routledge, 1993. 
8 Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Al-Hall al-Islami (3 volumes), Al-Hulul al-Mustawradah [The 
Imported Solutions], Vol. 1, Cairo: al-Risalah, 1980; first published in 1970. 
9 On the two waves of the Hellenisation of Islam, see W.M. Watt, Islamic Philosophy 
and Theology, Parts Two and Three, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1979; 
first published in 1962. 
10 Leslie Lipson, The Ethical Crises of Civilization, London: Sage, 1993, p. 62. 
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sure, globalisation and universalisation12 are different issues that ought not 
to be confused. There can be no ‘global’ but rather ‘universal’ democracy. 
In our age of the cultural turn one needs to acknowledge the existence of 
culturally different understandings of democratic rule, not only between 
civilisations – e.g. Islam and the West – but also on an intra-civilisational 
level, i.e. within the West itself. Thus the universality of democracy is 
questionable as well. For example, within the Islamic civilisation itself the 
problems of democracy in Indonesia are different from those in the Arab 
world.13  
Yet despite diversity, the search for a common, post-bipolar world 
order requires the acceptance of basic rules and common values of 
democracy as grounds for democratic peace. This acceptance in the Arab 
world presupposes the combination of universality with an unfolding of an 
Arab-Muslim cultural underpinning that not only diffuses the fears ignited 
by Islamists of an imposition by external powers – i.e. the West – (such as 
‘imported solutions’). It should also enable Arabs to speak the language of 
democracy, civil society and human rights in their own tongue as a way for 
smoothing an endogenisation of democratic rule based on law. The 
working hypothesis of this chapter is that diversity and commonality need 
to be related to one another when it comes to an envisioned 
universalisation of democracy to be shared by all of humanity. 
In going beyond the ideological bias of both the contention of a 
sweeping universality of Western democracy and of the opposite-named 
‘Islamic or Arab democracy’, one cannot escape the rooting of democracy 
in the cultural modernity from which it has been generated. In this 
understanding democracy is an addition to the Arab-Islamic heritage as 
much as earlier Hellenism was in classical Islam. The Arab and Muslim 
encounter with modernity led to an Arab and Muslim rediscovery of 
Europe,14 in which the predicaments hinted at are involved. The first Arab-
                                                      
12 On the difference between globalisation and universalisation, see Bassam Tibi, 
Islam between Culture and Politics, expanded 2nd edition, New York: Palgrave, 2005; 
first published in 2001, pp. 8-10.  
13 Robert Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia, Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000. 
14 See Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, Arab Rediscovery of Europe, Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1963 and Bernard Lewis, The Muslim Discovery of Europe, New 
York: Norton & Co., 1982. 96 | BASSAM TIBI 
 
Muslim who studied in the West was the Imam supervisor of an Egyptian 
group of students, who was sent to Paris by the modernising ruler 
Mohammed Ali in 1824. This Imam, Rifa’a al-Tahtawi, himself became a 
student in Europe. In his Paris diary he stated his admiration for the 
democratic rule and the compliance of both rulers and their opponents 
with the civilisational standards during the regime change that he observed 
in Paris.15  
Since that encounter in the early 19th century, there have been 
continuing Arab efforts to introduce democracy at home. The outcome, 
however, has been extremely poor. About two centuries after al-Tahtawi, 
the Arab authors of the UNDP report on the Arab world in 2002 
acknowledged that the core problems underlying the backwardness of the 
region are basically related to the lack of democracy and human rights.16 It 
is simply wrong to blame outside powers for this malaise. One can ask: 
Why is India a democratic country while no Arab state is? Colonial rule 
fails to be an explanation; this chapter considers the question of why the 
introduction of democracy to the Arab world has failed and why – unlike 
other non-Western countries – the Middle East continues to be outside the 
third wave of democratisation. Could the rising political Islam, acting as 
the new opposition to Arab autocrats, close this gap?  
The Arab world and democracy: An overview 
An overview of the contemporary history of democracy in the Arab world 
from the first Arab liberal, al-Tahtawi, up to the recent 2002 UNDP report 
can be mapped out under a scheme of periodisation that includes three 
patterns of rule as follows. 
First, Arab history in the period of Arab liberal thought17 as set out in 
the course of the encounter with Europe – positively as a challenge of 
modernity and negatively in a colonial context – has to be taken into 
                                                      
15 Rifa’a R. al-Tahtawi, Takhlis al Ibriz fi Talklis Paris, Beirut: Dar Ibn Zaidun 
(reprint, no date); for a German translation, see Karl Stowasser, Ein Muslim entdeckt 
Europa, Munich: C.H. Beck Verlag, 1988. 
16 United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Arab Human Development Report: 
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17 Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, London: Oxford University 
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account. Early post-colonial experiments with democratic rule (in Egypt, 
Syria and Iraq for instance) are part of this first period. 
Second, the failure of democratic rule under a multiparty system 
smoothed the way for the many coup d’états that resulted in establishing 
military populist rule. The existing corruption was identified with the 
democratic multiparty system and was replaced by the one-party systems 
of Nasserism and Baathism. This secular pan-Arab populism emphasised 
the unity of the nation against pluralism and supported the negation of 
democracy as a divisive form of rule. Some contended that this was a 
specific type of Arab democracy, which in fact concealed that dictatorship 
was at work. 
Third, the defeat of the Arab secular-populist regimes in the Six-Day 
War of 1967 first opened the way for a kind of ‘enlightenment’ that was 
instigated by the disillusioned Arab intellectuals seeking self-criticism 
(Adjami, 1981). This trend was not lasting in view of the rise of what has 
been named ‘al-hall al-Islami’ [the Islamic solution] (al-Qaradawi, 1970), 
which has become a truly mobilising ideology. Political Islam has its own 
ideology and system of rule called ‘Hakimiyyat Allah’ [God’s rule]. In the 
first volume of his trilogy, Al-Hall-al-Islami  (1980), the most influential 
Muslim Brother of today, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, coined the already-quoted 
term of the “imported solution”, in contrast with authentic “Islamic 
solutions”. In the first volume, “democratic rule” is depicted as one of the 
failed solutions. Democracy, which has its roots in the Greek polis, is 
considered to be alien to Muslims. As previously noted, al-Qaradawi and 
his followers ignore the historical fact that the Greek legacy was not alien to 
medieval Muslims and was even one of the pillars of Islamic rationalism in 
high Islam. Why can this sentiment not also be applied to a contemporary 
Arab who is receptive towards democracy? 
It goes beyond saying that any application of a political model – be it 
democracy or whatever – without considering local givens and constraints 
is doomed to failure. Nevertheless, the honouring of cultural peculiarities 
must have its limits and not be promoted to a cultural relativism that 
denies universal outlooks shared on cross-cultural grounds by all of 
humanity. International standards of democracy and individual human 
rights do in fact exist. Among them we find the basics of a democratic rule 
and the institutional safeguards guaranteeing its existence, above all the 
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In equally acknowledging cultural peculiarities and the return of the 
sacred under conditions of a crisis of secularism, one is compelled to 
consider Islam while dealing with democracy in the Arab world. In putting 
restraints on an application of cultural relativism to the Arab world, 
acknowledging limits in diversity in favour of establishing cross-cultural 
international standards is the preferred option. Above all, the 
reintroduction of the Shari’a in the name of democracy and also what is 
labelled by the Islamists as the ‘dawla Islamiyya’ [Islamic state] is to be 
argued against.18 This pattern of rule is not consonant with democracy but 
should rather be addressed as a new totalitarianism. In this spirit, 
democracy and human rights are presented as an alternative to Islamic 
fundamentalism.19 
To establish a cultural underpinning for democracy in the Arab 
world, the reference to Islam needs to be restricted to Islamic ethics20 of 
democracy, but never elevated to an Islamic Shari’a-based rule. Therefore, 
the approach taken by John Esposito and John Voll to Islam and democracy 
is utterly wrong.21 More promising are the efforts to rethink Islam and to 
aim at an Islamic reformation by enlightened Muslims themselves. First, we 
need to distinguish between Islam and Islamism and then, within political 
Islam, between institutional and jihadist Islamism. 
This discussion aims at addressing the contemporary debate on 
democracy in the Arab world both under conditions of post-bipolarity and 
the repercussions of the Iraq war, while taking pains to contextualise the 
entire issue. 
                                                      
18 On the ideological concept of an Islamic state, see Bassam Tibi, The Challenge of 
Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder,  updated edition, 
chapters 7 and 8, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002; first published in 
1998. 
19 Ibid.; see chapters 9 on democracy and chapter 10 on human rights as 
alternatives to the concepts of political Islam. 
20 See Sohail Hashmi, Islamic Political Ethics: Civil Society, Pluralism, and Conflict, 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002, specifically chapter 9 by Bassam 
Tibi. 
21 See John Eposito and John Voll, Islam and Democracy, New York and Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1996 along with the critical review by Bassam Tibi in the 
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Today, Western politicians also consider the need for democratisation 
in the Middle East as part of 21st century outlook, after having dealt with 
Arab dictators for decades. Especially after September 11th, the West began 
to seriously promote democracy in the Arab world. But long before “the 
promotion of liberal democracy became the catchword of the 1990s”22 in the 
West, Arab opinion leaders themselves engaged in discussing the problems 
of Islam, freedom and democracy in the Arab world, arranging to meet in 
November 1983 to address these issues. After having been denied the right 
to hold their meeting in an Arab city they had to convene in Limmassol, 
Cyprus. The title of that historical meeting was Azmat al-Democratiyya [The 
Crisis of Democracy].23 The speakers attending the conference were aware 
of the fact that democracy was a novelty to the Arab-Islamic ‘turath’ 
[cultural legacy], and they were conscious of existing structural and 
cultural obstacles that create impediments for democratisation.24 The 
alarming 2002 UNDP Arab Human Development Report prepared by Arab 
experts does not refer to the proceedings of that meeting, but it 
nevertheless highlights that the intensifying misery of the region is 
primarily home-made. Without overlooking the structural and political 
impediments, the lack of democracy can indeed, although not exclusively, 
be related to cultural factors. Indeed, the lack of democracy and human 
rights is a theme to being further elaborated upon by the “Culture Matters” 
project.25 Democracy is a political culture.  
All of these problems of democracy in the Arab world are currently 
discussed in the context of post-Saddam Hussein Iraq. To be sure, the Iraq 
                                                      
22 Beverly Milton-Edwards, Contemporary Politics in the Middle East, Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2000, p. 145. 
23 Center for Arab Unity Studies (eds), Azmat al-Democratiyy fi al-Watan al-Arabi, 
Beirut: CAUS Press, 1984. 
24 For the Limmassol meeting, the author of this chapter was asked to address the 
structural requirements for democracy in a paper presented there on existing 
obstacles. That paper is included in the volume referenced above by the Center for 
Arab Unity Studies, 1984, pp. 73-87. 
25 “Culture Matters” is a research project directed by Lawrence Harrison at the 
Fletcher School/Tufts University (2003-05), which will result in three forthcoming 
volumes (a general one and two volumes with case studies). The author of this 
chapter has also prepared a study on Islam in Vol. 1 and on Egypt in Vol. 2 for that 
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war26 waged in the name of democracy did not contribute to promoting the 
envisioned democratisation, but has instead exacerbated the issues under 
consideration on two levels: first, Arab-Muslim-Western tensions have 
intensified; and second, tensions within the West with regard to the 
understanding of democracy have also deepened the transatlantic rift 
between European and American opinion leaders. The repercussions of the 
Iraq war seem to reverse the formula of ‘from global jihad to democratic 
peace’, which arose in the hope of including the Arab world in the new 
wave of democratisation while formulating principles for a post-cold war 
order.27 In Iraq, it has become clear that a different understanding of 
democracy and the rule of law prevails in Arab public opinion. The call for 
an Islamic state based on the Shari’a illustrates this issue. The view of 
democracy referred to in this case is clearly different from the one pursued 
by the Bush administration. Meanwhile, Europeans have taken the position 
evidenced at the one-year commemoration of the Madrid attacks on 11 
March 2004, in which “security” was linked to “safe democracy”.28 This 
appears as an alternative to the American approach of ‘war on terrorism’. 
These transatlantic differences are not the concern of this chapter. Yet a 
reference to the different American, European and Arab understandings of 
the concept of democracy is pertinent to the present analysis, because the 
existence of these differences challenge the claim concerning the 
universality of democracy and the rule of law. The focus of the following 
discussion is to address pending issues related to both the cultural 
constraints underlying the contemporary introduction of democracy in the 
Arab world and the lack of structural support required for it. Iraq continues 
to be referred to as an example of what is envisaged as an Arab-Islamic 
democracy. 
                                                      
26 Liam Anderson and Gareth Stansfield, The Future of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democracy 
or Decision?, New York: Palgrave, 2004. 
27 See Bassam Tibi, “From Islamist Jihadism to Democratic Peace?”, Ankara Papers 
16, London: Taylor & Francis, 2005, pp. 1-41, with a reference to the debate 
launched by Bruce Russet, Debating the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold 
War, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993. 
28 See the brochure by the Club de Madrid, op. cit., which documents a European 
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Is Shari’a as a constitutional law in an ‘Islamic state’ the alternative 
needed? 
For an average Muslim, ‘law’ is tantamount with Shari’a. In talking about 
the rule of law as essential for establishing democratic rule, the reference to 
this perception seems pertinent. Yet there is no common understanding 
among Muslims about what Shari’a really is. Despite all the tensions 
between Sunna and Shi’a, Iraqi opinion leaders argue in their call for the 
Shari’a that it constitutes a constitutional law for the respective state. Other 
Muslims contest this claim by addressing the deep contrast existing 
between democracy and the political Islamist understanding of a Shari’a-
based Islamic state.29 While acknowledging cultural differences, Muslim 
reformers are committed to the universality of democracy and point at 
tensions between Shari’a and international law.30 Without overlooking the 
existing Middle Eastern peculiarities, which are partly determined by Islam 
and its worldview31 creating obstacles for the universality of democracy, it 
is argued that while being honoured those particularities need to be 
limited. But first they have to be determined. The core question is: Is Islam 
to be democratised or democracy to be Islamised? This section considers 
Arab debates on these issues while seeking an answer to this question. In 
this venture there is a need to look beyond ideological contentions as well 
as the accusations of the West. One needs to understand the issues 
underlying the lack of political freedom in Arab societies.  
First, it is useful to refer to an Arab debate that took place a quarter of 
a century ago, initially in Tunis in October 1980. There, the assembled 
Arabs addressed the future of their region by including the option for 
democracy in the Arab world. In this context they easily reached a 
consensus on that occasion: there is no political freedom in the majority of 
                                                      
29 Bassam Tibi, “Islamic Shari’a as a Constitutional Law?”, paper presented to the 
3rd International Conference on Comparative Constitutional Law, Tokyo on 2-4 
September 2005; see also the chapter on Shari’a in Tibi, Islam between Culture and 
Politics, op. cit., pp. 148-66. 
30 See Abdullahi A. An-Na’im, Toward an Islamic Reformation: Civil Liberties, Human 
Rights and International Law, Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1990 and 
Bassam Tibi, “Islamic Law/Shari’a, Human Rights, Universal Morality and 
International Relations”, Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 2, 1994, pp. 277-99. 
31 On the Islamic worldview, see Tibi, Islam between Culture and Politics, op. cit., 
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Arab countries and there is a need for change for the Arabs as they “face 
leur destin”.32 Two decades later, this observation was restated less 
rhetorically in the 2002 UNDP report. Owing to this lack of freedom, Arab 
intellectuals, who are committed to the cause of liberty, are unable to act 
freely towards establishing any authentic framework of democracy in their 
own countries. Either they fear imprisonment if they reveal their political 
commitments, or if they are allowed to do so, they lack access to means of 
cultural and political expression. These means, as with most other facilities, 
are under the complete control of the state. All means of articulation are 
under the surveillance of state institutions and reserved for those 
mercenary intellectuals willing to subject themselves to the respective state 
ideologies and to propagate it.  
At present, Islamism is the only opposition to this repression, 
presenting a Shari’a-inspired order for the future of Arabs and the option 
for an Islamic state as an alternative. It is argued here, however, that this 
prospect is by no means a promising one. Democratisation in our age of 
Islamism proves to be a most uneasy task. The contention is as follows: 
Shari’a is not a constitutional law and its use to legitimate an Islamic state 
cannot be considered an alternative. Yes, there is a need for a change. But in 
talking about change, mere descriptions alone of such a sad situation 
cannot be satisfactory. Change first requires an explanation of the social 
malady in order to determine how and where to begin to remedy the 
situation. 
In the West, be it in Europe or in the US, Arabs are usually viewed 
with an Orientalist bias. They are often regarded as ‘sons of the desert’ and 
therefore unfit to practice democracy. Currently, we see this sentiment 
revived with reference to Iraq. Yet it should be noted that this reference and 
a disregard for Orientalist explanations related to the alleged 
incompatibility between Islam and democracy does not imply putting all 
the blame on ‘Orientalism’ or on the West. The latter view has become 
fashionable among some Arab and non-Arab left-wing intellectuals in the 
West, which continues the tradition of Edward Said and ignores the 
                                                      
32 See the chapter by Bassam Tibi in the publication by the Centre d’Études et de 
Récherches Economiques et Sociales (eds), Les Arabes face à leur destin, Tunis, 1980, 
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critique of “Orientalism in Reverse”.33 But the real issue is to accept the fact 
that post-bipolarity is part of an age of cultural turn.  
In this context different explanations are given here for the lack of 
democracy in the Middle East. Imperialism and other external factors are 
mostly presented as the causes of the lack of freedom in Arab societies. In 
his presentation at the Arab conference entitled The Revolution in 
Contemporary Arab Thought, held at the University of Tunis in 1978, 
Khaldun al-Sham’a complained about the “infantile tendency to attribute 
everything to the objective external factors while almost completely 
neglecting the subjective ones!”34 This dispensing with the analysis of 
combined structural and cultural constraints blinds Arabs to the 
requirements for building up democracy. As compensation, the attitude of 
blaming others flourishes. Contemporary political Islam shares with 
secular Arab ideologies the commonality that foreign domination is to be 
viewed as the key issue for explaining the lack of any progress. No tasks 
related to the needed homework are acknowledged. In this situation 
authenticity has been brought to the fore to articulate particularism and, in 
this context, to raise the banner of Islam. The call for Shari’a is the chosen 
symbol. 
To be sure, in addressing the lack of democracy, in almost all Arab 
societies an emancipation from foreign dominance is a pertinent issue, but 
home-grown shortcomings need to be pointed out. When Arab opinion 
leaders met in Limmassol in 1983, it was emphasised that the need for 
democracy in terms of achieving participation on all societal levels requires 
cultural change in Arab societies (Center for Arab Unity Studies, 1984). One 
could not fail to notice that the notion of ‘external factors’ has been 
repeatedly employed to distract Arabs from the lack of political freedom in 
                                                      
33 See Zachary Lackman, Contending Visions of the Middle East: The History and 
Politics of Orientalism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Unlike these 
post-modern fashions, the Arab-Muslim Yale-educated Enlightenment philosopher 
Sadiq J. al-Azm speaks of al-Istishraq Ma’kusan [orientalism in reverse] and 
addresses it as conspiracy-driven thinking in his book, Dhihniyyat al-tahrin [The 
Mentality of Taboos], London: Riad El-Rayyes Books, 1992, pp. 17-128. 
34 Khaldun al-Sham’a, “Al-adab w ath-thaura. Ba’d al-mafahim” in Ath-Thaura fi al-
fikr al-‘arabi al-mu’asir, Centre d’Études et de Récherches Economiques et Sociales, 
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their own societies.35 For instance, one would be hard-pressed to find a 
foreign influence to blame for the state authoritarianism practiced by the 
police-governments in most Arab states. Instead of focusing on those who 
practice these methods to oppress political freedoms, external factors are 
blamed and ‘Mu’amarah’ [conspiracies] are imagined.36 A prominent Arab, 
Sadik Jalal al-Azm, expresses the need for a different approach to these 
questions, one that is committed to the ideals of the Enlightenment and 
rationality.37 In the medieval Islam that reflected the Greek impact in the 
context of Hellenisation, this standard of reason-based knowledge was 
accepted in Islamic civilisation, but not today (Watt, 1979). It is not the 
Shari’a in the new garb of constitutional law but rather Islamic rationalism 
that needs to be revived. What is at issue is the discourse for dealing with 
the problem of political freedom (i.e. democracy) in Arab societies. Political 
freedom is a notion that has a wide range of meanings. The discourse 
employed determines the outcome: a Shari’a state (Islamism) or the al-
Madina al-Fadila [the proper order], which was once addressed by Abu Nasr 
al-Farabi with regard to the Islamic rationalism of medieval Islam.  
No democracy without structural and institutional underpinning 
The first issue to be addressed relates to the human rights to freedom of 
expression and assembly and the required safeguards that are needed to 
ensure these freedoms. The crux of the matter here is the institutional 
framework of the political system. It is not enough to refer to political 
freedom as a democratic value. Democracy is a system of participation of 
the members of a society on all levels. These values cannot be practiced, 
however, without the respective structural and institutional frameworks 
that provide safeguards. It follows that the concern related to the structural 
and institutional requirements of political freedom in Arab societies is not 
an Arab or Islamic particularity. 
                                                      
35 Bassam Tibi, “Political Freedom in Arab Societies”, Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol. 6, 
No. 3, 1984, pp. 222-27. 
36 On conspiracy-driven Arab political thought, see Bassam Tibi, Die 
Verschwörung/al-Mu’armorah. Das Trauma arabischer Politik, Hamburg: Hoffmann & 
Campe, 1993. 
37 Sadiq Jalal al-Azm, Al-naqd al-dhati ba’d al-hazima [Self-Critique after the Defeat], 
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The second issue to be addressed relates to history, which provides 
the social scientist with rich material from which to learn, to draw 
comparisons and to undertake comparative studies. In an effort to obtain 
general historical guidance, this second point of inquiry focuses on the 
origins of democracy as it has evolved in European societies after the 
French Revolution. It is to be recognised that since then, there has not been 
a separate Middle Eastern time, but a world time. This expression is not one 
of sweeping universalism. 
Third and finally, one needs to look at contemporary Arab writings 
on the issue of democracy. How do Arab intellectuals view political 
democracy? In regarding social change as a combination of social-structural 
and attitudinal transformation, how do the majority of contemporary Arab 
intellectuals perceive the problem at hand? In view of the failure of Arab 
liberals, one has to enquire into the options currently presented as 
alternatives by the new Islamists to what is pejoratively called ‘hulul 
mustawradah’  [imported solutions]. At the outset of this discussion, 
reference was made to al-Qaradawi, who placed democracy among such 
imported solutions to be rejected. 
Despite the acknowledgement of the cultural turn, the debate on 
democracy is not merely a cultural issue. Democracy is not only a beautiful 
idea, it primarily refers to a political system. Any democracy that lacks the 
needed structural and institutional framework for practicing its values 
cannot flourish. Pre-modern societies lack the structural facilities required 
for democratic participation. In addition to institutions, the socialisation of 
individuals in a respective system of democratic values is an essential 
component of democracy. Therefore, along with the institutional setups 
needed for the practice of democracy it must be clear that culture matters as 
well. In this regard, the argument follows on with the interpretation of the 
late Iranian scholar of Oxford, Hamid Enayat, that Islam can be viewed as a 
distinctive system of democracy only if reconciled with modernity.38 To a 
Faqih, as an Islamic scholar of law, it is a matter of textual interpretation as 
to how to see Islam. But to a social scientist, social facts – in the 
Durkheimian sense of fait social and not the divine texts – must be the point 
of departure. From this point of view democracy is a socio-political system 
that first emerged in industrial societies. Arab societies are still lacking the 
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structural framework for implementing this system as well as the political 
culture related to it. It is by no means an expression of Orientalism to 
articulate the absence of the necessary requirements for democracy in Arab 
societies. Any critical, social scientific analysis of the existing constraints 
leads to the statement that the Arab political culture of neo-patriarchy is as 
much an obstacle to the introduction of democracy as the missing 
institutions of a democratic political system.  
In preparation for the Limmassol meetings of Arab opinion leaders, I 
was asked to review and revive the much-earlier effort of the distinguished 
Arab scholar Charles Issawi.39 Issawi’s groundbreaking analysis of the 
“economic and social foundations of democracy in the Middle East” has 
not lost its validity to date, although the situation has changed immensely. 
In his essay, Issawi points out that democracy does not thrive in the 
contemporary Middle East, “because the economic and social basis which it 
requires is as yet nonexistent”. Issawi was not a revolutionary, but rather a 
good scholar who was able to provide a profound analysis from which he 
drew his conclusion:  
What is required is a great economic and social transformation which 
will strengthen society and make it capable of bearing the weight of 
the modern state. Such a development is [a] necessary, if not 
sufficient, condition for the establishment of genuine democracy in 
the region.40 
The quoted analysis was published in International Affairs in 1956. In 
the past half century, the Middle East has undergone processes of rapid 
social change. It is true that change has taken place, but no structural 
transformations favourable to democracy have occurred. To quote Issawi 
again, “In the Middle East the economic and social soil is still not deep 
enough to enable political democracy to strike root and flourish. What is 
needed is not merely constitutional or administrative reforms, not just a 
change in government machinery or personnel.”41 
Since the publication of this classical article by Issawi, Arabs have 
witnessed numerous changes of government and the replacements of 
political leaders with others who only have different labels. Nevertheless, 
                                                      
39 Charles Issawi, “Economic and Social Foundations of Democracy in the Middle 
East”, International Affairs, Vol. 32, No. 1, January 1956, pp. 27-42, specifically p. 28. 
40 Ibid., p. 41. 
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the political culture of political oppression and the lack of political freedom 
continue to exist. Most Arab states reserve for themselves the monopoly of 
all facilities, while civil society not only means very little but is almost 
nonexistent. In short, it is not a Western conspiracy but the lack of the 
institution of democracy and the related political culture that determines 
the overall political situation. 
Is democracy alien to the Arabs because of its European origins? 
Identity politics42 is paramount in the context of the cultural turn. In this 
regard, authenticity is stressed and the spirit of gated communities is 
thriving. How does this affect democratisation? The claim of democracy is 
universal, but the fact that its origins refer to Europe closes the door for 
adoption elsewhere. The reference to European origins does not imply that 
any Eurocentric drive is followed here. The above-mentioned Hellenisation 
in Islamic civilisation reveals a rich record of learning from others.43 In his 
famous work on civilisations, Der Prozeß der Zivilisation,44  Norbert Elias 
enquires into the structural causes of the emergence of democratic rule in 
French history. Between the 14th and 17th centuries, France underwent 
crucial societal changes and also an attitudinal (in Elias’s terms, 
“sociogenetic” and “psychogenetic”) transformation in society. Germany 
was less developed and lacked not only territorial unity but also a similar 
structural transformation. These structural changes strengthened French 
society and were conducive to the unfolding of a complex structure in the 
state machinery. The structural reinforcement of French civil society 
contributed to limiting the all-encompassing, dominating power of the 
state. Elias labels this process with the term “Vergesellschaftung der Macht” 
[societalisation of social power]. Yet it can be argued that comparable 
processes in Islamic history, in which the state has always been in a 
                                                      
42 See Gary Lehring, “Identity Politics” in Mary Hawkesworth and Maurice Kogan 
(eds),  Routledge Encyclopedia  of Government and Politics, new edition, London: 
Routledge, 2004, pp. 576-86; see also the chapter by Bassam Tibi, 
“Fundamentalism”, 2004, pp. 184-204. 
43 Marshal G.S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam, Chicago, IL: Chicago University 
Press, 1977. 
44 Norbert Elias, Über den Prozeß der Zivilisation, 6th edition, Frankfurt: Frankfurt 
am Main, 1982; first published in 1978, English translation, The Civilizing Process, 
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position to impose its preferences on the umma society, are not seen. The 
lack of institutionalisation of power is a major factor in Islamic history. 
Prior to the French Revolution, the French king could rhetorically say: 
“L’état c’est moi”, although in reality, the French state consisted of a very 
complex structure that could not be governed by one person alone. The 
same cannot be said of any traditional Islamic ruler. It is not superfluous to 
refer in this context to Majid Khadduri’s many books, in which Arab 
politics is reduced to the study of biographies of Arab politicians.45 While 
this approach is methodologically extremely problematic, it does make the 
point that power in Arab politics is personalised. That does not mean, of 
course, that there are no structures underlying personalised politics in Arab 
societies. In Islamic history, the prevailing traditional question has been: 
‘Who is the Imam fadil [the true Imam]?’ and not ‘What are the proper and 
just institutions?’46 Among the very few exceptions one finds al-Farabi’s 
classical work on Al-Madina al-Fadila, in which he discussed the proper 
order47 continuing from the ancient Greek legacy in an Islamic tradition of 
rationalism. 
In the context of institutions, it is also worthwhile to look at 
Barrington Moore’s Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy,48 in which 
he provides a comparative analysis of Western and non-Western historical 
types of political development. Moore shows that those European societies 
that were able to develop a pattern of democracy had had some 
comparatively autonomous medieval institutions. The unfolding of these 
institutions contributed to strengthening the society vis-à-vis the state. 
Democracy requires the institutions of a civil state and society, and not only 
                                                      
45 See Majid Khadduri, Arab Contemporaries: The Role of Personalities in Politics, 
Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973; see also the more recent 
publication by the same author, Arab Personalities in Politics, Middle East Institute, 
Washington D.C., 1981. 
46 Bassam Tibi, Der wahre Imam: Der Islam von Mohammed bis zur Gegenwart, Munich: 
Piper, 2002; first published in 1996. 
47 Abu Nasr al-Farabi, Al-Madina al-Fadila [On the Perfect State], Richard Walzer 
(ed. and trans.), New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985. 
48 Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Boston: Beacon 
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a concept of a civil Islam as that which exists on cultural grounds in 
Indonesia.49 
The reference to the historical origins of democracy in Europe shows 
that without a strong civil society protected from the state, there can be no 
effective societal control over state power. If a society is weak, there is no 
real limit to the dominance of state power over the society. Without radical 
transformations of the existing economic, social and cultural structures, 
there can be no strong society in the Arab world and thus no real freedom. 
Some small organisations such as Saad Eddin Ibrahim’s Ibn Khaldun 
Center for Civil Society50 provide a model for the needed direction. These 
efforts are, as is well known, oppressed by the state and lack the needed 
impact. In summing up, it can be concluded that learning from others is not 
alien to the Arab-Islamic heritage. Democracy has Greek origins and 
Hellenism is a part of the Islamic legacy. Nevertheless, there are different 
varieties of democracy, which are adjusted to diverse local conditions. The 
local/global duality should, however, never serve as an argument for 
rejecting universality, i.e. commonalities above civilisational differences are 
to be shared by all of humanity. Authenticity, identity politics and the need 
for cross-cultural commonalities can work in harmony. 
Conclusions: Contemporary Arab political thought and democracy 
The question of an ‘Arab democracy’ needs to be related to the 
contemporary Islamic revival. Islam and its relation to democracy can be 
viewed in different ways. Yet we need to distinguish between Islam in 
general and the political Islam calling for a Shari’a state. Long before the 
rise of political Islam, the Lebanese political scientist and one of the true 
proponents of liberal democracy in the Arab world, Hassan Saab, 
published his book on a pro-democracy form of Islam as opposed to an 
Islam of despotism. Saab argues for a “comprehensive spiritual revolution 
in the soul of the man and in his life too”51 and applies his claim to the 
whole world of Islam. This is a plea for the attitudinal change required for 
achieving democracy in the Arab world and it supports the argument that 
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culture matters for the introduction of democratic traditions. At present, 
such liberal Arab thinking committed to democracy is rarely found. Has it 
been phased out? Arab liberals have viewed democracy as an idea and 
overlooked the structural and societal requirements to underpin it. The 
political culture of Arab liberals has failed to achieve democracy in Arab 
societies and therefore contributed to the decline of Arab liberalism. The 
introduction of a new value system first requires cultural innovations and 
second the awareness that it cannot flourish if the corresponding structural 
roots are missing. This insight has been absent in liberal Arab thought. 
Populist Arab socialists, who in the 1950s replaced the liberals with 
their rhetoric of populist freedom, believed in the collective political 
freedom (‘freedom of the Arab nation’), which was carried out by the state 
and aimed at shaping society in a totalitarian manner according to the 
respective populist ideology. Under their rule (Nasserism, Baathism and 
Qadhafi, etc.) there was no room for any individual political freedom, be it 
free expression or free assembly, let alone the freedom to build up political 
or social organisations (such as free trade unions). Pan-Arab socialists have 
continued to deny diversity and address it with contempt: man tahazaba 
khana [he who belongs to a political party/hizb is a traitor!]. Populist 
ideology has failed to conceive of society as a pluralist civil entity and 
instead views the nation as an organic whole. Like the liberals, the 
populists have failed and the new Islamists are on the rise.52 We need to 
understand this phenomenon and how to deal with it. Is there a light at the 
end of the tunnel or a continuation of the darkness? 
First, on the grounds of a quarter-of-a-century long study of political 
Islam, it can be argued that the politicisation of religion in Islam is resulting 
in the concept of a Shari’a-based Islamic order (the nizam Islami or Islamic 
system).53 This is the substance of Islamism. It is not a renaissance of 
                                                      
52 See Bassam Tibi, “The Renewed Role of Islam in the Political and Social 
Development of the Middle East”, Middle East Journal, Vol. 37, No. 1, Winter, 1983, 
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Challenge of Fundamentalism, op. cit. 
53 The first articulation of a ‘nizam Islami’ as an ‘Islamic solution’ is to be found in 
the first organisation of political Islam, the Muslim Brotherhood, established in 
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religion,54 or a spiritual Islam. If Islamists honestly – i.e. not tactically – 
accept democracy, then it would be fully wrong to address them as 
Islamists, because the term Islamism is bound in the belief in ‘din-wa-daula’ 
[unity of state and religion]. Islamism has two directions: institutional and 
jihadist (Tibi, 2005c). Institutional Islamists accept working in democratic 
institutions for tactical reasons and dispense with violent jihadist actions. In 
contrast, Islamist jihadists believe in global jihad/Islamic world revolutions 
as the only means to restore the siyadat al-Islam [Islamic global supremacy] 
(Tibi, 2005c). 
As to the question of how to deal with them, there are inclusive and 
exclusive strategies. It is democratic to include the institutional Islamists in 
the game of democracy but it should be recognised that such a move risks 
undermining democratisation in the name of democracy. When it comes to 
jihadism, the only approach is security, because for jihadists all that counts 
is the action directe of violence. This sort of double strategy is what is 
needed.55 
The defenders of militant and political Islam point to the ascendancy 
of new actors who reject the notion of individual freedom. It does not even 
exist as rhetoric because the discourse of political Islam is based on the 
umma [community] and does not take freedom into consideration. In the 
course of the recent political revitalisation of Islam, a process labelled in the 
West as ‘Islamic resurgence’, one cannot even find rhetorical pleas for 
democracy such as the previously cited one by Hassan Saab. It needs to be 
stressed that the foremost authority of contemporary political Islam, Yusuf 
al-Qaradawi, views democracy as a “hall mustawrad” [imported solution]. 
Al-Qaradawi expresses this attitude in his three-volume publication (Al-
Hall al-Islami wa al-Hulul al-Mustawrada, 1980).56 It follows that Islamist 
                                                      
54 On this issue, see the controversy presented in Bassam Tibi, “Habermas and the 
Return of the Sacred: Is it a Religious Renaissance or the Emergence of Political 
Religion as a New Totalitarianism?” in Religion-Staat-Gesellschaft: Journal for the 
Study of Beliefs and Worldviews, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2002, pp. 205-96. 
55 On the needed double-track strategy see Bassam Tibi, “Between Islam and 
Islamism: A Dialogue with Islam as a Pattern of Conflict Resolution and a Security 
A p p r o a c h  v i s - à - v i s  I s l a m i s m ” ,  i n  T a m i  A .  J a c o b y  a n d  B r e n t  E .  S a s l e y  ( e d s ) ,  
Redefining Security in the Middle East, Manchester: Manchester University Press, pp. 
62-82. 
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ideology is not favourable to democratic solutions but makes use of them 
for convenience. The commitment to the values of political freedom and 
democracy must be related to a structural transformation of Arab societies 
combined with an Islamic reformation to culturally underpin democracy. 
An Islamic ethics of democracy could be the alternative to religious 
fundamentalism in Islam, but it must be free of the misconception that 
Islam is a system of government. 
Finally, it is argued that the developments in the field of democracy 
in the Arab world have more important implications for Europe than for 
the US. If democracy is dismissed, it will be impossible for the European 
Islamic diaspora to integrate. Political freedom in Arab societies will not 
fall from heaven. Nor will it be presented as a gift by a ruler or be 
successfully imposed from outside by an external power. History teaches 
us that people have to fight for their rights and will continue to be 
subjugated as long as they fail to do so. In this context one needs to ask 
whether political Islam provides a light at the end of the dark Middle 
Eastern tunnel. The answer of the present analysis suggests that it does not. 
Yet the historical experience of introducing democracy to the Arab world 
has shown that no one can overlook the religion of Islam while talking 
about democracy in a political sense. The place of Islam has to be restricted, 
however, to an ethics of democracy and never be extended to a system of 
government and state. This author cannot detect the spirit and institutions 
of democracy either in the concept or practice of a Shari’a state. Therefore, 
the de-politicisation of Islam is an essential part of the needed 
democratisation of this religion.57 Stated in a nutshell, the formula 
presented by the Islamists of al-Islam huwa al-Hal [Islam is the solution] is to 
be reversed: political Islam is not the solution! The conclusion is thus 
twofold – on the one hand, there can be no democracy or democratisation 
without engaging an Islamic discourse on this issue. On the other hand, an 
                                                      
57 See Tibi, Islam between Culture and Politics, op. cit. In addition to the needed de-
politisation of religion, an education in democratic values is essential. See also 
Bassam Tibi, “Education and Democratization in an Age of Islamism” in Alan M. 
Olson, David M. Steiner and Irina S. Tuuli (eds), Education for Democracy, Lanham: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishing, 2004, pp. 203-19. This publication grew from the 
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presented and discussed at Boston University ahead of this publication, and are 
most pertinent to the CEPS project associated with this book. ISLAM, FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY IN THE ARAB WORLD | 113 
 
Islamisation of politics in the Arab world is not the right avenue for 
introducing a civil Islam that is consonant with democracy. To be sure, 
democracy is a political culture of rule based on pluralism; it is not a value-
free procedure of voting for a political direction that opposes pluralism in a 
civil society in favour of a religion-based rule under the heading of ‘nizam 
Islami’ [Islamic system]. This nizam would be no road to democratisation. 
Arab democracy cannot be a copy of Western democracy. Nevertheless, it 
could be a variety of the phenomenon of a universal democracy, but never 
really a rule in its own terms.  
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EGYPT’S MOMENT OF REFORM: 
A REALITY OR AN ILLUSION? 
EMAD EL-DIN SHAHIN 
Introduction 
The movement for democratic reform in Egypt seems to be gathering 
strength. Some of the factors that would make a good case for democratic 
transformation are rapidly converging: the formation of a wide spectrum of 
discontented segments in society; the mushrooming of pro-reform grass-
roots movements that agree on a clear list of short-term demands; and a 
sympathetic pro-reform international context. With presidential and 
parliamentary elections scheduled to take place in September and 
November respectively, will Egypt finally experience its democratic 
spring? The answer to this question still seems uncertain. The reform 
movement faces numerous challenges: the possibility of being sidelined by 
an agreement between the regime and external actors for the sake of 
stability and containing change; regime repression of the reform 
movement; and the radicalisation of the movement itself and the possible 
eruption of sporadic violence or chaos. For reform to become a reality and 
not another missed opportunity, certain structural changes and 
institutional safeguards must be introduced.  
Mounting discontent 
Several developments at the beginning of 2005 sent clear signals that the 
year would be a difficult one for the Egyptian government. The regime has 
become a target for internal and external pressures to undertake qualitative 
democratic reforms. The pro-reform forces in the country became 118 | EMAD EL-DIN SHAHIN 
 
determined to publicly and forcefully challenge the regime’s attempts to 
circumvent reform and outmanoeuvre the growing demands for ending the 
state of emergency, amending the constitution and allowing for a 
competitive presidential election. In an attempt to avert these pressures, the 
governing National Democratic Party (NDP) held a conference in 
September 2004 to launch its new vision for the country and propose ways 
to activate political life. But the NDP congress came as a big 
disappointment to the opposition, whose demands were all rejected. The 
party insisted on setting its own refor m  a g e n d a  b y  g i v i n g  p r i o r i t y  t o  
economic reforms and proposing minor political changes to some of the 
existing laws. In fact, the congress refused to even discuss the possibility of 
amending the constitution, changing the rules of the presidential elections 
or lifting the state of emergency. Instead, it focussed on superficial changes 
to the laws on party formation, public assembly and the practice of political 
rights. All the changes proposed sought to reinforce the party’s grip over 
the pace of political reform. 
It became obvious that the regime chose to derail the democratic 
reforms. Most alarming was the fact that the country was being prepared 
for a hereditary succession of power. President Hosni Mubarak, who is the 
head of the party, did not participate in the congress proceedings, except 
for the concluding session. The president’s son, Gamal Mubarak, who also 
heads the party’s Policies Committee, received wide publicity and most of 
the attention during the congress, as he appeared to be spearheading the 
reforms and the ‘reformist wing’ within the party. He assumed the role of 
explaining the party’s plans, outlining the government’s future vision and 
restructuring the party to increase the presence and influence of his own 
clients, the party’s ‘new guards’. As the presidential elections were at that 
time only one year down the road, and despite official denials, it became 
clear that the way would be open for Gamal Mubarak to become Egypt’s 
next hereditary president – a scenario that all the pro-reform forces in the 
country vehemently reject and are willing to resist. 
Another discernable development this year concerns the extent of the 
opposition to the regime’s agenda. The spectrum of pro-reform movements 
has been expanding daily and has become wide enough to include a 
diversity of activists such as university students, professors, lawyers, 
doctors, engineers and journalists – and perhaps for the first time – judges 
and Azharite scholars. Strangely enough, through its reluctance to change 
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all of these groups, who have begun to feel that the fulfilment of their 
demands is directly linked to a larger process of reform.  
The case of Egypt’s judges is worth elaborating upon because it could 
have significant political ramifications in the future. Traditionally, the 
judges have deliberately refrained from interfering in politics or taking a 
public political stand in order to ensure the independence and neutrality of 
the judicial branch. Yet last April, judges finally joined the movement and 
stressed the need for overall reforms. They pressed the government for 
certain demands in return for their supervision of the upcoming 
presidential and parliamentary elections. These demands included 
approving a new law for the judicial branch (which they had proposed but 
the regime had been stalling since 1991), to ensure complete independence 
of the judiciary from government interference. They insisted on their full 
supervision over the entire electoral process, from the preparation of the 
lists of voters to the announcement of the election results. The judges have 
been outspoken about past election irregularities and expressed their 
determination not to participate in future elections that could be rigged. 
Their stand received support from various organisations – representing 
lawyers, journalists, engineers, workers, the Muslim Brotherhood and the 
Egyptian Movement for Change, known as the ‘Kifaya  [Enough]’ 
movement, which consider the complete independence of the judiciary and 
its total supervision over the elections as a necessary safeguard for a 
democratic transition and the future of reform in the country. 
Pro-reform movements from the grass-roots level 
Egyptian political life has for a long time been monopolised by an over-
dominant state party. Its strength has not been driven by its popularity or 
clear vision, but has emanated simply from its close association with the 
state administration and control over an elaborate patronage system. This 
monopoly over the political arena has been recently challenged and broken 
by the emergence of several pro-reform movements from the grass-roots 
level, which have managed to attract various segments of the country’s 
‘dormant’ and ‘ineffective’ counter-elites and mobilise its ‘silent’ and 
‘apathetic’ public. Reform movements have been proliferating over a 
relatively short time. In one year, more than 14 pro-reform movements 
have emerged in opposition to the possibility of renewing Mr Mubarak’s 
presidency for a fifth term and to a hereditary succession. 120 | EMAD EL-DIN SHAHIN 
 
‘Change’ seems to be the buzzword or the common denominator 
among all these movements. An inventory of the recently formed 
movements includes: the Kifaya movement, the National Rally for 
Democratic Transformation, Journalists for Change, Doctors for Change, 
Intellectuals for Change, Writers for Change, Youth for Change, the 
Association of Egyptian Mothers and the Movement of White Ribbons. 
Obviously these groups vary in influence and impact, but their rapid 
growth has several indications. It is a clear sign that the existing legal 
political parties are not effective in articulating the demands of the people; 
that professional or particular reform interests cannot be achieved unless 
overall transformation occurs; and that the collective momentum for 
change requires the solidarity of various groups. All these forces seem to 
agree on a clear list of demands that call for ending the state of emergency, 
rejecting hereditary succession, holding free and clean elections and 
changing the constitution. The following sections address some of these 
movements for their potential future significance, particularly Kifaya and 
the National Rally for Democratic Transformation, as well as the Muslim 
Brotherhood, which has witnessed a clear change in its strategy over the 
past few months.  
The Kifaya movement 
The Kifaya movement appeared in August 2004, as a non-partisan, umbrella 
pressure group that reflects the major political trends in society. Its 
founders consist of a wide range of political activists, professionals and 
intellectuals, representing the Nasserites, Islamists, liberals and leftists, in 
addition to independents. Kifaya started with the formulation of basic 
reform demands on which all the political activists could agree, such as 
preventing the re-election of the incumbent president and hereditary rule. 
It also expressed its opposition to any foreign intervention in the reform 
process.  Kifaya’s objectives started to evolve as the movement gathered 
initial support from different political forces. It decided to take its demands 
directly to the streets. The movement organised its first demonstration on 
12 February 2005, which has since been followed by several more 
throughout the country. Despite its relatively short history and limited 
influence, last April it was able to organise 14 demonstrations in different 
parts of the country in one day. As a sign of further evolution, the 
movement is planning to hold a conference on democracy, to which it has EGYPT’S MOMENT OF REFORM | 121 
 
invited all the key political forces and intellectuals to discuss the future of 
democracy in the country. It is also planning to form popular committees to 
monitor the presidential and parliamentary elections.1 
Since its establishment, the Kifaya movement has become the focus of 
heated controversy. Even some of its founders are uncertain about its 
future or how it will evolve. Some question the objectives behind the 
formation of the movement and the reasons for the government’s toleration 
of some of its activities. The tamed political parties (those that have 
accepted to engage in a dialogue with the regime) are wary of the 
movement and are keen to discredit it. They consider the movement as a 
sporadic phenomenon and accuse it of being elitist and of maintaining 
foreign links. The Muslim Brotherhood, which participates in the 
movement and its demonstrations, expresses reservations regarding the 
language and the slogans used by the movement in these events. The 
Brotherhood also harbour some concerns about the possibility that Kifaya 
may evolve or be used to undermine its popular influence and presence 
among the public. In a sign of growing divergence from reality, the 
government accuses the movement of being foreign-inspired and of 
receiving finances from external sources. Referring to the Kifaya movement 
in an interview by Le Figaro, President Mubarak stated that “some 
movements are being dropped [in] by the outside”.2 In an attempt to 
undermine the impact of Kifaya, he hinted that it was easy for him to 
establish a counter-movement in support of the regime, entitled ‘mush 
Kifaya [not enough]’. 
The fact of the matter is that Kifaya is an evolving political movement, 
with genuine concerns for reform and for not leaving the political spectrum 
widely open to the manipulation of the regime or the influence of the 
Muslim Brotherhood. It has adopted effective protest tactics and achieved 
some successes in crystallising agreed-upon reform demands. It certainly 
reflects popular requests for change, and that could be a reason for its 
growing influence despite the relatively limited number of its supporters 
(estimated at 3000, mostly through the Internet). In addition, the movement 
has demonstrated high skills in using the Arab and foreign media. The 
Kifaya movement phenomenon also reveals the ineffectiveness of the 
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existing legal political parties and their inability to mobilise the people. 
This reason may explain why ‘tamed’ political parties are suspicious of the 
movement. The movement also presents a clear source of pressure on the 
regime, which has resorted to an unconvincing way to discredit the 
movement through accusations of foreign links. In fact, Kifaya is a 
transitional movement with short-term demands and it is unlikely that it 
would evolve into a political party, because of the nature of its formation 
through representatives of various political parties. Kifaya acknowledges 
that it has not articulated a comprehensive, long-term vision for reform; 
however, it could become a residual force that could assume a monitoring 
role for the process of democratisation in the Egypt and appeal to ‘the 
street’ whenever violations occur. 
The National Rally for Democratic Transition 
Another potentially important movement is the National Rally for 
Democratic Transition. It was created by a group of politicians and 
intellectuals in June 2005. The Rally is led by former Prime Minister Aziz 
Sidqi and includes former officials, diplomats, university professors and 
well-known experts in economics, education, diplomacy, media and law. In 
a press conference that was attended by more than 100 prominent figures, 
the group appealed to all the national forces to join together for the 
purpose of creating a ‘national front’ to crystallise and reach an agreement 
over a strategic vision of political change and democratic transition in 
Egypt. The founders confirmed their intentions not to organise 
demonstrations or compete for power, but to formulate ideas that would 
“rescue Egypt from the current state of stagnation and check the alliance of 
corruption and authoritarianism that blocks reform”.3 The group 
eventually seeks to hold a general conference of the national and 
democratic forces and form a constituent committee representing all the 
political and intellectual trends. The main task of this committee is to write 
a new constitution for Egypt. It is still too soon to assess whether this newly 
established movement will be successful. The most important aspect about 
the group is the idea it stands for and its attempt to devise a futuristic 
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vision that would generate the agreement of the main political actors. This 
challenge is not an easy one. 
The Muslim Brotherhood 
Many have noticed a clear change in the strategy of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in their relationship with the regime and in the reform agenda 
they have proposed. This change was observed in March 2005, when the 
Muslim Brotherhood insisted on carrying out a demonstration to demand a 
faster pace for the reforms and for increasing public freedoms. Despite a 
refusal by Egyptian state security to grant permission for the group to 
demonstrate, the Muslim Brotherhood defied the ban and organised a 
‘symbolic’ demonstration in which 10,000 persons participated. The 
government responded with the subsequent arrests of hundreds 
(thousands, according to some reports) of the Brotherhood’s followers. The 
show of force by both the state and the Muslim Brotherhood seemed to be 
heading towards a major escalation, or what some have already called a 
‘bone-crushing phase’.  
In a clear break from past practices, the group refused to relent and 
continued with even larger intermittent demonstrations over a period of 
three weeks. The Muslim Brotherhood did not promulgate its usual 
traditional slogans in these demonstrations, but adopted an appealing 
reform agenda that called for ending the state of emergency, allowing 
public freedoms, precipitating the pace of reform, holding clean 
presidential elections under total judicial supervision and releasing all 
political detainees (estimated at 20,000). In one day last May, it organised 
41 ‘surprise’ rallies in which 70,000 persons participated in 18 governorates. 
The surprise element was necessary to avoid the pre-emptive arrests of 
organisers and prevent state security from blocking the roads leading to the 
destinations of the demonstrations – a practice state security forces have 
been following recently. The group withheld the time and locations of the 
demonstrations from the media, which were only informed on the same 
day. The ability of the Muslim Brotherhood to organise these 
demonstrations despite government harassment attests to its organisational 
skills and popular influence.  
The government considered this continued defiance as a clear 
violation of all its redlines and stepped up its crackdown on the group by 
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preparing for the Brotherhood’s participation in the coming parliamentary 
elections as well as many of the group’s potential parliamentary 
candidates. Two days later, the group organised another demonstration. 
That day was later dubbed ‘Black Friday’, because of the violent 
confrontations that led to the death of one demonstrator, the injury of tens 
and the arrest of hundreds. This prompted the supreme guide of the 
Muslim Brotherhood to threaten “civil disobedience if that was the only 
way to achieve freedom and justice for the Egyptian people” and to insist 
on achieving comprehensive reforms.4  
The explanations behind the Brotherhood’s change of strategy varied. 
The government, its official media and critics of the group tried to attribute 
this change to external pressures. This view was widely publicised in order 
to discredit the group through claims of foreign affiliation and clandestine 
contacts and dialogue between the Muslim Brotherhood and the US and 
the EU. It was argued that the Muslim Brotherhood had become 
emboldened by the statements of American officials, indicating acceptance 
of the results of a democratic process even if it brings Islamists to power, 
a n d  b y  s o m e  E U  o f f i c i a l s ,  w h o  h a v e  c o n s i d e r e d  e n g a g i n g  t h e  m o d e r a t e  
Islamic movements in the reform process. 
Yet it is more likely that the change in the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
strategy is related to the rapid political developments and alterations in the 
balance of power that have been taking place in the country over the past 
year and a half. The general political atmosphere has been generating new 
(and reviving old) forces for change and reform in which various groups 
are competing for a place and a role. The government and the ‘legal’ 
opposition have opted for the exclusion of the Muslim Brotherhood, the 
most organised popular force. In March 2004, the group issued a 
comprehensive reform initiative that reflected a noticeable difference in its 
language and views. The main objective behind this initiative was to 
provide a common ground for discussion and agreement on basic reforms, 
over which the opposition would rally against the regime. The legal 
opposition, however, preferred to engage in a ‘national’ dialogue with the 
regime and exclude the Muslim Brotherhood from the negotiation process. 
This dialogue was completely manipulated by the regime, which used it to 
give the impression that its intended reform measures had been discussed 
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and sanctioned by the opposition. In addition, the emergence of new 
movements (particularly Kifaya), which have succeeded in gaining 
publicity in a relatively short time and in acquiring a de facto recognition, 
must have moved the Muslim Brotherhood to try to reassert its presence as 
a significant player and to avoid being marginalised or perceived as a non-
recognised political actor. 
Another probable explanation for the change in the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s strategy is the mounting pressures on the government and 
the feeling that the moment is ripe for extracting concessions and gaining 
new ground from a faltering regime. For the past year, the government has 
been exposed to domestic and external pressures to introduce meaningful 
political reforms and effective democratic advances. All its attempts to pay 
lip-service to reform and outmanoeuvre the pressures by introducing 
changes that could be described at this stage as more than cosmetic but less 
than profound have raised the expectations of its opponents and made the 
regime even more vulnerable. A calculated show of force and a popular 
presence on the part of the Muslim Brotherhood could add to these 
pressures, helping the group to reach a negotiated agreement with the 
regime that would perhaps grant them a larger representation in the next 
parliamentary elections in return for preventing the grass-roots supporters 
from plunging into total chaos and extremism.  
Notably, even when the tension between the government and the 
Brotherhood was mounting, both exchanged direct hints for easing the 
situation. President Mubarak declared in April that he did not hold any 
enmity towards the Muslim Brotherhood and would not mind the group’s 
participation in the political process as members of existing parties. The 
Brotherhood returned this courteous gesture. The group continued to 
confirm that they were not seeking to topple the regime and that they were 
interested in a dialogue. The supreme guide, himself a member of the 
Kifaya movement, criticised Kifaya, for not showing enough respect to the 
head of the state and for using insulting language against the president. 
This move should not come as a surprise. In fact, it is in the interest of both 
sides to prevent an all-out escalation and reach a compromise. The 
Brotherhood cannot afford the destruction of the organisational structures 
that it has worked for years to rebuild. Further, there is no reason for the 
time being to offer itself as the only scapegoat for government wrath, 
particularly in the absence of a supportive stance from the liberal and 
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government would remove a moderate Islamist movement and indirectly 
contribute to the emergence of radical Islamic groups. This scenario is not 
difficult to imagine, taking into consideration the re-emergence of such 
groups and the bombings that took place earlier this year. 
External actors 
Over the past few months, the US and EU have become more vocal in their 
support of real democratic changes and political reforms in the region. 
Unfortunately, the signals that the external actors have been sending are 
mixed and in some cases contradictory. There are clear inconsistencies and 
even retreats. To mention but a few examples, the regime’s sham 
constitutional amendment to Art. 76 concerning candidates for presidential 
elections has been described as ‘historic’; news about a possible EU 
engagement of moderate Islamic movements has been vehemently denied; 
human rights violations are selectively condemned. More importantly, and 
perhaps disappointingly, it is not yet clear which side either of these two 
external actors has decided to support: that of stability with reformed 
autocrats or change with unreliable reformers. There are growing 
indications that the choice might be ‘change with stability’. Ironically, that 
is exactly the slogan that the autocratic rulers in the region have been 
expounding for a long time. 
The Egyptian government has been exploiting this state of 
indecisiveness to pit domestic and external actors against each other. It has 
intimidated the pro-reform movements and the independent, non-
governmental organisations by raising issues of national sovereignty, 
violation of the country’s independence and even treason. The official press 
is accusing Kifaya of foreign funding and the president himself has 
threatened to take action against the Muslim Brotherhood upon proof that 
it has had contacts with external actors. Meanwhile, the regime continues to 
use the Islamist threat as a scarecrow to fend off the US and the EU. This 
strategy seems to be working. Almost all the pro-reform forces have gone 
at length to deny any foreign contacts and even condemn any external 
attempt to bring about reforms, despite that the fact that this could run 
against their interests in the long run. 
Nevertheless, external actors can play a role in supporting the pro-
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•  limit the government’s ability to circumvent reform and 
outmanoeuvre the demands for effective and substantive democratic 
changes; 
•  send clear, unequivocal signals to the regime that they would not 
allow it to crush the opposition or violate basic human and public 
rights (the right to demonstrate, articulate demands, assemble, form 
political parties, etc.); 
•  urge the state to include all the non-violent and moderate groups in 
the political process; 
•  support the demands of Egyptian judges for ensuring the 
independence of the judiciary; 
•  insist on free and clean presidential and parliamentary elections; and 
•  support effective, independent domestic monitoring of the elections. 
This task has to be handled in a highly diplomatic way. In general, 
the pro-reform forces are suspicious of US and EU intentions. There is a 
strong objection to any possible outside interference. Some may even fear 
that the external actors might be contemplating a forceful regime change, 
which, despite opposition to the government, is unacceptable. 
Obstacles to the democratic spring 
The movement towards transition can turn into a democratic spring or a 
democratic mirage. It faces several challenges that could arrest this 
potential opportunity for transformation. A major challenge is that the 
regime might succeed in aborting this momentum for change by striking a 
deal with the US and the EU. The government could plea for a transitional 
phase to introduce gradual reforms in return for maintaining stability. Such 
an initiative could be carried out through appropriating some of the 
demands of the opposition, yet adapting them to legalise the continuation 
of certain restrictions and maximising the gains. A good case in point is the 
constitutional amendment to Art. 76. It scuppered a major demand of the 
opposition to prevent hereditary succession and ensure competitive 
presidential elections by introducing a structural change that legalises the 
ascendancy of Gamal Mubarak to power in a nominally competitive 
presidential election, in which, given the conditionalities of the 
amendment, only the candidate of the official state party can stand a 
chance. In a similar vein, the new package of laws that the regime has 
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formation and the practice of political rights promise only superficial 
changes. 
Another major obstacle is the lack, so far, of a clear alternative to the 
existing regime either at the level of a popular presidential candidate 
backed by the opposition or a future political alternative. It is true that the 
pro-reform movements are in agreement on a short-term list of reform 
demands. This is a remarkable achievement that should not be 
undermined. But the problem is ‘what next?’. Most of the proposed 
demands are partial measures for reform. Admittedly, the regime is in no 
other position but to respond to the mounting domestic pressures; 
however, it will do so in its own manipulative way. Will that be enough to 
achieve a democratic reform or must a real transfer of power come about? 
Are the pro-reform movements ready – with candidates, programmes and 
alternatives – for such a possibility? This situation really calls for a national 
conference that includes all the pro-reform forces in the country to debate 
and formulate a future vision and concrete alternatives for the country. In 
fact, the Muslim Brotherhood, Kifaya and the National Rally for Democratic 
Transition have all called for such a step. 
This last point raises a number of concerns. The multiplicity of reform 
movements with similar demands, but different objectives, can easily 
generate competition, discord and potential fragmentation of the reform 
momentum. It also underscores the continued absence of a mainstream 
organisation that can aggregate the bulk of these objectives and represent 
the majority of the public. Despite the coordination between the Muslim 
Brotherhood and other pro-reform movements, tension transpires every 
now and then. It is natural at this stage that many of the members of the 
Muslim Brotherhood feel disappointed by the inadequate support given to 
them by other movements, despite the fact that they have been subjected to 
government condemnation the most. Undoubtedly, the regime will not 
spare any opportunity to create divisions and fragment its opponents. It 
will use its typical tactics of selective repression, toleration and co-option in 
order to break down their temporary and fragile unity. 
A serious obstacle to a democratic transition is the possible loss of 
control and deterioration of the situation into a state of chaos and violence. 
This remote, but possible scenario could arise if the government insists on 
repressing the moderate opposition. In a transitional process, both the 
regime and the pro-reform movements should have an interest in avoiding 
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escalation would give radical elements the opportunity to sabotage the 
entire reform movement. Radical forces within the government could use 
the pretext of the spread of violence for repression in order to restore 
stability; a radical opposition could easily undermine the moderates and 
validate arguments to resort to violence. 
Structural changes and institutional safeguards 
It is impossible to build a democratic system on authoritarian structures 
and dynamics. The existing constitution, state structures and political 
culture in Egypt would turn the most idealist of democrats into a repressive 
dictator. The system has a history-old tradition of making ‘pharaohs’. In 
addition, the existing distrust and mutual fear among almost all the 
players, regime and pro-reform forces alike, cannot be addressed by good 
intentions alone. Likewise, the practice of guilt by association unfairly 
excludes an important group, namely the moderate Islamists, from the 
right of inclusion in the political process. All this calls for the need to 
construct institutional guarantees and strong safeguards that would 
prevent any force – radical Islamic, radical secular or a military junta – 
from sabotaging any future democratic gains.  
Most likely, Mr Mubarak’s regime will continue for a term or less, 
depending on his state of health and his government’s ability to handle the 
domestic pressures. The pro-reform movements should use this transitional 
phase to continue to push for: 1) dismantling the structures of 
authoritarianism; and 2) constructing structural safeguards. They seem to 
be clear about the first step. It is the second step, however, that needs some 
elaboration.  
Democracy by nature allows for different visions and perspectives. 
The expectation that an agreement must be reached on a universal vision 
for the future of the country is closer to totalitarianism than democracy. 
This is exactly where the role of political parties comes in, as they compete 
for support for their particular visions and plans. In other words, each 
party has the right to have and propose its vision, with the voters being the 
decisive element. Yet, a successful transition requires agreement on certain 
political practices and processes, which could be enshrined in a national 
charter for political action or in a new constitution. Such a charter cannot 
avoid addressing three main issues: identity, economic growth and public 
liberties (citizenship rights). It has to secure the consent of all political 130 | EMAD EL-DIN SHAHIN 
 
forces, regardless of their orientations, on principles concerning the transfer 
of power, free and fair elections, the condemnation of violence, respect for 
public and individual freedoms, the freedom of association, an 
independent judiciary and de-politicisation of the military. These measures 
could provide assurances to all the political forces that they can have a 
chance to compete in a stable and fair process. 
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DOES THE EU PROMOTE DEMOCRACY 
IN PALESTINE? 
NATHALIE TOCCI 
Introduction 
Particularly since the late 1990s, EU actors have become increasingly vocal 
about the need for democracy and good governance in Palestine. 
Palestinian democracy is viewed officially both as desirable per se as well 
as instrumental to the peace process since the eruption of the second 
intifada. To support Palestinian democracy, the Union has used diplomatic 
instruments, as well as bilateral aid and trade policies, delivered 
conditionally upon the fulfilment of political and legal benchmarks. The 
Palestinian Authority (PA) is also included in the nascent European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).  
Compared to other cases in the southern neighbourhood, the EU can 
take pride in achieving relative success when it comes to strengthening 
Palestinian democracy and good governance. Palestine’s economic and 
political dependence on Europe has translated into a high degree of 
potential EU influence on the PA. This influence has been exerted by 
graduating the delivery of EU (principally aid-related) benefits in 
compliance with specified and monitored obligations. Yet the Union’s 
potential influence has not been fully realised. At times, reforms passed 
have been inadequate, superficial or implemented for the primary purpose 
of acquiescing to foreign demands. The reasons explaining the limits in EU 
conditionality are manifold. The most critical are those linked to the sui 
generis context in Palestine. The deteriorating economic and humanitarian 
situation, the deepening Israeli occupation, the blunt US approach to 
Palestinian reform during Arafat’s rule and internal Palestinian political 132 | NATHALIE TOCCI 
 
dynamics in a non-state context have all hindered the potential impact of 
EU conditionality.  
But a second set of limits, far more linked to the EU as an actor in 
international affairs, relates to the inadequate or incomplete specification of 
EU conditions. In cases such as judicial reform, conditions have been too 
general and have not been sufficiently specified and followed-up to yield 
effective long-term results. In other cases, the Union has pushed for 
reforms that were not necessarily the most desirable or urgent. The passing 
of the Basic Law may be a case in point. Furthermore, while some areas 
have received disproportionate EU attention (such as the security sector, or 
the prime minister’s post), others have received none at all. Most critically, 
the questions that lie at the centre of Palestinian democracy, such as the 
relationship between the PLO and the PA and the exclusion of the Islamic 
factions from both organisations, have been neglected by EU actors. 
Tackling these questions is no simple feat. Indeed underlying these 
questions are three fundamental dilemmas: namely which polity, which 
territory and which authority do we refer to when talking about Palestinian 
democracy.  
The renewed international attention to Palestinian politics in the post-
Arafat period offers scope for enhanced EU action on Palestinian reform. 
The concomitant publication of the EU-PA Action Plan, which largely 
focused on questions of reform, provides the avenue for revamped EU 
efforts in this direction. Several ideas are presented to enhance the EU’s 
support for democracy in Palestine through its new (and old) instruments. 
However, over and above the modalities of EU conditionality, successful 
EU policies requires an internal EU consensus on whether and to what 
extent the Union is truly intent on fostering democracy in Palestine. 
EU Aims and Instruments in Palestine 
Supporting reform to further democracy, end violence and promote the peace 
process 
Collectively, Europe has defined its end-goals in Palestine over the course 
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increasing clarity their support for Palestinian self-determination.1 By the 
end of the Oslo Process in the 1990s, the EU asserted that Palestinian self-
determination would be best fulfilled through the creation of a viable, 
sovereign and independent state, on the basis of the 1967 borders, with 
minor adjustments agreed by the parties.2  
When the concept of a Palestinian state took root in the 1990s, the 
Union was largely unconcerned with the internal governance of the 
Occupied Territories. The focus was on institution-building in general, 
rather than on the precise modalities and quality of Palestinian democracy. 
This was in part because of the embryonic nature of the PA. It was also 
because, in the context of the Oslo process, the EU (as well as the US) opted 
not to criticise the parties (i.e. Israel for its violations of international law 
and the PA for its corruption, human rights violations and 
authoritarianism), fearful of disrupting the negotiations.  
Condemnations surfaced towards the end of the process, and most 
acutely since its demise. As negotiations came to a halt and violence re-
erupted, EU policy-makers became more vocal about the shortcomings of 
the Palestinian state-in-the-making. Since the 1999 Berlin European 
Council, all EU official statements specified that the future state should be 
democratic as well as independent, sovereign, peaceful and viable.3 With 
the eruption of the intifada, the European Council affirmed that the reform 
of the PA was essential and would be supported by the Union. Underlying 
these statements were three inter-linked objectives. The first direct objective 
was to support democracy and good governance as an end in itself. The 
two indirect aims were to quell Palestinian violence and to remove any US 
and Israeli reason (or excuse) to reject negotiations with the Palestinians.  
The objective of reform tailored to strengthening Palestinian 
democracy came in response to donor experience and to the internal 
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mounting criticism within the OTs. By the mid-1990s, Palestinians 
increasingly criticised their leadership for having failed to deliver peace 
and better standards of living. They resented the widespread corruption, 
inefficiency and authoritarianism of the Authority. Palestinian scholars 
have argued that in view of these resentments, divisions emerged between 
the ‘old guard’, including the revolutionary PLO leadership from Tunis, 
and the ‘young guard’, including younger secular and Islamic groups, 
indigenous to the OTs and connected to the grass-roots.4 Other scholars 
have painted a more complex picture, identifying different and often 
opposing actors within the Palestinian political scene.5  
The objective of reform as a means to curb violence (and re-engage 
Israel and the US) is far more problematic, in so far as it is based on a 
tenuous (if at all existing) link between reform and a permanent end of 
violence. The second intifada saw the perpetration of grave human rights 
abuses by Palestinian militant groups. The PA leadership may have 
initially ridden the wave of violence as a means to regain its lost legitimacy 
post-Camp David II. However, there is no internationally-corroborated 
evidence showing that the PA planned, ordered or carried out attacks on 
Israeli civilians.6 The identified responsible groups have been Hamas, 
Islamic Jihad, the PFLP and the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, none of which are 
part of official institutions, and indeed most of which oppose the 
Authority. The former leadership under Yasser Arafat was criticised for not 
taking sufficient remedies to prosecute those responsible for the attacks. It 
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January/February, p. 92. 
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responded by claiming that its actions were contingent on Israel’s 
behaviour, given that Israel’s violations reduce the PA’s ability to repress 
crimes perpetrated by groups not acting under its instructions. The 
difficulties encountered by the new leadership under Mahmood Abbas, 
despite its efforts to end violence, validate this point. It has been difficult to 
pinpoint the line separating the PA’s capability from its political will to end 
violence. Reform may strengthen capability, but alone it is unlikely to quell 
violence.  
The deployment of EU instruments tailored to reform 
Diplomatically, EU objectives on Palestinian reform have been pursued 
through its participation in the Quartet since 2001 (and the Quartet’s work 
on reform since 2002) and through bilateral diplomatic channels (via the 
High Representative, the Special Envoy and individual member state 
initiatives). In 2002 and 2003, High Representative Javier Solana and British 
officials engaged in back-channel attempts to broker cease-fire talks 
between Palestinian factions. The High Representative has also elaborated 
plans to train Palestinian security forces in Gaza in the light of Israel’s 
disengagement.7 Alongside him, British Prime Minister Tony Blair 
organised two international conferences (in 2003 and 2005) on Palestinian 
reform. 
EU objectives have also been pursued through bilateral aid and trade 
policies, delivered conditionally upon the fulfilment of political 
benchmarks. In 1986, the member states established a preferential import 
regime for Palestinian goods produced in the occupied West Bank, East 
Jerusalem and Gaza Strip. In 1997, in the context of the Barcelona Process, 
the Community signed an Interim Association Agreement with the PLO, at 
the heart of which lay the anticipation of Palestinian statehood. The aim 
was to further trade liberalisation and to establish a framework for political 
dialogue with the nascent Authority. Like other agreements of its kind, the 
Interim Agreement included a ‘human rights clause’, which opened the 
scope for the EU’s use of political conditionality as well as for the 
discussion of democracy and human rights in the context of political 
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dialogue. In 2003, the PA was included in the ENP, which holds the 
promise of deepening the bilateral contractual relationship. Far more than 
the Interim Agreement, the 2004 Action Plan on Palestine offers wide scope 
for political conditionality. Indeed it states that its principal raison d’être is 
that of furthering Palestinian reform and democracy. 
However, due to the absence of a state and the humanitarian and 
economic conditions in the OTs, bilateral relations with the Palestinians 
have far more emphasised aid over trade. Since 1971, Community 
assistance has been channelled to Palestinian refugees through UNRWA 
(United Nations Relief and Works Agency). In 1987, this was 
complemented by direct assistance to Palestinian civil society. In the 
context of the Oslo process, the member states, through a Joint Action, 
stepped up their economic support to the Palestinians, this time directed 
primarily to the PA. In the delivery of aid, particularly since the eruption of 
the intifada, the Union has gone the extra mile to ensure that EU funds 
have not been redirected to finance political violence. The Commission has 
investigated the use of EU funds to Palestine by initiating an independent 
enquiry by OLAF (European anti-fraud office), which concluded that 
monies disbursed have been subject to careful monitoring.8  
Furthermore, financial assistance has been made conditional on 
reform obligations. Increasingly stringent conditionality has been imposed 
since 2001. In particular, with Israel’s withholding of revenue transfers to 
the PA, the EU provided the PA approximately €10 million per month in 
direct budgetary assistance in 2000-03. These funds were disbursed under 
strict conditions and IMF monitoring. As Israel partially resumed revenue 
transfers in 2003, the EU cut direct budgetary support and established a 
new Reform Instrument. This included €80 million for the targeted support 
of SMEs, municipalities and social services, and €10 million in technical 
assistance for ongoing fiscal reform. The Commission also financed the 
preparation for new elections, the institutional reform of the judiciary and 
the security services, and counter-terrorism measures. It has stepped up its 
technical support and initiated twinning projects and training initiatives. In 
view of the January 2005 presidential elections, the EU committed over €3 
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million to finance an observer mission. EU observers have and will be 
dispatched also for the municipal and parliamentary elections in 2005. 
The Commission began focusing on Palestinian reform well before 
the widespread Israeli and American interest in the question. The first EU-
sponsored attempt to highlight the deficiencies of the PA came in 1999, 
with the publication of the Rocard-Siegman report.9 In addition to the 
report’s proposals, EU conditions drew from the recommendations of the 
Palestinian Legislative Council in 2001, numerous Palestinian NGOs and 
PA officials. Internal Palestinian recommendations included ratifying and 
enacting the Basic Law and the Law on the Independence of the Judiciary, 
establishing a Constitutional Court and a High Judicial Council, abolishing 
State Security Courts, holding general elections, redistributing competences 
between the President and the Cabinet, ensuring transparency of public 
finances and restructuring municipalities, the civil service and the security 
sector. These calls were supplemented by the 100-day reform plan, 
approved by President Arafat in June 2002. In particular, EU conditions 
called for greater transparency in public finances through the consolidation 
of all revenues in a single account monitored by the IMF and under the full 
responsibility of the Finance Ministry, a freeze on public sector hiring, the 
adoption on a Law on the Independence of the Judiciary, and the passing 
and application of the Basic Law.  
Several EU-demanded reforms were implemented. In 2002, the Basic 
Law was adopted, and it was revised in 2003 to allow for a Prime 
Ministerial post (pushed for by the US and Israel). In October 2002, the 
Cabinet was restructured and reshuffled. A law on the independence of the 
judiciary was passed. Significant progress was made in the management of 
the PA’s finances, curbing the potential for corruption. PA revenues were 
included in a single transparent account, the President’s budget was cut 
and there has been ongoing work on an effective audit system. In 2003, the 
security sector was partly restructured, as the former 12 (poorly 
coordinated) apparatuses were streamlined into six sectors, although three 
remained under the President’s direct authority (efforts are currently being 
made to streamline further the six sectors into three branches). Particularly 
in the areas of judicial and financial reform, EU conditionality has been 
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pivotal. At specific moments in 2002-03, EU threats to withhold assistance 
provided the necessary external trigger to pursue the reform agenda.  
There have been also clear limits to the impact and effectiveness of 
EU conditionality. At times reforms have been superficial and 
implemented for the sole purpose of pleasing EU (and US) interests. The 
cabinet was reshuffled in 2002, but apart from a few exceptions, changes 
were largely cosmetic. Despite the passing of the Law on the Independence 
of the Judiciary in 2002, this was immediately followed by amendments 
introduced by the President, diminishing its effective independence. In 
2003 the creation of the Prime Minister’s post did not come with its 
effective empowerment, since most control remained in the President’s 
hands. In the security sector, the bulk of the reform began only in 2005, and 
the new President is facing acute problems in recruiting former militants in 
the security forces. In the fiscal sector, the President retains approximately 
8% of the budget, i.e. enough to persist in the nepotism that has lied at the 
fore of the corruption and the skewed inter-institutional balance of powers. 
Despite the announcement of elections in early 2003, presidential elections 
took place only in January 2005, in view of the imperative to replace the 
late President Arafat. Parliamentary elections, due to take place in 1999, 
were initially scheduled to take place in July 2005, but have now been 
postponed, ostensibly due to technical reasons relating to the passing of the 
new electoral law, yet in practice due to the fears of a strong showing by 
Hamas.  
Explaining the Impact of EU Conditionality on Palestinian Reform 
The international and domestic contexts 
The reasons explaining the effectiveness of EU conditionality, as well as its 
limits, are manifold. The most critical are those linked to the sui generis 
context in which EU conditionality operates. There are four inter-related 
features constraining the EU’s potential impact and influence in Palestine. 
First is the deteriorating status quo and the downsizing effect this has had 
on EU objectives. Particularly during the most acute years of the second 
intifada in 2001-2003, maximalist goals of state-building were scaled down 
to minimalist goals of survival. Israel’s destruction of PA infrastructure as 
well as the deepening humanitarian crisis in the OTs meant that rather than 
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and development, donor assistance shifted its attention to short-term goals 
of crisis management, poverty alleviation and institutional survival.  
Second is the deepening Israeli occupation, which has erected 
mounting material and political obstacles to Palestinian reform and the end 
of violence. The restrictions on movement and Israel’s withholding PA 
revenues have posed tangible obstacles to the accomplishment of reform as 
an aim in itself. In order to strengthen and empower different institutions, 
to hold free and fair elections and to reform the security sector, legislators, 
civil servants and police forces need to dispose of the necessary resources, 
and to move freely across the territories. However, as put by one 
Palestinian minister: “How can we speak of a separation of powers when 
we don’t have any?”10 Put differently, how can reformist domestic actors be 
empowered to pursue domestic change under the status quo? Turning 
instead to the corollary aim of ending violence (bearing in mind the 
tenuous link between reform and violence), Israeli actions have limited the 
political ability of any Palestinian leader to quell violence. The extent to 
which any PA leader can use his (limited) powers to repress Palestinian 
violence is directly linked to Israel’s conduct. It has often been argued that 
without Israel’s easing of the situation in the OTs, no Palestinian leader 
could put an end to violence without causing internal strife. This point is 
repeatedly made by Mahmood Abbas, who is intent on ending the violent 
intifada.  
The third feature is the blunt approach adopted by the international 
community to Palestinian reform, and in particular by the US and Israel 
during Arafat’s rule. As long as the peace process continued, the 
international community refrained from heavy criticism of the Authority, 
despite the mounting complaints amongst the Palestinian population.11 In 
early 2002, Israel, following the US, began focusing on the question of 
Palestinian reform. Yet their discourse was framed in terms of ‘regime 
change’ and focused on the demonisation of Arafat. The frontal attack on 
the former leadership strengthened its waning legitimacy, hindered 
succession, weakened Palestinian voices that had long called for reform 
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and at most triggered merely superficial reform. The widespread 
expectation that Arafat would have won new elections also delayed 
presidential elections until 2005 (in view of Arafat’s death). 
Likewise, the expectation of Hamas’ strong showing in the 
parliamentary elections, initially scheduled for July 2005, led to informal 
American and Israeli pressure to postpone them. While the postponement 
was ultimately decided by Abbas, not least due to the internal chaos within 
his secular Fatah faction, the fact that Israel and the US supported the 
decision deepened doubts within the OTs on the international community’s 
genuine support for Palestinian democracy. Suggestions made by Israeli 
and US officials concerning their response to a possible victory by Hamas 
further weakened moderate forces in Palestine. In this respect, it is 
important to note that popular support for the Islamic factions is far more 
linked to their stance on internal governance matters than to their positions 
on the conflict. As such, to the extent that the public viewed the 
postponement of the elections as the ruling elite’s attempt to cling to power 
while bending to foreign demands, their support may have fallen.  
Finally, Palestinian political dynamics constitute another contextual 
reason for the limited success of EU conditionality. The Palestinian political 
scene is highly complex, with many actors interacting in constantly 
changing ways. While this is true for most countries, the distinctiveness of 
Palestine is the absence of a state and thus the limited ability of governing 
structures to exercise full and effective control over its territory and people.  
When it comes to EU conditionality aimed at curbing Palestinian 
violence, the principal problem has been that the targets of conditionality 
have not been the direct authors of most violent acts perpetrated against 
Israel. Despite back-channel contacts aimed at brokering a cease-fire, the 
EU has had no direct official contact with and thus leverage on Palestinian 
actors such as Hamas. Indeed under heavy US and Israeli pressure, Hamas 
was included in the EU’s terrorist list in 2003. Instead, EU conditionality 
has targeted the PA, in direct opposition to the Islamic camp. The question 
is thus whether EU conditionality could have been indirectly effective by 
inducing the PA and Fatah (the dominant party in the PLO) to repress 
violence orchestrated by others. It has been difficult to ascertain to what 
extent this could have happened. The degree to which late President Arafat 
could have curbed violence, had he so wished, will be determined in the 
period following his death. Evidence in 2005 certainly points to an 
increased willingness and ability of the new leadership to curb violence. DOES THE EU PROMOTE DEMOCRACY IN PALESTINE? | 141 
 
The February 2005 cease-fire agreement and the leadership’s efforts to 
reform the security sector led to a significant drop in Palestinian violence. 
However, the temporary reduction in violence is linked to many other 
time-contingent factors, including Hamas’ desire to participate in elections 
and enter the PLO. As such, the ability and strength of the new President to 
put a permanent end to violence is uncertain and can only be credibly 
tested after the parliamentary elections.   
When it comes to wider questions of reform and good governance, 
the hindrance posed by the late President is far more evident. Under 
Arafat, the pre-eminence of the presidency within the executive and 
between the executive and other branches of government was enshrined in 
law and augmented by the personal status of the late president. The 
resulting institutional hierarchy and centralisation has started to change 
since November 2004. There is now a greater sharing of powers within the 
executive (between the president, the prime minister and the cabinet) and a 
greater separation of powers between the three branches of government. 
Furthermore, the Palestinian Legislative Council is likely to be empowered 
through parliamentary elections.  
The reform agenda is being pursued with unprecedented vigour. 
Under the new leadership, a technocratic cabinet has been appointed, 
mandated to further the reform process. The president and cabinet have 
pursued security sector reform, working to consolidate three stream-lined 
apparatuses, namely general security (including policing), general 
intelligence and national security (i.e. the embryo of a future defence force). 
The president has overhauled the personnel service, downsizing and 
training forces and preparing to recruit former militants. Administrative 
and legislative work is underway to establish a 12-member National 
Security Council, as well as to create budget and oversight parliamentary 
committees with effective financial powers. In the fiscal domain, 
transparency in public finances is being enhanced through the control of 
the President’s funds. In foreign affairs, the new Foreign Minister Nasser 
el-Kidwa is intent on overhauling the diplomatic service, introducing 
rotation and affiliating the diplomatic corps to the PA (rather than the 
PLO). In the judicial sphere, a draft law is being prepared clarifying the 
relationship between the Ministry of Justice and the Higher Judicial 
Council. Work is also underway to review the role of the Public Prosecutor. 
Regarding overall administrative reform, the Ministry of Planning is 
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overlaps and improve coordination. Discussion is also underway to 
restructure the institutional relationship between the cabinet and the 
parliament, so as to enhance the latter’s benchmarking, monitoring and 
oversight roles. 
Finally, in 2005 there has been an intensified dialogue between the 
secular and Islamic camps, as well as an ongoing redefinition of roles and 
power balances within the main secular Fatah movement. Dialogue 
between the factions has enhanced and improved, as the new Palestinian 
president intensified his efforts to broker a ceasefire in February 2005. The 
militant groups and in particular Hamas have consented to temporarily 
end violence. Hamas has also accepted to participate in the parliamentary 
elections. Its success in municipal elections in 2004 and 2005 and the rising 
tensions within (and thus weakening of) the secular camp persuaded 
Hamas that the politically expedient moment has come to enter official 
institutions, namely the PLC, and depending upon electoral results 
possibly the executive itself. Dialogue is also underway concerning the 
possible inclusion of Hamas in the more comprehensive PLO. When it 
comes to the secular camp and in particular Fatah, tensions have been 
mounting within the movement, triggering violent acts perpetrated by 
activists and militants against PA institutions since March 2005. It remains 
to be seen whether the sixth Fatah Congress, scheduled for August 2005 
(the first held in 16 years), will empower young Fatah members with strong 
backing from the public, and whether this will regenerate the largest 
secular movement in Palestine and enhance the coherence of the 
Palestinian liberation strategy.  
Assets and constraints of EU instruments and their deployment 
Turning to the intrinsic merits and deficiencies of EU policies in Palestine, 
the first observation to make is that the relative success of EU 
conditionality is linked to the Palestinian economic and political 
dependence on Europe. The sheer magnitude of EU economic aid to 
Palestine created the scope for significant political influence and leverage 
on the Authority. Community assistance to Palestine, linked to different 
budget lines, has risen progressively since the 1990s. In 1994-98, the EU 
committed 400 million ECU in grants. It committed a further €600 million 
in 1998-2002. Through these monies, the EU financed both PA institutions 
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During the intifada, EU assistance increased exponentially. The Palestinian 
humanitarian crisis and Israel’s withholding of revenues to the PA in 2000-
03 led to a rise in EU assistance of over €300 million per year in 2000-03. 
Today, the EU (including member states) represents by far the largest 
donor to Palestine, and without EU aid since 2000, the PA may well have 
collapsed.  
Table 1. EU aid to the Palestinian Authority 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 
Total aid (€ million)  215  144  317  256 
Direct budgetary support (€ million)  90  101  97  16 
 
Palestinian political dependence on Europe is also high. Like Israelis, 
Palestinians frequently accuse Europe of playing an inadequate political 
role in the Middle East. However, unlike Israel, they would warmly 
welcome a more substantial and effective European involvement in the 
c o n f l i c t .  G i v e n  t h e i r  v i e w  o f  t h e  U S  b i a s  i n  f a v o u r  o f  I s r a e l  a n d  t h e i r  
appreciation of the multifaceted weaknesses of the Arab world, 
Palestinians view Europe as the international actor that could best support 
their cause.  
Palestinian economic as well as political dependence on Europe 
creates the scope for a relatively high degree of potential EU influence. In 
addition, financial assistance to Palestine does not suffer from problems of 
time inconsistency often present in ex ante or ex post EU conditionality (i.e. 
the time lag between the demanded conditions and the delivery of the 
benefit, which decreases the value of the latter). In the case of the 
Palestinians, the nature of the benefit (aid) allows for its graduated 
delivery. Indeed, as the PA became critically dependent on EU budgetary 
transfers over the course of 2002-03, the Commission refined its techniques 
of delivering assistance in return for and in compliance with strict 
conditions and monitoring over time.  
However, there are discernible limits in the value of the EU’s 
economic and political ties to the Palestinians. In terms of aid, over the 
course of the intifada, many EU-funded projects have been destroyed by 
Israeli raids, thus reducing the objective value of positive EU incentives. 
When it comes to negative incentives, while threats of suspending 
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withdraw the bulk of its economic assistance to the Palestinians. Doing so 
would trigger the collapse of the Authority and would consequently oblige 
Israel to undertake the financial responsibilities that derive from its legal 
status as occupying power. EU actors have never realistically contemplated 
or desired this outcome. 
In terms of trade, EU carrots are of minimal value. Even the limited 
provisions for preferential trade included in the 1997 Interim Association 
Agreement are largely unimplemented, due to Israeli obstructionism. In 
view of Israel’s non-recognition of the EC-PLO agreement, the government 
has prevented the preferential import of European products with 
certificates of origin issued under the EC-PLO Agreement, and it has often 
issued Israeli certificates of origin for Palestinian exports. This problem has 
received little EU attention, and the Union has made no systematic attempt 
to persuade Israel to alter its stance. Under this status quo, it seems 
unlikely that the ENP Action Plan with the PA will succeed in enhancing 
trade ties with the Palestinians. At best, the Union, through its Action Plans 
with both Israel and the PA, can push for a more effective implementation 
of the trade aspects in the existing Palestinian Agreement, particularly in 
relation to Palestinian trade through Gaza port (in view of Israel’s 
disengagement). Corroborating this point is the fact that the EU-PA Action 
Plan foresees hardly any trade-related benefits to the Palestinians.  
Politically, the EU’s influence is also constrained by the widespread 
Palestinian perception of Europe’s weakness and the belief that ultimately 
the US is the only third party worth taking seriously. Much to their 
frustration, the Palestinians are all too aware of the external and self-
imposed constraints in European foreign policy in the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict.  
Conflicting political priorities? 
But perhaps the major limit to the effectiveness of EU conditionality relates 
to its insufficient, inadequate or incomplete specification of conditions and 
obligations. In some cases, conditions have been too general and have not 
been sufficiently specified and followed up to yield effective long-term 
results. Judicial reform is a case in point. In 2002, under heavy EU pressure, 
the PA passed a Law on the Independence of the Judiciary. With the 
passing of the law, EU attention waned. Yet despite marginal 
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Council, the Supreme Court and the Public Prosecutor are still appointed 
by the executive without clear and objective selection criteria. This has 
caused persisting limits to the real independence of the judiciary and to its 
ability (and willingness) to hold the executive accountable. There have been 
acute tensions between the Higher Judicial Council, the Public Prosecutor 
and the Ministry of Justice, partly due to the unclear division of 
competences between the three. This has caused delays and inefficiencies in 
the judicial system, with a disproportionate number of unimplemented 
judgements and several key unimplemented laws. For example, the Higher 
Judicial Council has not yet established a Constitutional Court or 
administrative courts, although these are foreseen in the approved Basic 
Law.  
In other cases, the Union pushed for reforms that are not necessarily 
the most desirable or urgent under present circumstances. In 2002, the 
Union insisted on the implementation of the Basic Law. While the Law was 
welcomed by some, many Palestinians have doubted its desirability in the 
absence of territorially-defined statehood.12 The Oslo accords set the legal 
basis of the Basic Law, casting it in a legal and political straightjacket, 
which may well hinder Palestinian self-determination in the long-term. 
This is not least because it entrenches the distinction between territorial 
sovereignty and the authority over individuals. Under current 
circumstances, a more fruitful way ahead would have been to adopt a Bill 
of Rights defining the extent and manner in which the PA is responsible for 
the protection of its citizens.13 Indeed the carrying out of four death penalty 
sentences in Gaza in June 2005 reminds us of the pressing need to secure 
human rights in the OTs. 
More problematic still is the fact that some areas have received 
disproportionate EU attention (such as the security sector, or the post of 
prime minister), while others have received none at all. The questions 
which arguably lie at the forefront of Palestinian democracy have been 
largely neglected by EU actors. A core issue in Palestinian democracy that 
has received scarce attention from EU policy-makers is the non-
comprehensive nature of the PLO and PA and the subsequent 
                                                      
12 Contribution by Raja Shedada at the Conference on 10 Years of the Palestinian 
Authority, 14-17 March 2005, Ramallah. 
13 Contribution by Kamil Mansoor at the Conference on 10 Years of the Palestinian 
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consolidation of a one-party system (i.e. Fatah). Beyond creating a 
territorial divide between Palestinians (inside and outside the OTs), the 
Oslo accords also generated a political divide between proponents and 
rejectionists. Rejectionists in turn have been excluded from PA structures 
(legally and politically based on the accords), leading to a fracture in the 
Palestinian political system. Current domestic dynamics to include the 
Islamic parties, and most notably Hamas, in the PLO and the PLC could 
considerably enhance the quality of Palestinian democracy. The Union, 
through High Representative Solana, has exerted efforts in the past to 
sponsor inter-factional dialogue, but this has been for the sole purpose of 
brokering a cease-fire agreement, and has not been directed to wider 
questions of Palestinian politics. In fact, the Union has shown remarkably 
little interest in these questions, which arguably lie at the very core of 
Palestinian democracy.  
Another key issue is the duality between the PLO and the PA. While 
the (uneasy) co-existence between the two institutions was frozen during 
Arafat’s rule, due to the historical and overarching role of the former 
Chairman-President, PLO-PA tensions have mounted since Arafat’s death. 
More precisely, there has been an increasingly vocal debate on the relative 
merits of the two organisations to legitimately represent the Palestinians. 
Similar debates apply to the duality between the Palestinian Legislative 
Council (the legislative branch of the PA) and the Palestinian National 
Council (the representative body of the PLO), and between the PLO 
Executive Committee and the PA Cabinet.  
PA-PLO duality touches on three fundamental dilemmas underlying 
Palestinian democracy, namely the definition of a polity, a territory and an 
authority being democratised. When referring to Palestinian democracy, 
which Palestinians are included? The entire Palestinian people dispersed 
throughout the diaspora, the Palestinians in the OTs and the Palestinian 
citizens of Israel, or the Palestinian minority in the OTs? In turn, which is 
the relevant territory to which democratisation policies apply? The OTs, 
Israel and Palestine combined or all the territories hosting large numbers of 
Palestinian refugees (Israel, Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria)? And 
finally, which are the authorities to be democratised? The PA, Israel and the 
PA, or the PLO throughout the diaspora?  
In principle, to enhance Palestinian democracy, greater efforts should 
be exerted to re-empower the PLO, as the only institution representing all 
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and Gaza Strip, can only claim to represent a minority of the people. As 
such, it is particularly ill-suited to externally represent the Palestinian cause 
and to decide upon pan-Palestinian issues such as refugees. Furthermore, 
in view of Israel’s status as occupying power, the PA is not responsible for 
key policy areas affecting Palestinian lives (even within the OTs).  
However, the EU has implicitly decided to focus on the PA rather 
than the PLO. In this respect, it is interesting to note that while the Interim 
Association Agreement was signed by the PLO (which at the time 
represented the only legal entity), the ENP Action Plan was negotiated with 
the PA. A strong case can be made in justification of this choice. The PA 
(rather than the PLO) represents the Palestinian-state-in-the-making, whose 
establishment is a declared EU objective. Furthermore, even if the EU was 
intent on revamping the PLO due to its more representative nature, the 
practical difficulty is that the Organisation is scattered throughout the Arab 
world, and thus cannot meet, let alone be elected democratically (not least 
due to the lack of democracy in its host countries). While PLO-affiliated 
organisations are theoretically far more legitimate and representative, they 
are materially prevented from acting as democratically-elected institutions. 
However, quite apart from the relative merits of the EU’s de facto choice to 
focus on the PA, the notable fact is that there has been no EU debate on 
these problems. While supposedly advocating Palestinian democracy, EU 
actors have never confronted the most basic questions on this issue: namely 
democracy for whom, of what and where? 
Policy Avenues 
The renewed international attention to Palestinian politics in the post-
Arafat period offers scope for enhanced EU action on Palestinian reform. 
The concomitant publication of the EU-PA Action Plan, largely focused on 
questions of reform, provides the avenue for revamped EU efforts in this 
direction.  
One of the major challenges stems from the Palestinian elections and 
the desirability to allow these to enhance the legitimacy and accountability 
of the PA. In order for desired effects to occur, competitive, free and fair 
elections would be in order. The conduct of presidential elections on 9 
January 2005 was largely considered a success story. The same effort 
should be devoted to securing successful legislative and municipal 
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its voice in the Quartet, through financial and technical assistance and 
through monitoring, are all welcome. It is fundamental that the 
international community accepts whatever results emerge from the 
elections. In this respect, the EU has a pivotal role to play by adopting and 
keeping a principled position to be followed by the considerably more 
sceptical US administration.   
On longer-term questions of reform, the Union could pay greater 
attention to three key factors underlying the reform agenda; namely, 
domestic actors, incentives and capability. First, EU policies could focus 
more on local Palestinian actors and their interaction, in so far as these, 
rather than externally-imposed conditions, represent the driving force of 
any progress (or lack thereof) of reform. One step to support home-grown 
reform is to encourage greater involvement of Palestinian civil society. The 
Quartet set up a separate track on civil society. The reform process would 
benefit if civil society actors were not simply part of a separate reform 
track, but were included as stakeholders in the determination and 
implementation of the reform agenda.  
Another key issue, which resurfaced in late 2004, is that of Palestinian 
intra-factional dialogue, particularly between the secular and Islamic blocs, 
and the ultimate inclusion of the Islamic parties within the PLO and the 
PA. Ideas for dialogue and inclusion have long been sought by several key 
personalities on both sides. The purpose would be to enhance the quality of 
democracy and representation and provide greater clarity and unity in 
Palestinian national objectives as well as in the legitimate means to achieve 
them. Beyond the Islamist parties (and affiliated armed groups), dialogue 
with and participation of Islamic groups, particularly those active in civil 
society, would also enhance the effectiveness of humanitarian assistance 
and socio-economic development in Palestine. The merits of intra-factional 
dialogue and inclusion should not overlook its potential drawbacks. These 
drawbacks exist also in other contexts (from the Basque ETA, the Irish IRA, 
the Kurdish PKK to the Islamic parties throughout the Maghreb and 
Mashreq), and relate to the general desirability of including ‘anti-system’ 
groups within the legal political system. The merits are those of enhancing 
moderation and receptiveness to the rule of law. The dangers lie in 
legitimising radicalism or violence.  
In the Palestinian case, a more nuanced understanding of the 
intricacies within the Islamic bloc and in particular the important 
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armed groups, political parties and civil society actors) represents a first 
necessary step to resolve this dilemma. Greater European attention to these 
distinctions could contribute to more effective humanitarian and 
development strategies towards Palestine. When it comes to political 
participation, irrespective of whether their full inclusion in the PLO and the 
PA is on the horizon, the need for dialogue is likely to persist. The Union, 
and in particular High Representative Solana, building on its former 
support for intra-Palestinian ceasefire talks, could contribute more actively 
to mediating a strengthened dialogue, if and when needed.  
Second, the EU could formulate more consistently the incentives 
embedded in its conditionalities. The EU-PA Action Plan goes far in 
specifying the ‘priorities for action’ in the areas of institutions, democracy, 
human rights, the legal system, the fiscal and security sectors.14 Greater 
clarity in the reform objectives, to be followed through in political dialogue 
and monitored through joint EU-PA sub-committees, are all welcome 
developments. However, while rightly heavy on the obligations, the Action 
Plan is thin on the incentives. The only additional incentives mentioned in 
the Plan include efforts to implement the trade aspects of the association 
agreement and possible cooperation in the areas of transport, energy, 
research and people-to-people contacts. It is indeed hard to draw up 
feasible ‘integration incentives’ for a non-state actor under occupation. 
Moreover, given that the overarching Palestinian preoccupation is that of 
liberation and state-building, the most valuable EU incentives would be 
those directly or indirectly related to these aims. Firmer EU commitments 
to persuade Israel both to facilitate Palestinian trade and development 
(through its control of territorial waters, borders and airspace in Gaza post-
disengagement), as well as to respect human rights and international law in 
the OTs would be viewed as the most valuable incentives to the 
Palestinians. In this respect, it is interesting to note that while the EU-Israel 
Action Plan covers internal Palestinian questions (such as reform and 
terrorism), the EU-PA Action Plan makes no mention of Israeli policies 
towards the Palestinians. EU pledges geared towards increasing Palestine’s 
autonomy vis-à-vis Israel would also be valued highly by the Palestinians. 
High on the agenda would be aiding the PA to reach full fiscal autonomy 
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through an amendment of the Paris Protocol and supporting early 
accession to the WTO. 
Third, effective EU conditionality would factor in the limited 
capability of the PA as a non-state actor. As such, in the context of the EU-
PA Action Plan, EU policy-makers would need to distinguish between 
reform priorities that the PA can and should meet, priorities that require 
Israeli cooperation and priorities that need external support. On the first, 
including fiscal, judicial, legal and education reform, the EU could 
strengthen targeted positive and negative conditionality, particularly 
following amendment of the Paris Protocol, granting the PA full fiscal 
autonomy. On the second, such as security sector reform, the Union would 
hold the PA responsible up to and not beyond its capabilities, lest it fuel 
unrealistic expectations. Beyond PA capability, EU policy-makers should 
make the most of the enhanced EU-Israel relations to encourage Israeli 
cooperation. On issues requiring external support, including administrative 
reform, institution-building, trade and development, the EU would 
continue to focus on targeted financial and technical assistance.  
Making such distinctions in practice is no simple feat. Measuring 
relative capability is not only open to subjective interpretation, but it also 
requires continuous review, in so far as capability is contingent on time and 
circumstance. Yet however imperfect, breaking down reform priorities 
along these categories would be a first necessary step for an effective EU 
policy of conditionality. This could be done by EU and PA officials together 
through an appropriate sub-committee under the existing EU-PA Joint 
Committee. One method to move forward on this issue would be that of 
projecting what conditionality benchmarks would look like under ‘normal’ 
circumstances of sovereign statehood, and then work backwards from this 
end-point to current circumstances. The fact that the Palestinian context is 
highly open and internationalised, relative to cases of sovereign states, 
eases this task. As such, acquiring the necessary information for the 
specification of conditions and benchmarks may prove easier than in 
contexts of sovereign statehood. 
By way to conclusion, two key dilemmas are opened for discussion 
and further research. The first concerns the potential danger that ongoing 
support to the PA may perpetuate Israel’s occupation rather than 
contribute to Palestinian statehood. The dilemma arises because 
developments on the ground inevitably shape international assistance 
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municipalities in 2002-03, in the light of Israel’s ‘cantonisation’ policies or 
the rising attention to security reform in the light of the Gaza 
disengagement. Yet when aid follows developments on the ground, 
developments which are also largely shaped by Israeli policies, the risk 
becomes that of acting to support spoiling strategies, viewed as 
incongruent with EU aims. There seems no easy way out of this dilemma. 
The best way out could be that of strengthening conditional support for the 
PA, but only if the Union holds Israel legally and thus financially 
responsible (in deed and not only in word) for its actions in the OTs.  
Second, and linked to the discussion on the EU’s neglect of key 
reform priorities (such as the PA-PLO duality or the reform of the PLO), is 
a question of fundamental importance: namely, does the EU truly wish to 
promote democracy in Palestine? More accurately, what is the priority 
accorded to democracy and good governance compared to other goals, 
such as the end of violence and a peace agreement with Israel? Security and 
conflict settlement do not necessarily compete with democracy promotion 
and good governance. On the contrary, in the long-term and particularly if 
the focus is on conflict resolution over and above settlement, democracy 
and good governance may be a sine qua non for peace in the region. 
However, to the extent that EU actors may believe that particular 
manifestations of Palestinian democracy (such as the inclusion of the 
Palestinian diaspora or of Islamic parties) may hinder or preclude a 
putative agreement with Israel, its policy goals could become competing, if 
not mutually exclusive. No conclusive answer to this question can be 
provided here. Suffice it to say however that with without it, analysts and 
policy-makers could become overly preoccupied with the capability and 
modalities of EU democracy promotion, while failing to acknowledge that 
the core problem may lie elsewhere. 
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PARTIES OF POWER AS ROADBLOCKS  
TO DEMOCRACY: 
THE CASES OF UKRAINE AND EGYPT 
MADALENA RESENDE & HENDRIK KRAETZSCHMAR 
Introduction 
Political parties are the backbone of any functioning representative 
democracy. They are the agents that compete in the political arena for 
p u b l i c  o f f i c e  b y  o f f e r i n g  p r o g r a m m a t i c alternatives to voters. It is not 
surprising therefore that an analysis of countries that have failed to 
democratise shows political parties suffering from a severe pathology that 
renders them weak institutions. In both the eastern and the southern 
neighbourhood of the EU, a type of party has emerged, the ‘party of power’ 
characterised by its dependence on the state, the absence of ideology and 
the linkage with specific sectoral groups. Examples of such parties can be 
found in Ukraine during the reign of President Kuchma and in present-day 
Egypt.  
The ideological weakness of parties of power and their dependence 
on the state is both a symptom and a cause of the failure of democratic 
consolidation. Because they prevent the emergence of a multi-party system 
based on competing ideological-programmatic currents, these parties and 
their legacies should be seen as an important stumbling block in the 
transition towards and consolidation of democracy. This paper attempts a 
summary analysis of the phenomena, suggesting that an alternative model 
of party development is required in order for democracy to take hold in the 
eastern and southern neighbourhood of the EU. 154 | RESENDE & KRAETZSCHMAR 
 
Both Ukraine and Egypt are going through critical political 
transformations. Whilst in post-Orange revolution Ukraine, the pro-
Yushchenko coalition is now attempting to reproduce its victory over 
Kuchma’s oligarchs in the 2006 parliamentary election, there are signs in 
Egypt that rising domestic and international pressures for change are 
finally being met by government efforts to reform the political system. To 
be sure, serious differences exist between these two countries in the depth 
and pace of political change. In the aftermath of the Orange revolution, 
Ukraine is taking its first tentative steps towards democratic consolidation 
with crucial constitutional issues being discussed. During the Orange 
revolution, profound changes were introduced to the institutional 
environment, affecting the electoral system and the balance between 
presidential and parliamentary powers. Because these changes were 
imposed by the outgoing elite, the current government questions their 
legitimacy and is presently discussing how to settle these crucial 
questions.1 The ruling elite’s constitutional choices will be of paramount 
importance for the development of political parties and, ultimately for the 
democratisation of Ukraine.  
In Egypt, by contrast, mounting pressures for change on the eve of 
crucial presidential and parliamentary election this year have so far failed 
to produce real changes to the political status quo. Nevertheless, it is clear 
that domestic demands for reform, which have gained momentum in 
recent months, probably pose the most serious political challenge to the 
legitimacy of the Mubarak regime since the early 1990s.2 It is interesting to 
note in this regard that these pressures for reform do not primarily emanate 
from the legalised political opposition which, being co-opted into the 
regime, carries little pressure potential to challenge the established order. 
Instead – and this is a new phenomena in Egyptian politics – they emanate 
from a rising number of grass-roots reform movements and a more 
assertive and emboldened Muslim Brotherhood. Being united in their 
demands for immediate political reforms, these movements have in fact 
managed to challenge the authorities by mobilising a seemingly apolitical 
                                                      
1 V. Yushchenko, Ukraine President Hints at Referendum on Constitutional Changes, 
Interview with One Plus One TV, BBC Monitoring Unit in Kiev, 2005. 
2 E.E.-D. Shahin, Egypt's Moment of Reform: A Reality or Illusion?, CEPS Policy Brief 
No. 78, July 2005. 
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public and by organising a vast number of rallies and demonstrations 
across the entire country.  
Despite these differences between the two countries in the pace of 
reform, there is little doubt that the success or failure of democratic change 
in Egypt and Ukraine will largely hinge on the capacity of the political 
elites to shed the legacy of parties of power. In Ukraine this implies that the 
pro-Yushchenko coalition must go beyond creating a vote-winning 
coalition by laying the foundations of a centre-right party. In fact, if the 
current elite in power takes seriously the task of building an independent, 
centre-right party before the next election, Ukrainian democracy seems to 
have a chance. Otherwise, the patronage system set up by Kuchma could 
be reproduced again.  
For Egypt, this means that the authorities ought to do two things. 
First, they need to abolish all legal restrictions that have hitherto stifled the 
autonomy of political parties and their development into programmatic 
mass-based organisations. Second, and setting an example for other parties 
in the country, the Egyptian authorities must also cut the lifeline with the 
National Democratic Party (NDP), enabling the party to mutate into a truly 
autonomous and programmatic political force that can survive under 
competitive conditions.  
Surely, from the regime’s perspective, both of these measures are 
highly problematic, as they shake the very foundations on which the 
authoritarian system has been built. With rising domestic and international 
pressures for reform, however, it is all too clear that the logic of repression 
and patronage, so successfully employed by the Egyptian authorities 
during the 1980s and 1990s, will in the end have to give way to a logic of 
pluralism and competition. Consequentially, there are two ways forward 
for the NDP: it can either strive for greater autonomy from the state and 
stand a chance of survival, or, on failing to do so, crumble with the 
authoritarian regime that it has sustained over the past 20 years.  
The Concept of ‘Parties of Power’ 
Parties of power develop from a ruling elite’s drive to maintain control 
over the state by means other than programmatic competition, normally in 
situations of unconsolidated democracy or of limited pluralism. Being 
created from above, these parties are not meant to become autonomous 
political forces in their own right, but are utilised by the ruling elites as 156 | RESENDE & KRAETZSCHMAR 
 
instruments of co-optation, sometimes even coercion and political 
hegemony. To begin with, they simply serve the regime to sustain a 
network of patronage relationships with the major socio-political, economic 
and administrative actors of the country. By using the patronage networks, 
in fact, the regime seeks to ensure its very survival by granting these actors 
access to the spoils system of the state in return for their complacency 
concerning the existing order. What is more, such ruling parties also serve 
to provide regime-supportive majorities in the major elected institutions of 
the state. Since we are dealing with transitional regimes, all of which have 
introduced regimes, some form of multi-party elections, the control of the 
ruling elite in parliament is no longer guaranteed. Facilitating the 
formation of crushing majorities in parliament, ruling parties hence serve 
to sustain the political hegemony of the ruling elite in parliament and 
government.  
Despite their instrumental value within the political system, and 
possibly even because of that, there is little interest on the part of the ruling 
elites to develop these parties of power into fully institutionalised 
organisations with a clear ideological profile. The dependency of the party 
on the state would be broken by the formation of a ruling party with a will 
and a power base of its own. The oxygen of these parties of power is hence 
their relationship with the state. In fact, being an exceptionally weak 
institution, such parties will most likely disintegrate once deprived of their 
connection with the state. 
And herein lies the paradox. A truly competitive multi-party system 
cannot emerge within a system of parties of power, which unbalances the 
electoral game in favour of single party or a set of political parties that 
thrive on the spoils of the state. For democracy to take hold, these parties 
must be de-linked from the state and put on equal par with the other 
political forces in the country. In concrete terms, this means that political 
leaders have to yield to a different logic of party-building that undercuts 
dependency on the state and creates links with civil society through 
programmatic choices.3 At the same time they ought to facilitate the 
development of parties based on distinct ideological profiles to undercut 
existing patronage patterns and to facilitate electoral competition around 
                                                      
3 V. Randall and L. Svasand, “Party Institutionalization in New Democracies”, 
Party Politics, 8, 2002. 
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clear programmatic alternatives. Only once these preconditions are met 
will parties make the transition to a different model and contribute to a 
further democratisation of the political system.  
Yushchenko’s Ukraine 
The failure to consolidate democracy in Ukraine during Kuchma’s period 
in office owed much to the system of parties of power, characterised by a 
strong alliance of the political elites with common economic interests, who 
increasingly took control of political power in Ukraine during the 1990s.4 
With few exceptions, political parties in Ukraine represented networks of 
economic client-patron relations rather than expressing wider social and 
economic options for ruling the country.  
After the election of Kuchma to the presidency in 1994, the 
strengthening of the grip of several economic groups over the legislative, 
executive and judicial branches accelerated. Kuchma’s ruling Party of the 
Regions was little else than an assembly of clans and oligarchs who used 
state structures to further their vested interests. In parallel, the 1996 
Constitutional Amendments pursued by Kuchma strengthened the 
p r e s i d e n c y  b y  t r a n s f e r r i n g  p o l i t i c a l  p o w e r s  t o  t h e  o f f i c e  f r o m  t h e  
parliament. The formal concentration of powers by Kuchma was also 
accompanied by the strengthening of the control of the executive power 
over the judicial and legislative branches as well as the local state 
authorities.5 The hopes of further democratisation raised by Kuchma’s rise 
to power in the 1994 presidential election were dashed when the regime 
tightened its oligarchic control over the state and increased its authoritarian 
practices.  
The December 2004 mobilisation of masses to protest against electoral 
fraud in Independence Square was essentially a rebellion of civil society 
against the oligarchs’ control and the elite’s authoritarianism. The promise 
of a break with the past regime symbolised by the Orange revolution will 
                                                      
4 P. Kubicek., “The Limits of Electoral Democracy in Ukraine”, in Democratization, 
8, 2001. 
5 O. Sushko and O. Lisnychuk, “The Political Campaign and Ukraine's Political 
Evolution”, in H. Kurth and I. Kempe (eds), The Political Campaign and Ukraine's 
Political Evolution, Kyiv: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2005. 
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only be attained, however, when deep institutional reform takes place. 
Political parties are arguably central elements of such a transformation, and 
the new political elites should seriously attempt to break the legacy of 
parties of power. A first step is the strengthening of political parties by 
cutting their dependency on an illicit relationship with the state and 
strengthening their relationship with the voters through programmatic 
appeal. The strengthening of political parties is a building block for the 
strengthening of parliament and, ultimately, a more democratic form of 
control of political power.  
Arguably, the Orange revolution might have provided the 
institutional incentives for such a move. Indeed, a side-effect of the 
revolution, even if opposed by Yushchenko, was a constitutional settlement 
limiting the extremely wide powers gained by the President in the 1996 
constitutional reform. Although the legitimacy of the constitutional 
settlement is being now questioned for it was achieved under the threat of 
the use of force against the masses in Independence Square, the settlement 
still created a benchmark in transferring some of the powers back to the 
parliament. Although Yushchenko might try to limit the loss of presidential 
powers to the parliament implied in the package of constitutional reform, 
the reinforcement of the parliament’s powers appears inevitable. Although 
uncertain as to its scope and timing, the strengthening of the parliament 
will be an incentive to the creation of parties based on programmatic lines.  
But even if a more powerful parliament increases the value of 
political parties, a more powerful parliament will not lead automatically to 
the emergence of independent, programmatic parties and a structured 
party system. For this to happen, it is crucial that political leaders commit 
to take ideological coherence as their primary criteria for party-building, 
even when this implies a short-term loss of votes and office control. For the 
time being, Yushchenko’s priorities seem focused on creating a winning 
coalition for the 2006 parliamentary elections, with the institutionalisation 
of a party relegated to second place. When in early 2005, Yushchenko 
announced the formation of a new party, many expected it to be based on 
the parliamentary bloc created in 2001 to support his candidacy, the ‘Our 
Ukraine’. However, it soon became clear that the new party would be 
based on the public movement ‘For Ukraine! For Yushchenko!’ and would 
mainly include members of the new government, while on the whole the 
parties participating in the ‘Our Ukraine’ parliamentary bloc remained 
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(NSNU) took place in early April 2005, observers raised concerns in the 
political community that a new party of power was being created.6  
For the moment the new ‘Our Ukraine’ shows a number of features 
that augur poorly for its institutionalisation as a programmatic party. First, 
being based on a social movement rather than a structured party or 
coalition of parties makes the process of creating a coherent internal 
structure much harder to achieve and therefore decreases its chances of 
long-term survival.7 Second, the only ideological inheritance that the new 
party received from the popular movement supporting Yushchenko is 
rather vague: a commitment to democracy, opposition to the outgoing 
authoritarian regime and a commitment to the European route. Such 
commitments do not appear to give any decisive direction to the 
government in terms of political and economic decisions, which means that 
these identities do not provide sufficient glue and the parties do not 
survive much beyond the first set of elections.8 Political ideologies should 
thus provide more convincing indications regarding political and economic 
policies, such as positions on nationality or the size of the public sector. 
Obviously, ideological identities are not built instantaneously; one 
short-cut to ideological definition is thus the assimilation of existing 
parties’ ideological profiles by integrating parties with established profiles. 
At the time of writing, it remains unclear whether the original ‘Our 
Ukraine’ (Viktor Pynzenyk’s former ‘Our Ukraine’ party) and the parties 
descending from the Ukrainian Popular Movement (Rukh) – Yuriy 
Kostenko’s Ukrainian People’s Party and Boris Tarasiuk’s People’s Rukh of 
Ukraine – will eventually be included on the NSNU’s party lists as the 
Parliamentary elections of 2006 approach. Their exclusion would worsen 
the chances of consolidating the NSNU as a centre-right party.  
The descendents of Rukh would help build the ideological identity of 
the new party. Not only were the descendents of the Rukh,  Kostenko’s 
People’s Party and Tarasiuk’s Rukh, instrumental in the unification of the 
opposition parties behind Yushchenko’s presidential candidature, but as 
the movement that had earlier propelled Ukraine to independence, and the 
                                                      
6 J. Maksymiuk, Is New Pro-Yushchenko Party More Than a Party of Power?, RFE/RL 
Special Report, Prague, 2005. 
7  See Randall & Svasand, op. cit. and Sushko & Lisnychuk, op. cit. 
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one that is “most rooted in an independent civil society”, 9 it carries an 
important symbolic heritage. Even when attempting a catch-all strategy, 
the NSNU could define its ideological profile by combining the Rukh’s 
moderate and inclusive nationalism and Yushchenko’s moderate economic 
liberalism in a typical conservative profile. 
Yushchenko’s electoral coalition with Yulia Tymoshenko’s bloc and 
the Agrarian Party of Vlodymyr Lytvyn is advancing, with talks underway 
on the principles for parity of seats. Unfortunately, this seems to go hand in 
hand with a disregard for the basic procedures involved in forming a party 
with coherent structures and ideology. By relinquishing the party 
leadership, Yushchenko increased the uncertainty over the party 
leadership. In his way Yushchenko weakened the identity of the party, 
with the latest opinion polls showing a decline in the support for the Our 
Ukraine People’s Union.10 
Summing up, the ruling elite in Ukraine faces crucial decisions 
concerning the shape of the country’s political system. The choice is 
roughly between a semi-presidential system in which the parliament and 
parties are strong, and a presidential system where political parties remain 
dependent on the state. By taking a short-cut to electoral success rather 
than agreeing on building a single party structure based on a clear-cut 
ideology, the carriers of the Orange revolution would be reproducing the 
path taken by Kuchma following the 1994 elections. Circumventing the 
process of party institutionalisation allows a short-term attitude to the 
control of political power to dominate, at the expense of strengthening 
democratic institutions. In the absence of institutionalised political parties, 
the single-minded logic of political leaders’ control over the state 
institutions that characterised Kuchma’s system parties of power could 
thus prevail. The democratisation of Ukraine is thus at stake.  
Mubarak’s Egypt  
In many respects, the Egyptian party political scene resembles that of 
Ukraine prior to the Orange revolution. Here again we come across a 
system of parties of power, which as elsewhere in the Mashrek region, has 
prevented the country from developing a functioning multi-party system 
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based on programmatic-ideological competition. At the heart of this system 
stands the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP), which was carved out 
of the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) by President Sadat, when he abolished 
the single-party state in favour of limited party pluralism in 1977. From the 
onset, the NDP was not intended to become an autonomous political force 
in its own right, with a strong organisation and a clear ideological profile. 
Rather the ruling elite at the time, and President Sadat in particular, 
wanted to create a party that was subservient to the needs of the 
government and dependent upon it. Essentially the NDP was to function as 
an instrument of political hegemony and co-optation, ensuring the regime’s 
political supremacy in parliament and government and facilitating its 
linkage to the country’s major sectoral organisations, such as the trade 
unions and business associations.11 In this sense then, the NDP differed 
little from its predecessor, the ASU, which, under the authoritarian single-
party regime of the 1950s and 1960s, had served as a corporatist umbrella 
organisation, linking all major societal sectors to the state.  
To perpetuate the NDP’s regime dependence, Sadat, and even more 
so his successor Mubarak, made sure that the party remained both 
underfinanced and understaffed and that the appointments of all senior 
party positions remain the prerogative of the president. Most crucially, 
both presidents ensured that the NDP lacks a clear ideological profile and 
so also an ideologically committed membership base. Indeed, to this day, 
no serious attempt has been undertaken to unite the party’s vastly different 
ideological currents and fractions under a coherent programme and to 
build up a membership base that is defined by ideological commitment 
rather than by access to state patronage. As it stands, the NDP is populated 
by old Nasserites, market liberals, moderate Islamists, members of the 
‘parasitic bourgeoisie’ and state technocrats, and its programme remains 
little else than a collection of vaguely formulated principles. In fact, 
probably the only glue holding together this diverse blend of currents and 
fractions within the NDP is the dictum of statism, i.e. the belief in the 
legitimacy and continuity of the established order, and with it the party’s 
close ties to the all-powerful Egyptian presidency and the state’s spoils and 
patronage system. 12 
                                                      
11 See M. Kassem, In the Guise of Democracy: Governance in Contemporary Egypt, 
Ithaca, NY: Ithaca Press, 1999 and H. Nafaa, Al-Ahram Weekly, 12-18 October 1995. 
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According to most observers of Egyptian politics, the ideological 
vagueness of the ruling party is deliberately sustained by the regime for 
two reasons. First, it is sustained to pre-empt the development of an 
ideologically committed membership base that could turn the party into a 
new locus of power with a potential of undermining the supremacy of the 
Egyptian presidency. Second, this vagueness is also sustained as a means to 
justify any policy decisions taken by the government, without formally 
breaching official party doctrine. In other words, the party is being 
instrumentalised to legitimise post-factum the policies pursued by the 
government.13 This means that, contrary to the role of ruling parties in 
established democracies, the NDP carries little policy-making initiative 
despite its status as party in government. Here, as elsewhere in the region, 
policies emanate from the executive, with the parliamentary party 
functioning as a rubber-stamp institution for policy ratification. Whilst 
plaguing its day-to-day operations, the ideological weakness and state 
dependency of the NDP are probably most noticeable during election 
times. In most representative democracies, this heightened period of 
electioneering usually exposes the programmatic-ideological profiles of the 
parties that vie for the voters’ attention and confidence. This is not the case, 
however, with the NDP and its candidates which, rather than being 
selected by the party’s grass roots, have in the past been handpicked by the 
president to run for public office. In fact, over the past two decades of 
multi-party elections, the NDP has rarely produced an election manifesto, 
outlining the party’s policy proposals based on a coherent ideological 
profile. In the absence of such a profile, the party has instead relied on its 
linkage with the government in order to attract voters and secure election 
victory. Amongst other means, this has been done by instructing party 
candidates and their campaigners to propagate the government’s five-year 
plan, the past achievements of the NDP regime and, most importantly, the 
direct connection between the party and the president.  
In recent years, however, some steps have been undertaken by the 
NDP to revive the party as a mass-based organisation and to re-assert its 
position as a prominent player in Egyptian politics. These attempts follow 
on the heels of the 2000 parliamentary poll, which saw a drastic decline in 
the electoral fortunes of the NDP. Held under partial judicial supervision, 
these elections robbed the NDP of a home-grown majority in parliament, 
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which it was only able to salvage by re-admitting those de-selected NDP 
members who had defied party orders and run as independents. Alarmed 
by the dire state of the NDP, and particularly by its decreasing credibility 
as the governing party, the calls for internal reform rapidly gained 
prominence within party ranks and even amongst the ruling elite.  
At the 2002 general party conference, these calls for change 
eventually culminated in the implementation of a set of internal reforms 
that were intended to reconnect the party with the Egyptian electorate and 
to enhance its position within the power structure of the state. Under the 
direction of Gamal Mubarak, the son of the incumbent president and leader 
of a reformist camp within the party, several structural changes were 
introduced to the party statutes. Propagating greater internal democracy, 
for instance, the party introduced the direct election of its top positions and 
the grass-roots participation in the selection of candidates for 
parliamentary elections.14 Under the captivating slogan ‘new thinking’, the 
congress also debated and adopted a new programme for the party, which 
was meant to better reflect the changing socio-economic realities in Egypt. 
Most crucially, however, attempts were made to reverse the NDP’s junior 
position within the party-government relationship. Realising that a party 
without a programme and command of government policy could not 
survive in the long run, Gamal Mubarak, who in 2002 took over the NDP’s 
powerful policy committee, stated clearly:  
The NDP is the party that formed this government because it is the 
party that won the majority of votes in parliamentary elections. This is 
why the government must be restricted by the party’s 
recommendations, proposals and strategies on socio-economic and 
political developments in Egypt.15 
That Gamal Mubarak’s demands did not entirely fall on deaf ears 
within the regime became apparent in 2004, when the President formed a 
new government under Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif. As it later 
transpired, the NDP’s policy committee was directly involved in the 
formation of the new government, nominating a number of crucial cabinet 
                                                      
14 J. Brownlee, “Democratisation in the Arab World? The Decline of Pluralism in 
Mubarak’s Egypt”, Journal of Democracy, 13, 2002. 
15  See G. Al-Din, “NDP Congress’ Aftershocks”, Al-Ahram Weekly, 26 September-2 
October 2002. 
 164 | RESENDE & KRAETZSCHMAR 
 
ministers with strong linkages to the younger cadre of the NDP. These 
included amongst others the Ministers of Higher Education, Youth, 
Communications and Information Technology as well as the Minister of 
Industry and Foreign Trade. What is more, not only was the policy 
committee directly involved in the formation of the cabinet, but 
immediately after taking office, the new PM also promised to work closely 
together with the NDP in the development and implementation of 
government policy and to hold regular meetings between the party and 
government to that effect.16 
Surely, any move by the NDP to obtain greater policy initiative over 
the government, as demanded by the young Mubarak and evidenced in 
recent developments, would constitute a significant step in reducing the 
party’s dependence on the state, and hence a move away from the current 
system of parties of power. The same can be said about the introduction of 
greater internal democracy, which could reduce the influence of the 
executive over the composition of the party leadership and its candidates, 
and thus increase the overall autonomy of the party. 
At this point in time, it remains to be seen whether the recent internal 
reforms will indeed enhance the NDP’s position vis-à-vis the state. In any 
event it seems fair to say that even if these developments are to stay, many 
obstacles remain for the party to become a truly autonomous actor with a 
clear ideological profile. For this to happen, the party must engage in far 
bolder internal reforms aimed at strengthening its own organisational 
structure and at clarifying its position within the ideological spectrum. 
Such reforms must include a proper system of party financing that 
attempts to reduce the NDP’s current dependence on the infrastructure of 
the state, a clear separation between government and party officials and the 
development of a membership base that is programmatically and not 
patronage-oriented. At the same time, of course, the ruling elite must 
support such developments and put the conditions in place for further 
internal reforms of the NDP.  
Summing up, what are the chances that such reforms are on the 
cards, and that the system of parties of power will eventually make way for 
one that is structured around competitive and ideologically-oriented 
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political parties? At present, the dire answer must be ‘none’, given the 
regime’s unwillingness to significantly alter the political status quo. Indeed, 
despite a recent string of political reforms, there are few signs that the 
ruling elite is truly committed to the emergence of a more competitive 
party system, in which the NDP would have to assume the position of one 
amongst equals in the electoral game. A case in point is the recent 
amendment of the Egyptian Constitution, which for the first time in the 
country’s electoral history introduced multi-candidate elections for the 
presidency. Although initially hailed as a significant step forward towards 
democracy, it quickly became clear that the amendment was never meant 
to open the presidency to true contested elections. Having been drafted by 
an elite unwilling to concede power, the new presidential election law 
makes it virtually impossible for opposition parties to stage their own 
candidates and to lead an effective election campaign on an equal par with 
the ruling NDP.  
What is more, it is even debatable whether any transformation of the 
NDP from a party of power to one of ideology can take place within the 
confines of a regime whose very existence is based on the fusion of party 
and state. In fact, unless the ruling elites are willing to resort again to 
violent coercion as a means to sustain power, they will require the presence 
of a timid regime-supportive party that provides the Egyptian regime with 
the necessary political hegemony in the central institutions of the state. De-
linking state and party would hence upset the logic of authoritarianism 
under conditions of controlled pluralism and most likely lead to the demise 
of the incumbent regime and certainly to the disintegration of the ruling 
party.  
Conclusions 
As typified by Ukraine and Egypt, most of the semi- or non-democratic 
countries of the European neighbourhood pretend to offer a degree of 
political pluralism. The standard is for a plurality of parties to run in 
national elections and participate in parliamentary sessions. In contrast to 
fully fledged democracies, however, these electoral rituals have little 
bearing on the composition of government and its policy output, which 
remains entirely dominated by the executive institutions.  
Parties of power constitute a crucial element of such political order. 
As discussed above, they function as instruments of co-optation and 166 | RESENDE & KRAETZSCHMAR 
 
political hegemony, enabling the ruling elites to sustain their regime 
without major internal challenges. In so doing, parties of power rob the 
concept of ‘political party’ of its traditional meaning in Western 
democracies. Throughout this paper we argued that the trademarks of 
these types of parties constitute a serious stumbling block for the 
development of a multi-party system based on competing ideological 
currents. For democracy to take hold in the eastern and southern 
neighbourhood of the EU, it is crucial that the logic of parties of power be 
replaced by one structured around autonomous and ideologically cohesive 
parties.  
These conclusions have of course significant implications for policy-
makers with an interest in promoting democracy in the region. If 
democratisation is of central concern to the European Neighbourhood 
Policy, ideological and organisational party-building should be an integral 
part of its current agenda. Beyond the democratisation of authoritarian 
regimes, assistance and encouragement should be given to the formation of 
autonomous and ideologically cohesive political parties. Equally, parties 
should be encouraged to translate such ideological precepts into coherent 
policy positions so that in the long run the shift of loyalties from 
clientelistic practices to programmatic principles can be achieved. Together 
these changes would surely enhance the nature of multi-party competition 
and with it the quality of procedural democracy in the region.  
Certainly, the regional significance of this analysis of parties of power 
varies. Where revolutions have already created a more pluralist 
environment, such as in Ukraine and Georgia, independent political parties 
will be the cornerstone of a system of democratic institutions. In Ukraine 
this demands that the Yushchenko elite institutionalises its visions in a 
political party. However, if an instrumental attitude towards the 
parliament and political parties prevails, the Orange revolution could still 
be remembered as an unfulfilled promise. Indeed the challenges faced by 
the Yushchenko regime in 2005 and 2006 are paramount: not only to secure 
electoral victory in the 2006 elections but also to ensure that the strong 
popular movement taking them to power is not transformed into a simple 
agent of the state. On the other hand, in those countries under authoritarian 
government, the only way for the ruling elite to introduce more pluralism 
without completely losing control is to progressively cut the links between 
the ruling party and the state. In Egypt and other countries of the southern 
neighbourhood, reforming the secular ruling parties is crucial as a means of PARTIES OF POWER AS ROADBLOCKS TO DEMOCRACY | 167 
 
facing Islamic parties in a more pluralist scenario. Indeed, it is only once 
the ruling parties are taken off the state’s life-support that a truly 
competitive party system can emerge, in which the ideological contest 
comes to outweigh the importance of patronage and state spoils.  
References 
Al-Din, G., “NDP Congress’ Aftershocks”, Al-Ahram Weekly, 26 September-2 
October 2002. 
Al-Din, G., “Bringing the News”, Al-Ahram Weekly, 2004. 
Al-Din, G., “Preparing for September”, Al-Ahram Weekly, 2004. 
Birch, S., Elections and Democratisation in Ukraine, Basingstoke: MacMillan, 2000. 
Brownlee, J., “Democratisation in the Arab World? The Decline of Pluralism in 
Mubarak’s Egypt”, Journal of Democracy, 13, 2002. 
Kassem, M., In the Guise of Democracy: Governance in Contemporary Egypt, Ithaca, 
NY: Ithaca Press, 1999. 
K u b i c e k ,  P . ,  “ T h e  L i m i t s  o f  E l e c toral Democracy in Ukraine”, in 
Democratization, 8, 2001. 
Maksymiuk, J., Is New Pro-Yushchenko Party More Than a Party of Power?, 
RFE/RL Special Report, Prague, 2005. 
Nafaa, H., Al-Ahram Weekly, 12-18 October 1995. 
Randall, V. and L. Svasand, “Party Institutionalization in New Democracies”, 
in Party Politics, 8, 2002. 
Shahin, E.E.-D., Egypt's Moment of Reform: A Reality or Illusion?, CEPS Policy 
Brief No. 78, July 2005. 
Sushko, O. and O. Lisnychuk, “The Political Campaign and Ukraine's Political 
Evolution”, in H. Kurth and I. Kempe (eds), The Political Campaign and 
Ukraine's Political Evolution, Kyiv: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2005. 
Yushchenko, V., Ukraine President Hints at Referendum on Constitutional Changes, 
Interview with One Plus One TV, BBC Monitoring Unit in Kiev, 2005.  
 
 
Part II 
 
The EU as Exporter 
of Democratic Values  
| 169 
 
 
 
 
THE RELUCTANT DEBUTANTE: 
THE EU AS PROMOTER OF DEMOCRACY 
IN ITS NEIGHBOURHOOD 
MICHAEL EMERSON, SENEM AYDIN, GERGANA NOUTCHEVA, 
NATHALIE TOCCI, MARIUS VAHL & RICHARD YOUNGS 
Some paradigms and syndromes  
The role of the European Union in the promotion of democracy in its wider 
neighbourhood can be assessed at different levels, from the broad sweep of 
the history of Europe through the centuries, to the contemporary history of 
the European Union as a set of norms, values and institutions, and finally 
down to the technicalities of democracy promotion programmes. The 
substance of the EU’s role is bound up with the paradigm of 
‘Europeanisation’, which has a strong normative democratic content, and at 
the same time relates to the empowerment of the EU institutions.  
There are certainly inhibitions in the system holding the EU back 
from playing this role, which come from particular sensitivities of 
individual member states. These reflect a whole collection of syndromes, 
ranging from different proximities and historical experiences in relation to 
the various neighbours, to different European visions and world views. The 
divergences represented by these syndromes sometimes make it difficult or 
impossible for the EU institutions to pursue active foreign policies, 
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Historical perspectives 
Europe has a long tradition of contagion of ideas and revolutionary 
political movements: from the Renaissance and Reformation of the 15th to 
17th centuries, to the republicanism of 1789, the liberalism of 1848, the 
communism of 1917, the post-fascist democracy of 1945, and the post-
communist democracy of 1989-91, which is receiving a new boost in 2004-
05. 
Starting with 1789, there have been well-defined starting points to 
several revolutionary episodes. As one tries to assess whether the Rose, 
Orange and Cedar Revolutions of the last year have the real hallmarks of 
revolution, it is worth remembering that the maturing of most of the earlier 
revolutionary episodes took decades. The regime changes were often long 
and drawn out processes, especially when they were not introduced by 
war, as in the case of 1848, and this seems to be true also of the current 
episode from 1989 onwards.  
Should the 1989-91 episode of collapse of the Berlin Wall and the 
Soviet Union be seen as part and parcel of the current episode, beginning in 
2004? Yes and no. 1989-91 was an episode of demolition of a flawed system. 
2004 onwards marks the ratification of solid new democracies centred on 
the enlargement of the European Union. As a stylised simplification, one 
may view the wider Europe as having entered a two-stage democratic 
revolution in 1989-91. In the first stage, from 1989 to 2004, one group of 
states – the EU accession candidates – locked onto a fast track for becoming 
real democracies. Meanwhile the rest of Europe only became phoney 
democracies, adopting the institutional forms of democracy, but with 
deeply corrupted and unaccountable regimes that neglected the rule of law. 
For them, the second stage of democratisation may have begun in 2004.  
More precisely, three things happened in 2004, all more or less at the 
same time.  
First, 10 states acceded to the EU, of which eight were former 
communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, with two more to 
follow in 2007.  
Second, the peoples of some of the phoney democracies, who were 
close to the new member states of the EU, showed that they were ready to 
protest. Both new governments (Georgia and Ukraine) and the continuing 
old ones (Moldova and Armenia) have stressed the long-run objective of 
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and legitimacy as democratic regimes. For these states the second part of a 
two-stage democratic transition seems to have begun, after a sufficient 
number of years of phoney democracy for the public to be ready to demand 
a second revolution.  
Third, is the possibility that the movement may be extending beyond 
Europe to the Arab/Muslim wider European neighbourhood, from 
Morocco to Central Asia. The post-war government of Iraq is presented by 
the US as herald of its drive to transform the region. Whatever the impact 
of the Iraq war, which is surely too recent for one to know, the Arab world 
on the whole, and with great variations, seems to be moving towards at 
least the first stage of setting up the formal institutions and electoral 
mechanisms of democracy. Even the most authoritarian regimes are under 
pressure, from Egypt to Uzbekistan, while the Cedar Revolution and the 
case of Kyrgyzstan have already shown the power of street democracy. Is 
the contagious democracy virus now spreading from Tbilisi and Kiev to 
Central Asia and the Mediterranean? In the Arab Mediterranean states the 
EU offers a different political concept compared to its European 
neighbours, but still an important one. This may be described as fashioning 
a sense of Euro-Mediterranean identity, with partial penetration of EU 
norms and standards into the economies and societies of the southern 
neighbours, and with the important Arab and Turkish diasporas within the 
EU being also party to the process of demonstrating the compatibility of 
Islam and democracy.  
On balance it seems that 2004-05 is acquiring some claims for 
becoming a landmark date in the political history of the wider European 
neighbourhood.  
Institutional perspectives 
The EU has been progressively mandated to take up certain responsibilities 
for foreign policy. It started from a near zero role in foreign policy in its 
early days to something that has been on an accelerating curve of 
significance in the last 15 years following the collapse of the communist 
regimes of Central and Eastern Europe. The early developments were 
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level. The principals were the member states, and the EU was assigned 
agency roles with strictly limited mandates.1 
In the early days of the EU, the institutional structure consisted of the 
European Economic Community (EEC), which had no foreign policy 
competence at all. Outside this institutional framework however there 
began to develop some ‘political cooperation’ over foreign policy matters 
through the so-called Davignon Committee, named after Viscount Etienne 
Davignon, whose legendary diplomatic charms successfully persuaded 
jealous foreign ministries to dare to sit together to discuss some foreign 
policy matters in a forum that was emphatically not part of the EEC. The 
member states met together as principals, but they hardly appointed any 
person or institution to be their agent.2 The EEC was not a foreign policy 
actor, except in the strictly circumscribed role as trade policy negotiator. 
The member states were on their guard to prevent the horrifying prospect 
that the mandates accorded to the EEC or later EU as foreign policy agent 
might ever become so substantial that the agent would turn into a principal 
actor in its own right. 
Since those early days, there have been major systemic developments 
in all three EU institutions in the foreign policy field.  
The Commission has acquired huge increases in its instruments of 
economic aid and technical assistance, especially after the collapse of 
communism in Central Europe through to the Soviet Union. These 
instruments were first intended to help consolidate the transition to 
democracy and market economics. It soon led to the Commission’s major 
institutional role in the enlargement process for the former communist 
states of Central and Eastern Europe – perhaps the most spectacular 
democratisation policy ever seen.  
                                                      
1 Paul Pierson, “The Path to European Integration – An Historical Institutionalist 
Analysis”, Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 29, No. 2, April 1996, pp. 123-163. 
2 There was the egregious incident in 1973 when foreign ministers were meeting in 
Copenhagen to discuss internal EEC matters. They wished then to turn to some 
foreign policy matters, whereupon the French foreign minister, Michel Jobert, 
insisted that they could not do so without flying all together to Brussels before 
treating this topic, since otherwise there would have been an unacceptable slide 
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The European Parliament has gradually grown in stature and 
developed a certain voice in foreign policy maters, particularly on matters 
of democracy and human rights, using its budgetary powers to push 
through the creation of a special budget line for democracy promotion – the 
European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). It also 
harasses the Commission over any suspected financial irregularity, at the 
price of user-friendly effectiveness of the instruments of democracy 
promotion, a subject to which we return below.  
The Council enhanced its own institutional role with the designation 
of a High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy in the person of 
Javier Solana, who also acquires responsibility for executive capabilities in 
security and military domains. A climax to this institutional development is 
the intended creation of the post of EU Foreign Minister in the European 
Constitution, which would double-hat the roles of High Representative of 
the Council and Vice-President of the Commission. This would involve a 
consequential integration of the staff resource of the Council and 
Commission in a European diplomatic service. At the time of writing, 
Javier Solana has already been designated for the post of Foreign Minister 
and various schemes are under consideration for the common diplomatic 
service.3 This fusion of resources and partial institutional merger in 
themselves raise itself interesting issues regarding principals and agents. 
Certainly there will be a greater single power centre over EU foreign and 
security policy. But it is ambiguous at this point, and much discussed, 
whether this will be a reverse takeover by the principals in the Council over 
the Commission as an agent that was seen as becoming too powerful; or 
whether the new Foreign Minister will embody the EU as an increasingly 
powerful actor in its own right.  
The outcome should in principle see enhanced synergies and 
credibility from the integrated use of the EU’s many instruments of action. 
An enhanced credibility should become manifest in the words or speeches 
of the EU Foreign Minister being taken very seriously by partner states in 
the neighbourhood. But there are risks that the complexities of the EU’s 
                                                      
3 The failure of the Constitution to be ratified does not necessarily mean an end to 
these proposals, since it is considered legally possible to introduce these particular 
innovations by inter-institutional agreement without requiring treaty ratification.  174 | EMERSON, AYDIN, NOUTCHEVA, TOCCI, VAHL & YOUNGS 
 
inter-institutional power struggles will for years crowd out efficient focus 
on the substantive objectives of these systemic developments. 
Europeanisation 
Democracy and Europeanisation are overlapping categories but not the 
same thing. Both have both been the subject of many definitions.4 
                                                      
4 Thomas Risse, Maria Green Cowles and James Caporaso define Europeanisation 
as the emergence and development of distinct structures of governance at the 
European level [Thomas Risse, Maria Green Cowles and James Caporaso (eds), 
Europeanization and Domestic Change, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001, p. 
1]. Robert Ladrech understands Europeanisation as an “incremental process 
reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and 
economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and 
policy-making” [Robert Ladrech, “Europeanization of Democratic Politics and 
Institutions: The Case of France”, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 32, No. 1, 
1994, p. 70]. Johan P. Olsen differentiates between five possible meanings of 
Europeanisation. According to him, Europeanisation may refer to changes in the 
external territorial boundaries of the EU, to the development of institutions of 
governance at EU level, to central penetration of national and sub-national systems 
of governance, to the export of forms of distinctively European political 
organisation and governance beyond the territory of the EU, and to a political 
project aiming at a unified and politically stronger EU [Johan P. Olsen, “The Many 
Faces of Europeanization”, ARENA Working Papers, 2002, WP 01/2, 
http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/wp02_2.htm]. Claudio M. Radaelli 
defines Europeanisation as a process of “(a) construction (b) diffusion and (c) 
institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, 
styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined 
and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated into the logic of 
domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies” [Claudio M. 
Radaelli, “The Europeanization of Public Policy”, in K. Featherstone and C. 
Radaelli (eds), The Politics of Europeanization, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003, p. 30]. Most studies of Europeanisation have an explicit emphasis on the EU 
policy process and limit Europeanisation effects to the EU member states. Olsen 
suggests a possible transfer of EU rules, procedures and paradigms to third 
countries, but it is Heather Grabbe who offers a systematic analysis of the EU’s 
impact on the applicant countries from Central and Eastern Europe in the context 
of the EU accession process [Heather Grabbe, “Europeanization Goes East: Power 
and Uncertainty in the EU Accession Process”, in K. Featherstone and C. Radaelli THE RELUCTANT DEBUTANTE| 175 
 
Europeanisation embraces democracy for sure, but is a wider concept. For 
the EU, the Copenhagen criteria adopted in the conclusions of the 
European Council meeting in Copenhagen in June 1993, provide an official 
reference on democracy: 
Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved 
stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, 
human rights and respect for and protection of minorities. 
Europeanisation on the other hand may be understood as a process of 
convergence on modern European norms and values through the 
interaction of three dynamics: 
•  first the legally binding norms of the EU (and of the Council of 
Europe) for democracy and human rights,  
•  secondly the transformation of objective interests of enterprises and 
individuals as a result of increasing integration and 
•  third the transformation of subjective values and identities at the 
societal level.  
The mechanisms for setting into motion these complex processes are 
summarily divided into two categories: conditionality and socialisation.  
Under the conditionality model, the EU offers advantages to the 
neighbour, ranging from full membership to graduated economic, political 
and institutional incentives under neighbourhood policy, on the condition 
that economic and/or political conditions are met. Sanctions may be 
undertaken in very negative cases.  
Under the socialisation model, the proximity and attractiveness of the 
EU model of democracy, governance and the rule of law are of the essence. 
The EU does not pursue a forceful policy, but stands as an example, 
engaging the neighbours with multiple personal and institutional contacts 
and joint activities.  
The conditionality model requires that the EU institutions really act, 
whereas the socialisation model relies more on demonstration effects and 
endogenous processes at the level of society. In both cases, however, 
Europeanisation relies upon the neighbo u r s  p e r c e i v i n g  t h e  E U  t o  b e  a  
strong role model.  
                                                                                                                                       
(eds), The Politics of Europeanization, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 309-
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The EU has now constructed a set of policies for its neighbourhood as 
a well-defined geo-political space. This consists of the whole of Europe and 
the Mediterranean basin. The states in this area come in three categories for 
the EU policy-maker: first the acknowledged accession candidates, second 
the Western Balkan states for whom accession is acknowledged as a long-
term goal (grouped in the Stabilisation and Association Agreement Process 
– SAP), and third the official ‘neighbours’ of the former Soviet Union and 
the Mediterranean (now grouped under the European Neighbourhood 
Policy – ENP).  
All three policies – accession, SAP and ENP – have the same 
normative foundations, with only differences in the intensity of pressures 
and incentives for compliance with EU values, norms and standards. In all 
cases the policy documents give first place to the objective of convergence 
on democratic values and the rule of law. For accession full compliance is 
mandatory. The SAP states are set on a course that makes full compliance 
necessary in due course, but with much more flexibility on the time 
sequence. For the ENP states the same broad objectives are endorsed, but 
compliance can be still more flexible, or selective. Nonetheless the 
Commission has followed the same comprehensive normative framework 
for all three categories. The SAP process is a first derivative of the accession 
process, and the ENP a second derivative, even if accession prospects are 
not acknowledged in this case.  
The EU’s democracy promotion policies have emerged through a 
process of path-dependency. The Commission learned first how to fashion 
a negotiation and monitoring model to bring the accession candidates into 
full compliance with EU norms. In so doing it built on its unique expertise 
in the complex field of EU law and developed very important mechanisms 
of economic and technical aid to help the candidates. When the 
Commission was mandated to devise the SAP policy, it adapted the 
accession process. When it had next to design the ENP, the task was given 
to the Enlargement Directorate General, which produced something that 
was again based on the accession model with the same comprehensive list 
of chapters covering all EU policy concerns. This extension of the accession 
methodology into the SAP and ENP also represented an important 
institutional ‘mission creep’. The Commission’s strengths are its executive 
powers based on EU internal laws and policies, whereas it has very limited 
room for manoeuvre in traditional foreign policy, which the member states 
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that can be heard in the Brussels institutions is that the member states have 
been worried about the way the ENP was developing, because the 
Commission was taking too much into its own hands.  
The EU’s new neighbourhood policy is a somewhat ambiguous 
attempt to set in motion the Europeanisation of its partner states. The idea 
of Europeanisation fits well the current political objectives of Ukraine. For 
the Arab states of the Mediterranean, one may aim at notions of a Euro-
Mediterranean identity, which already has some resonance in countries 
such as Morocco or Tunisia. The EU’s power to influence its neighbours is 
clearly strongest for those European states that have membership 
aspirations, even when this is not reciprocated for the time being by the 
EU. It is less obvious whether the same logic can work in the much weaker 
setting of close neighbourly relations, and this lies at the heart of the case 
studies below. 
Syndromes among the member states 
The individual member states of the EU are naturally inclined to give 
priority to neighbours that they are closest to geographically. This will also 
relate often to historical experiences that resonate in the foreign policy 
reflexes of national capitals. Thus France, Spain and Italy always put the 
Mediterranean high on the agenda; Germany, the Baltic and Central 
European states are most interested in their northern neighbours, while the 
UK still looks across the Atlantic.  
Nevertheless, these obvious interests implied by geographical, 
historical and cultural proximities provide no simple indicator of whether 
the member states in question will be harder or softer, or more or less 
vigorous in democracy promotion in various areas of the neighbourhood. 
The historical colour of these close relationships has to be brought into 
play. Former colonial powers have tended to be hesitant to intervene 
politically in their former colonies, as perhaps in the case of France and 
Spain in the Maghreb. The legacy of World War II makes Germany very 
reluctant to see the EU take strong positions towards Israel over issues of 
international law, and also this may partly explain a rather soft line 
towards Putin’s de-democratising Russia. On the other hand, the Baltic and 
Central European states, after their occupation by the Soviet Union, show 
the same logic turned around, with a much greater inclination to make 
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EU’s two permanent UN Security Council members may also come into 
play at times. Certainly it was in evidence over Iraq, with some collateral 
impact on relations with Russia, when France and Germany made common 
cause with Russia against the US-UK.  
 
Some syndromes and cleavages among the EU’s member states 
 
Preferences from geography: 
  North prefers north 
  South prefers south 
 
Sensitivities of former colonial powers: 
  France and Spain towards the Maghreb 
  Austria towards the Balkans 
 
Sensitivities of the formerly colonised or occupied: 
  Baltic and Central European states towards Russia 
 
Sensitivities from World War II: 
  Germany towards Israel and Russia 
 
Alternative European visions: 
  A united, democratic Europe 
  A powerful, controllable core Europe 
 
Alternative world views: 
  New Europe Atlanticism 
  Old Europe Gaullism 
 
These cleavages may on occasion undercut the EU’s declared 
democracy promotion objectives, but not necessarily so. Some rather subtle 
blends of national and EU roles are possible. There have been repeated 
examples of member states promoting deeper EU relations with their 
favourite neighbours, using their comparative advantages in relations with 
these states to the EU’s advantage. Another type of situation is where the 
member state may be politically inhibited from championing a strong 
democracy promotion policy in a former colony, but sees an advantage in 
the EU exploiting its historical innocence to pursue such policies more 
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and member state actions in the ‘good cop, bad cop’ category, where the 
intimately friendly national leader may persuade the partner state’s leader 
to understand better the case for the EU’s harsher conditionality. We shall 
see examples in practice below.  
Case studies 
Balkans 
The EU has advanced its relations with the Balkan countries within the 
framework of two separate policies – the enlargement process and the 
stabilisation and association process (SAP). Both policies aim at domestic 
political and economic transformation of the target countries in preparation 
for full integration in the EU. Bulgaria and Romania are part of the Central 
and Eastern European group for which the enlargement strategy was 
devised shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The five Western Balkan 
countries received the conditional offer of EU membership in 2000 shortly 
after peace had been restored in the region and the member states had 
decided to secure the long-term stability in the former Yugoslav republics 
by bringing them into the European mainstream. 
The EU policy vis-à-vis the Balkan candidates and potential 
candidates can be described as conditional support for reforms in the 
direction of Europeanisation. The recipe is encoded in the Copenhagen 
accession criteria demanding a prospective member to endorse the 
community values of democracy and rule of law in order to be admitted as 
an equal member of the club. The EU membership conditionality touches 
on the core of the political systems of would-be members and affects a wide 
spectrum of policy domains through legal harmonisation with the acquis 
communautaire. The ultimate objective is diffusion of the European norms 
and governance practices prior to a country’s accession to the EU. 
Democracy-building features high on the enlargement agenda. 
In the Western Balkans, however, the democracy goal is coupled with 
and complicated by the process of state-building and state consolidation. 
The EU conditionality in the Western Balkan context has a double objective 
of building viable states and steering the transition to democratic 
governance and rule of law. The former Yugoslav republics of the Western 
Balkans have an extra layer of problems to address as a consequence of the 
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structures that emerged as a result of the peace settlements. The EU 
conditions vis-à-vis these former war adversaries intervene in these highly 
sensitive political matters, suggesting a vision for the map of the region and 
the internal state structures against the promise of EU membership. 
In the Western Balkan region, therefore, the driving forces behind the 
EU policy are the security concerns of the member states, and the goal of 
maintaining peace and building viable states comes first. The democracy 
objective is not less important but it becomes a matter of highest priority 
only after a stable security environment is put in place and the outstanding 
statehood questions are resolved. The Stabilisation and Association process 
is especially designed to stabilise and strengthen the Western Balkan states 
in order to make them credible accession candidates to which the full range 
of democracy requirements will then be applied.  
The EU’s involvement in the Western Balkans has an important 
security dimension which is absent as an emphasis in the enlargement 
context. The EU has taken over various security tasks in the Western 
Balkans through both military and civilian means. The EU military 
operation ‘Concordia’ in Macedonia and the replacement of NATO’s SFOR 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) with an EU military mission at the end of 
2004 are both examples of the EU’s interest in maintaining peace in the 
region as a first step toward creating the necessary conditions for good 
governance. The EU police missions in Macedonia and BiH constitute 
further attempts to strengthen the capacity of the Balkan states and help 
them enforce law and order in their societies.  
Both interests and values converge in the Balkans context to produce 
a strong consensus in the EU on the goals and methods of the EU policy. 
While coherent in principle, the EU can still appear inconsistent in the 
execution of its policy. In the enlargement cases of the Eastern Balkans, this 
tendency is less pronounced. There, the European Commission is the sole 
agent of democracy conditionality. As a manager of the enlargement 
process, the Commission is the institutional player evaluating the state of 
democracy in each candidate and enjoys large discretion in demanding 
aspiring governments to improve democratic practices and human rights 
provisions in their countries. In the Western Balkans, the EU security 
missions have required the involvement of the High Representative for the 
CFSP and/or his special envoys representing directly the member states. 
The split of the EU mandate between the European Commission and the 
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the two institutional agents have been perceived as speaking with two 
different voices instead of complementing each other to achieve the EU 
policy goals.  
Bulgaria is a country where the EU classical enlargement recipe is 
applied. The European Commission has been the main EU actor executing 
conditionality in the pre-enlargement period, with the member states acting 
in agreement with the Commission and in support of the common values 
of democracy and rule of law.  
The concrete political conditionality vis-à-vis Bulgaria evolved in the 
context of the European Commission’s monitoring of the reform process in 
the country and reporting to the Council of inadequate practices registered 
by it. The first assessment of the state of democracy in Bulgaria measured 
against the broadly defined Copenhagen political criteria was made in the 
Commission’s opinion on Bulgaria’s application for membership in the EU 
in July 1997. The Commission concluded in this evaluation that Bulgaria 
“was on the way to meeting the political conditions”.5 Formal institutions 
of democratic governance were not in question but the quality of 
governance and the rule of law was judged unsatisfactory. More seriously, 
the country lagged behind in economic reform and was deemed 
economically unprepared to fully integrate in the single market. As a result, 
Bulgaria was not invited to start accession negotiations at the Luxembourg 
European Council in December 1997 together with the first five front-
runners from Central and Eastern Europe.6 
The overall positive assessment of Bulgaria’s democratic practice was 
gradually followed by sharp criticism of various institutional shortcomings 
and practices by the European Commission. The more the Commission 
learned about the institutional structure and the legal basis of Bulgaria, the 
more deficiencies it saw in them. Among the Commission’s concerns, the 
weak capacity of the Bulgarian judiciary featured high and Bulgaria’s 
progress in the accession process became dependent on reform in this area. 
The Commission saw deep structural problems, ranging from excessive 
immunity from criminal prosecution to the responsibility of judges for pre-
trial investigation. The member states fully supported the Commission’s 
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criticism of the inefficiency of the Bulgarian judicial system and joined 
forces with the Brussels bureaucracy in putting pressure on the political 
establishment in Sofia to reform the judiciary. 
The delayed accession timetable for Bulgaria, considered not ready to 
join the EU with the first wave of 10 countries in May 2004, sent a strong 
signal to Sofia to step up its efforts. As a result, important constitutional 
amendments and legislative changes were made in Bulgaria, facilitating 
substantial reform of the judicial system. In order to ensure full 
implementation of the commitments the Bulgarian authorities undertook 
during the closing phase of the accession negotiations, the EU included a 
special safeguard clause in the accession treaty with Bulgaria explicitly 
linking the completion of judiciary reform with the accession date of 2007 
and envisaging a delay of one year in case of failure to reform.  
Croatia is officially part of the Stabilisation and Association Process, 
although an EU candidacy status was conferred upon it in 2004 after the 
Commission judged that the country has substantially fulfilled the 
Copenhagen political and economic criteria. Yet, Croatia has been subject to 
some specific conditionality, a consequence of the Yugoslav wars of 1990s. 
A core element of the international community’s strategy in the Western 
Balkans has been ensuring that those indicted as war criminals are 
transferred to the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) and that domestic authorities cooperate fully with The Hague. 
There is a strong agreement in the EU and the international community at 
large that cooperation with the ICTY constitutes a key element in building a 
state based on the rule of law where crime, including war crime, is 
prosecuted and punished. There is also a strong consensus that dealing 
with the issue of war crimes in war-divided societies is part of the societal 
process of coming to terms with the past and reconciliation. The EU has 
insisted on ICTY cooperation since 1997, when the General Affairs Council 
identified it as a specific requirement for all countries from the Western 
Balkans.7 Progressively, the EU has tightened the conditionality in this area. 
Yet, regardless of the agreement in principle on the importance of 
ensuring full cooperation with the ICTY, the member states were sharply 
divided on how strict the EU should be in evaluating Croatia’s compliance 
with this condition. The dividing line proved geographical with Croatia’s 
direct neighbours Austria, Slovenia and Hungary taking a more lenient line 
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on the issue whereas the rest of the member states insisted on firm 
application of the conditionality principle, not least to send a signal to the 
other countries in the region that the EU is serious about cooperation with 
The Hague. In March 2005, however, the EU decided to postpone the 
opening of accession negotiations with Croatia because of Croatia’s failure 
to hand over General Gotovina to the war crimes tribunal in The Hague. 
The member states that were arguing for immediate start of accession talks 
could not block this punitive EU position, since the decision to open 
negotiations required unanimity. This case is illustrative of the EU 
unanimity rule resulting in the highest standards of political conditionality 
being effectively applied, rather than the reverse. It also illustrates 
divergences among the member states at the operational level, despite the 
overall agreement and support for Croatia’s bid to join the EU ahead of the 
rest of the Western Balkans group. 
In Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), the EU has demanded a long-term 
transformation process in a number of areas that form an intrinsic part of 
the democratisation agenda, including the building of democratic 
institutions, securing guarantees for the rule of law, encouraging the 
creation of a professional public administration, stimulating the reform of 
the judiciary, etc. Yet, in the Bosnian context, the goal of state-building and 
state consolidation is paramount in all spheres of reform.  
More importantly, the protectorate status of BiH and the presence of 
external actors in its domestic authority structures have important 
consequences for the democratic process in the country. Since the end of 
the war in 1995, international military troops have been stationed in BiH to 
maintain peace and prevent further eruption of ethnic conflict. The civilian 
aspects of peace implementation have been formally supervised by a High 
Representative of the international c o m m u n i t y  ( H R )  w h o  e n j o y s  l a r g e  
discretion in dismissing elected politicians and imposing legislation where 
and when he considers it appropriate. While these extraordinary powers 
have been justified in the immediate aftermath of the conflict to get the 
reconstruction and transformation processes going, they have 
progressively become a brake on autonomous decision-making and 
domestic political bargaining and coalition-building. BiH political leaders 
have used the HR’s mandate as a cover  o r  a n  e x c u s e  t o  a v o i d  t a k i n g  
responsibility for unpopular but necessary measures. The advances in 
many reform areas have happened so far due to external interventions and 
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issues decrees, the less the domestic space for self-governance which is at 
the heart of a democratically-functioning system.  
From the point of view of coordination of external action, the EU-
demanded institutional and legislative changes have been in line with the 
policy of the rest of the international community present in the country. 
There are numerous international organisations in BiH with different 
priorities, but they are all united in their objective to build a functioning 
multi-ethnic state in BiH where minority protection and government 
efficiency co-exist. The EU conditionality in this sense enjoys the 
consensual support of all other external actors. 
The EU institutional actors themselves coordinate their activities on 
the ground in an effective manner. The EU and its member states are partly 
represented by the HR after his appointment to also serve as an EU Special 
Representative in 2002. The HR can be viewed therefore as an EU foreign 
policy player too, and he can use the instruments of the CFSP to the extent 
that all Solana’s special envoys can. He is linked institutionally to the 
Council’s foreign policy establishment and can mobilise the political 
support of the EU member states when he needs their political weight to 
push through specific reforms. And even though his tasks go beyond the 
strictly-defined EU mandate, he has fully supported the EU conditionality 
and has actively pursued the reforms prescribed by Brussels. 
The European Commission is the other EU actor in the Bosnian 
context that has a special mandate to manage the SAP conditionality policy 
on behalf of the EU. Its specific demands have intervened in a critical 
moment of the post-conflict transformation to steer BiH’s transition from a 
protectorate to an EU member candidate. Regardless of the many other 
external actors in BiH, the EU has managed to speak with one voice, and to 
deliver a consistent message compatible with the one of the rest of the 
international community. 
The EU institutional coherence in the Bosnian context is not the norm 
in the conduct of the EU policy towards Serbia and Montenegro  even 
though the objectives are similar – state-building as a matter of most urgent 
priority and democratisation as an equally important but long-term goal. 
All EU efforts have been oriented towards preventing further state 
disintegration and fragmentation of the region into micro-states. Not only 
does the EU fear recurrence of violence and further conflict, but it also has a 
structural problem of institutionally integrating many smaller entities from 
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and Montenegro came into existence as a result of these profound security 
concerns of the EU member states and naturally the emphasis in the EU 
early conditionality vis-à-vis Serbia and Montenegro has been on setting up 
the common state institutions and making them function.  
Solana’s mediation in the constitutional impasse between the two 
republics in 2002 was a solo act of the EU but an act fully supported by the 
rest of the international community. Above all, it was the consensus among 
the EU member states that empowered Solana to use the levers of power 
assigned to him as High Representative for the CFSP and to compel the two 
sides to stick to a common state constitutional formula. Widespread 
agreement that the EU interest in the stability of the Balkans was at stake 
backed Solana’s active search for a political deal. The technical details of 
the settlement did not matter that much as long as the geopolitical objective 
of keeping the common state together was fulfilled.  
The technicalities, however, matter a great deal to the European 
Commission since it is the EU institution that has to assess the capacity of 
the State Union to conclude a Stabilisation and Association Agreement 
(SAA) and to take up the obligations under a contractual relationship with 
the EU. As a manager of the SAP, the Commission is interested in having a 
credible partner at the State Union level sufficiently empowered for 
efficient decision-making concerning the EU accession process. Because the 
Commission is driven by a different set of objectives, its view on the 
workability and even desirability of the thin common state structure does 
not necessarily coincide with that of the member states.  
Indeed, the member states have set the EU foreign policy line in 
Serbia and Montenegro, and the European Commission is in no position to 
reverse the EU policy orientation. The Commission, however, finds itself in 
a difficult position to combine its technocratic responsibility to measure 
objectively the compliance of potential candidates with the objectives of EU 
foreign policy, retaining it its own levers of power in the SAP process while 
remaining junior partner to Solana politically. On the one hand, it has to 
deliver on Solana’s promise for faster European integration of the State 
Union and, on the other hand, it has to deal on a daily basis with what it 
sees as a weak and non-functional common state which is incapable of 
being integrated into the EU structures in its present shape.  
The EU is therefore not a unitary actor in the Serbia-Montenegro 
political context, notwithstanding the fact that it is the only external actor 
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republics. The voice of Solana has focused on the security interests of the 
EU member states, while the voice of the European Commission has 
focused on technical aspects of compliance with pre-accession 
conditionality and ultimately progress towards EU membership. Domestic 
actors are well aware of this division in the foreign policy portfolio in the 
Serbia-Montenegro case, and it affects how they respond to EU 
conditionality. The EU’s incoherent message has hampered the 
effectiveness of its conditionality policy. 
Turkey 
Despite the fact that the issue of Turkish accession has always been on and 
off the table of EU policy-makers since 1963, a serious debate on the subject 
only took off recently with the granting of candidacy status to Turkey and 
the possibility of the start of accession negotiations. The late 1980s were the 
years after the coup d’etat in which the Turkish application for 
membership was rejected outright unanimously. The rejection was justified 
on the grounds that Turkey lacked a functioning democratic political 
system.  
In the 1990s, there was almost a tacit alliance between the member 
states  on the Turkey question. The dominance of Christian Democrat 
parties in Europe also helped the emergence of an almost unanimous 
rejection of any prospects for accession. The CDU/CSU-led German 
government at the time had the most unequivocal position against Turkish 
membership, as often demonstrated in the speeches of Helmut Kohl, the 
Chancellor and Klaus Kinkel, the Foreign Minister. Meanwhile the 
Commission viewed Turkey as a valuable ‘partner’ or a ‘neighbour’ rather 
than a future member. Relations with Turkey were often discussed together 
with relations with Israel and Morocco while the emphasis was on 
countries of Eastern Europe that had priority, belonging to the ‘European 
family of nations’. The President of the Commission, Jacques Santer, openly 
stated in July 1997 that Turkey did not have a serious chance of joining the 
European Union. 
A similar attitude could also be observed at the European Parliament. 
Here, the discussion never even reached the point of membership but 
focused mainly on the human rights problems which were quite severe in 
the 1990s amidst the ongoing armed conflict of the Turkish military with 
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for its human rights violations and even the customs union agreement 
barely managed to obtain the approval of the European Parliament. 
As discourse and action are inseparable variables, it did not come as a 
surprise to many when Turkey was excluded from the enlargement lists at 
the Luxembourg Summit of 1997. However, the strong reactions of the 
Turkish government, the changing international climate after the Kosovo 
War and the rapprochement with Greece started leading to shifts in 
European positions in the following two years. Turkey was eventually 
granted candidacy status at the Helsinki Summit of 1999, with the new 
Social Democrat government in Germany playing a leading role. Turkey 
was now subject to the same formal mechanisms used for the Central and 
Eastern European countries to guide and measure progress on the 
Copenhagen criteria. This implied that Annual Progress Reports would be 
prepared by the EU to monitor progress on EU criteria. After the Summit, 
the European Commission published the first Accession Partnership 
document in March 2000, which was followed by the preparation of the 
Turkish ‘National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis’ by the 
Turkish authorities in March 2001.  
These first signs of EU conditionality provided the initial trigger for 
change. Immediately following the approval of the National Programme, 
the silence on political reform was broken with a record number of 34 
constitutional amendments in October 2001, a new Civil Code in January 
2002 and three ‘harmonisation packages’8 adopted in the follow-up to the 
Copenhagen summit of 2002. The legislative changes introduced significant 
reforms, particularly in the fields of human rights/protection of minorities, 
freedom of expression and freedom of association. These reforms were the 
first crucial responses to EU conditionality, passed under a fragile three-
party coalition government that included the highly Eurosceptic right-wing 
nationalist party in Turkey.  
As Turkey began to reform itself internally, the objective factors that 
stood in the way between Turkey and the EU, such as human rights, the 
protection of minorities and the excessive role of the military in political 
life, began to dissipate. The Copenhagen Summit of 2002, at which the EU 
decided to open accession negotiations with Turkey as and when it fulfilled 
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the Copenhagen political criteria reinforced the EU’s commitments. The 
Copenhagen summit fostered a ‘sense of certainty’ in EU-Turkish relations 
by giving a specific date for the beginning of accession negotiations.9 Even 
though 2004 was a conditional date, it was nevertheless a significant step 
forward, as “it has provided Turkey with the prospect that full EU 
membership is a real possibility”.10 Meanwhile, the EU also decided to 
significantly increase the amount of financial assistance to Turkey. Hence, 
EU impact was not only confined to pure conditionality but extended to 
cover technical and financial assistance. Pre-accession financial assistance 
would reach €250 million in 2004, €300 million in 2005 and €500 million in 
2006 to “help Turkey prepare to join the EU as quickly as possible”.11 
Similarly, administrative and judicial capacity-building mechanisms, the 
most prominent of which is the Twinning instrument, was now employed 
to make EU member states’ expertise available to Turkey through the long-
term secondment of civil servants as well as short-term expert measures 
and training. The strengthening of the credibility of conditionality was 
immediately reflected in the four subsequent reform packages adopted by 
the Turkish government (AKP) and two sets of constitutional amendments, 
leading up to the decision to open accession negotiations at the Brussels 
Summit of 2004.  
The single-party rule of AKP, following their electoral victory in 
November 2002 elections, was very effective in translating the 
strengthening of conditionality into real change in the domestic sphere by 
deepening the reform process initiated by the previous coalition 
government. In fact, the advocates of a previously religious-based anti-
establishment party played a significant role behind political reforms due 
to a combination of interests and ideological concerns. First and foremost, 
the AKP viewed EU accession and the necessary reform process as a tool to 
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increase its legitimacy and guarantee its political survival vis-à-vis the 
secular establishment in Turkey. In a similar sense, the EU also provided 
increasing legitimacy for the AKP’s heavy emphasis on democracy and the 
protection of individual rights and freedoms in its political ideology. 
Hence, democracy as advocated by the EU became the “catchword and the 
strategy through which the former Islamists seek to change the system at 
the same time as they change themselves”.12 In fact, the reforms were often 
justified to the public on the grounds that the reforms themselves were 
more important for the country than eventual EU accession. Questioned on 
the possibility of a negative outcome at the December 2004 European 
Council Summit, Prime Minister Erdoğan frequently stated that in such a 
case, Turkey would continue pursuing the path of reform regardless of 
accession perspectives, arguing that the Copenhagen criteria would then be 
named the ‘Ankara criteria’.13  
Civil society also had a prominent role in promoting political reform 
in the country. The profound political and economic transformation 
initiated in the 1980s, especially de-ruralisation coupled with the failed 
policies of the strong state and the increasingly corrupt parties of the 
centre, had already paved the way for the emergence of a stronger civil 
society and identity-related politics in Turkey, most notably regarding 
political Islam and the Kurdish identity. By helping to create a strong 
language of rights in the country, the EU started to play an important role 
in furthering the change in state-societal relations and provided legitimacy 
for a vast amount of civil society organisations calling for a more 
democratic Turkey and demanding recognition of cultural/civil rights and 
freedoms.14 For example, while civil society organisations have for long 
years demanded a reform of the Law on Associations, change on this front 
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has been brought by the momentum of EU accession on the previous 
groundwork prepared by the domestic actors.15 
Reforms were also made possible by the decrease in adoption costs 
for traditional veto players such as the Turkish military and security 
establishment after the defeat of the terrorist organisation, the PKK, by the 
Turkish military. This significantly helped create a more conducive 
environment for political reform, particularly in the area of human rights 
and minority rights as well as freedom of expression and association.  
While domestic change in Turkey was made possible through the 
interaction between domestic actors and the European Union, in the post-
1999 period, EU actors did not have a coherent view on how EU relations 
with Turkey should develop. The scope of debate on the future of Europe 
was being widened by the European Convention, which raised issues on 
the future of Europe and European identity, and in this context the case of 
Turkey provoked widely divergent positions. Amidst these debates, the 
actors of EU policy-making started taking their positions. The biggest 
divisions occurred within and between the member states themselves.  
Germany under SPD/Greens supported the Turkish bid on the 
grounds of Turkey’s strategic importance in the post-9/11 world and its 
role model for the harmony between Islam and the West as well as the 
compatibility between Islam and democracy. The high number of Turks in 
Germany, traditionally supportive of the SPD and the Greens, was another 
important factor behind this support. This position, however, was strongly 
attacked by the CDU/CSU opposition that rejected Turkish accession on 
mainly cultural-religious grounds and argued instead for a ‘privileged 
partnership’ with Turkey.  
Britain was firmly supportive of Turkish membership. Tony Blair put 
forward similar arguments to Schroeder and Fischer on the strategic 
importance of Turkey in general and its potential as a role model for the 
Middle East in particular. The Conservatives also argued along the same 
lines, although expectedly more explicit in their emphasis on the possible 
reinforcing effects of Turkish accession upon the intergovernmentalist 
structure of the EU.  
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France  on the other hand was the most negative, among the core 
three. Despite his rhetorical support for Turkish membership, President 
Chirac repeatedly asserted that the accession negotiations might fail and 
that alternative scenarios for such a case have to be devised. He insisted on 
a referendum to be held in France on Turkish membership upon the 
completion of negotiations, which was subsequently entrenched as an 
amendment to the French Constitution. His party, UMP, was more open in 
their rejection of Turkey in the EU, particularly through the speeches of its 
new leader, Nicolas Sarkozy who is seen by many as the major challenger 
to Chirac’s post. His arguments focused on the identity issue as well as 
certain threat perceptions. According to Sarkozy and the centre-right in 
France, an EU with Turkey would not resemble anything more than a free 
trade area. This widespread perception was triggered by two major 
concerns. One was the fear of a decrease in French influence in the EU after 
Turkish accession, and the other was the fear of a ‘no’ vote on the 
Constitution. Hence Chirac strived to play the middle ground between the 
strong ‘no’ camp in his own party and the pro-Turkey camp of the other 
decision-makers in the core of Europe, namely Britain and Germany. 
Other countries in the EU were also divided on the issue. While 
Spain, Belgium and Greece sided with the ‘yes’ camp, Austria remained 
strongly opposed. The Netherlands was ambivalent whereas the 
Scandinavian countries were generally in favour, despite strong opposition 
particularly by the extreme right that is strong in some member states such 
as Denmark.  
The Commission, on the other hand, has in general been cautiously 
supportive of Turkish accession. The former enlargement Commissioner 
Verheugen often emphasised that there is no alternative to full membership 
for Turkey so long as the country fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria. 
Responding to questions regarding a ‘privileged partnership’ with Turkey, 
he stated that “Turkey is eligible for membership. It does not matter that 
Tu rkey is so big, that Tu rkey is so far, that Tu rkey is so poor and that 
Turkey is a country with a Muslim population”.16 As the reform process 
gained momentum after the strengthening of conditionality by the 
Copenhagen Summit of 2002, the Commission’s role as a monitoring body 
of reform has increased and its support became more than a mere rhetorical 
                                                      
16 Interview with Gunther Verheugen, 16 April 2004 (see 
www.edition.cnn.com/2004/world/europe/04/16/eu.verheugen). 192 | EMERSON, AYDIN, NOUTCHEVA, TOCCI, VAHL & YOUNGS 
 
entrapment. The changeover at the Commission does not seem to be 
reversing this trend. Olli Rehn, speaking before the Brussels Summit 2004 
where the decision to start accession negotiations with Turkey was taken, 
stated that “there is no Plan B for Turkey...we have the responsibility to 
accept the country as a member if it fulfils the criteria”.17  
The position of the European Parliament was more mixed than that of 
the Commission. Although some party groups in the EP had a more or less 
coherent and united position on the issue, many continued to voice 
discordant views due to the differences in the opinions of national party 
delegations. The debates over Turkey intensified prior to the EP elections in 
June 200418 and the general position of the EP became clearer with the 
reactions to the Oostlander Report which was adopted in April 2004. With 
211 votes in favour, 84 against and 46 abstentions, the Parliament rejected a 
‘privileged partnership’ with Turkey, but stated that the political reform 
process in legislation and in practice is the absolutely necessary condition 
for membership. In a similar fashion, in the wake of the crucial Brussels 
Summit, the Parliament adopted the Eurlings Report in December 2004. 
With 50 votes in favour, 18 against and 6 abstentions, the EP recommended 
the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey, so long as in the first 
phase of negotiations, priority is given to the full implementation of the 
political criteria.  
Hence the positions of the major policy-makers in Europe were 
hardly coherent on the issue of Turkish membership. The Commission was 
by far the most positive, followed by the Parliament who put the most 
emphasis, as expected, on the political criteria. The member states on the 
other hand were deeply divided on the issue between those who argued for 
a ‘privileged partnership’ and others who emphasised the virtues of the 
Turkish accession which would come after a long time. Such divisions were 
overcome in the long-awaited December Brussels European Council 
summit of 2004 that gave concessions to all parties concerned. Pressure 
particularly from the German and the British governments, Turkey’s 
progress along the political criteria and the prevalent fears of radical Islam 
were highly influential in the decision taken in the Summit to start 
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accession negotiations with Turkey. Provisions were also there to satisfy 
those who were against full membership. The conclusions of the Brussels 
summit referred to “The Union’s capacity to absorb new members” as an 
important consideration was emphasised alongside those measures that are 
perceived as running contrary to the EU spirit, such as “permanent 
safeguard clauses in areas such as the freedom of movement of persons, 
structural policies or agriculture”. The term ‘privileged partnership’, as 
used by German CDU leaders was not used in the European Council 
conclusions, but the text said as much in other words: “negotiations are an 
open-ended process, the outcome of which can not be guaranteed 
beforehand…if it (the candidate state) cannot assume the full obligations of 
membership, it must be ensured that the candidate state concerned is fully 
anchored in the European structures through the strongest possible bond”.  
The prospects of Turkish accession seem to be less bright in 2005, the 
year in which accession negotiations are scheduled to start. The widely-
predicted negative outcome of the long-scheduled 29 May referendum on 
the European Constitution in France as well as the largely unexpected 
election defeat of the ruling Social Democrats in North Rhine-Westphalia 
on 22 May appear to have cast shadows over the prospect of Turkey’s 
accession to the EU. Such developments are not expected to prevent the 
formation of a superficial unity to open accession negotiations in October 
2005. The Commission has recently confirmed that accession talks with 
Turkey will begin as scheduled.19 However, these developments signal that 
the negotiation process will indeed prove to be difficult with the possibility 
of resulting in a privileged partnership, as accommodated in the Brussels 
Summit conclusions.  
Any outcome that falls short of full membership would be a deep 
disappointment to Turkey. Yet it seems that the dramatic wave of political 
reform achieved in 1999 to 2005 pushed by strong EU conditionality has 
become essentially irreversible. Domestic factors, both at political levels 
and in society as a whole, seem to be ratifying this ratcheting up of 
Turkey’s democracy to an impressively high qualitative level. The EU’s 
intervention, very strong during a very specific period of a few years in 
Turkey’s political history, was instrumental in this ratchet effect, which 
surely enters into the category of an unanticipated consequence of the EU’s 
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own complex political dynamics coinciding with a particular stage of 
Turkey’s own development. On the other hand, further change without the 
EU anchor is expected to occur at a slower pace than witnessed between 
1999 and 2005. 
Russia and Ukraine 
During the early post-Soviet period, EU policy towards the former Soviet 
Union was rather coherent. The ‘Russia first’ policy was at first quite 
uncontroversial and justified on grounds both of interests (Russia as geo-
political and energy power) and political values, since Yeltsin’s Russia had 
led the way towards both democracy at home and the peaceful 
dismemberment of the Soviet Union. During the 1990s, EU policy towards 
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was otherwise graduated 
on the basis of size and proximity. Relations with Russia came first, 
followed by relations with Ukraine, then the other Western CIS states and 
lastly Central Asia. Also Putin was much appreciated in his first term for 
reversing the chaotic unpredictability of Russian politics. 
Political transition towards democracy, the rule of law and human 
rights has been a central feature of EU policy towards all the former Soviet 
Union in the early post-Soviet period. Yet by the early 2000s, and with the 
important exception of the situation in Chechnya, there was hardly a 
categorical difference in the apparent quality of democracy, the rule of law 
and human rights between Russia and Ukraine. The South Caucasus states 
were regarded as small dysfunctional democracies, whereas the Central 
Asians revealed early on that they were not inclined at all towards 
democracy. 
There were some differences in priorities among EU member states, 
but this was more often a question of geography than debate over ‘values’ 
versus ‘interests’, with the usual north-south differences in emphasis.20 
Those in favour of a stronger policy towards the Northern European 
neighbours were able to placate Southern member states by simultaneously 
agreeing to strengthen EU policy with the Southern neighbours. The 
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decision to enlarge to Central and Eastern Europe in the early to mid-1990s 
was thus followed by the creation of the Barcelona process. The geographic 
factor was also evident in the Finnish ‘Northern Dimension’ initiative in the 
late 1990s. However the expansion of the scope of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy in late 2002 to include the Southern Mediterranean 
partners as well as the new European neighbours (Ukraine, Moldova and 
Belarus) was another example of how these mild north-south tensions 
could be reconciled.  
It has taken the de-democratising trends in Russia under Putin’s 
second term in office, followed by the renewal of Ukraine’s democratic 
transition with the Orange Revolution in late 2004, for more serious 
divergences within the EU to emerge. It is tempting to regard this as a 
result of the May 2004 enlargement, which brought in new members from 
Central and Eastern Europe with strong views on EU policy towards all the 
European CIS states.21 Many of the new member states, with Poland and 
Lithuania in the lead, have actively supported a greater EU engagement 
with Ukraine, including acknowledging Ukraine as a potential member of 
the EU, as well as calling for a tougher line vis-à-vis an increasingly 
authoritarian Russia.  
However, growing internal disagreements on policy towards the 
European CIS states, and Russia and Ukraine especially, predate the May 
2004 enlargement. There developed considerable support in 2003 among 
the 15 member states, as well as in the Commission, Council Secretariat and 
European Parliament, for a more critical line towards Russia on matters of 
political values. During the review of policy towards Russia in early 2004, 
there was broad agreement in the Council on a tougher approach proposed 
by the Commission and the Council Secretariat with regard to Putin’s de-
democratising tendencies. This immediately followed and had been 
provoked by Berlusconi’s astonishing (and generally considered shameful) 
performance as President of the European Council, when he concluded the 
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December 2003 EU-Russia summit with remarks at a press conference 
about volunteering to be Putin’s advocate over Chechnya. In autumn 2004, 
the Nordic member states and Austria joined with seven new Central and 
Eastern European member states calling for a greater engagement with 
Ukraine and a growing reluctance to support enhanced cooperation with 
Russia.22  
Several big ‘old’ member states were, however, soon critical of this 
call for a tougher line towards Russia. France and Italy had already earlier 
found themselves opposing a common EU position during tensions over 
Kaliningrad in 2002, with both favouring a more conciliatory approach 
towards Russia.23 Both President Chirac and Chancellor Schroeder 
criticised the ‘new’ position on Russia agreed by the Council in early 2004. 
Most recently, in 2005, France and Italy supported the Russian position that 
the four ‘road maps’ developing ‘common spaces’ with Russia should be 
adopted separately, rather than the common EU position of adopting them 
as one package.24 A large majority of member states were, however, against 
the proposal to implement the common economic space while leaving other 
common spaces, such as the one on freedom, security and justice, to be 
agreed upon at some later date. It was only in this latter document that 
adherence to common values such as democracy, the rule of law and 
human rights featured, and even so only in a token manner.  
The idea of a more active EU policy towards ‘new neighbours’ other 
than Russia, such as Ukraine and Moldova, was first proposed by the 
British and Swedish foreign ministers in early 2002, and this eventually led 
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to the European Neighbourhood Policy.25 Net contributors to the EU 
budget, such as Germany and the Netherlands, were cautious, however, 
being loathe to undertake costly new commitments towards Ukraine. On 
the other hand, there later emerged increasing cooperation between 
Germany and the pro-Ukrainian camp in the Council, with joint policy 
papers with Poland in October 2004, and with Poland and Lithuania in 
January 2005, calling for stronger engagement with Ukraine.  
It should also be noted that the positions of several EU member states 
concerning EU policy towards Russia and the role of ‘common values’ in 
this policy appear to have changed considerably over the last few years. 
Finland, France and Britain provide three examples of such changes. Upon 
its accession to the EU in 1995, Finland soon became a leading advocate of a 
stronger and more pro-active EU policy towards Russia, seen most notably 
with its Northern Dimension initiative from 1997 onwards. During the 
Putin presidency, Finland has become increasingly sceptical of 
developments in Russia, and is now calling for a tougher EU policy line 
vis-à-vis Russia, for instance concerning the issue of visas. British Prime 
Minister Blair was also in the forefront in courting Putin early in his first 
term. Since then, however, Blair has gradually distanced himself from 
Putin, and bilateral British-Russian relations have become strained due to 
Britain’s granting of asylum to oligarchs and Chechen leaders and the 
refusal by British courts to extradite these individuals to Russia.26 The story 
seems to be one of Britain and Finland tilting towards values, versus France 
tilting towards geo-strategic and diplomatic interests. 
Indeed, President Chirac has changed his position radically since the 
beginning of Putin’s presidency. France was among the hardest critics of 
the second Russian military campaign in Chechnya from late 1999.27 A 
variety of arguments are used in favour of rapprochement with a non-
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democratic Russia. A geopolitical argument, used mainly by Chirac, calls 
for an EU-Russian strategic partnership as a key building block towards the 
creation of a global multi-polar order. The geopolitical argument has a 
lighter version, where Russia’s unique role as the only direct EU neighbour 
that is also a global power is emphasised. This is supported to a greater or 
lesser extent by most EU actors. A ‘geo-economic’ argument focuses on the 
EU’s growing reliance on external sources of energy and the crucial role of 
Russia as a supplier of oil and natural gas. This argument is emphasised by 
Germany under Chancellor Schroeder, although it must be noted that the 
new member states calling for a tougher line on Russia are even more 
dependent on Russian energy supplies than Germany.28 Other economic 
issues related to trade, investment and debt can also partially explain the 
position of some of the bigger EU member states, with Germany and Italy 
being Russia’s two largest creditors. 
A recurrent argument of those in favour of a more conciliatory line 
vis-à-vis Moscow are varieties of ‘better the devil you know’. In spite of the 
partial failure of the transition process under Yeltsin and the first war in 
Chechnya, the EU, led by the big member states, provided support for 
Yeltsin ahead of the 1996 presidential campaign. Leaders of big EU member 
states such as France, UK, Germany and Italy, have spent considerable time 
and energy in courting President Putin. The most prominent example is 
perhaps Italy’s policy towards Russia under Prime Minister Berlusconi. The 
Italian premier has forged a close relationship with Putin, and has become 
one of his and Russia’s greatest supporters within the EU. While Italy had 
little interest in Kaliningrad, Berlusconi was highly critical of EU proposals 
(which were eventually adopted in Berlusconi’s absence). The most 
egregious example came during the Italian presidency in November 2003 
over Chechnya (as already noted) and similarly with Berlusconi support to 
Putin over the Yukos affair. Russia also made common cause with France 
and Germany against the US-led invasion of Iraq.  
While EU actors can broadly agree in their analysis of the growing 
authoritarianism in Russia and the importance of putting democratisation 
at the top of the EU’s agenda vis-à-vis the Eastern neighbours, current 
divisions could be interpreted as disagreement over means. The announced 
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purpose of the March 2005 Paris Quartet summit (of France, Germany, 
Spain and Russia) was to encourage democratisation of Russia, based on 
the argument that this can be better achieved through high-level dialogue. 
Similar arguments have been voiced regarding Schroeder’s bilateral 
dialogue with Putin. 
The stance of EU member states is often coloured by their bilateral 
relations with Russia. In the cases of the UK, Denmark and to a lesser 
extent Greece, tensions with Moscow have emerged due to asylum granted 
to Russian oligarchs and/or Chechen leaders whom Russia wanted 
extradited. The EU-Russia summit in November 2002 had to be moved 
from Copenhagen to Brussels, following the holding of a conference on 
Chechnya in autumn 2002.  
As between the institutions, the Ukrainian Orange Revolution saw 
initially Solana and the Commission taking cautious positions. However as 
the crisis developed and the heads of state of Poland and Lithuania headed 
for Kiev to mediate a peaceful solution, Solana was brought to accompany 
them and ultimately played an active role in persuading Leonid Kuchman 
to abstain from the use of force. But still the Council and Commission were 
loathe to encourage Ukraine’s EU aspirations. The European Parliament 
could find allies in only a minority of member states in support of 
acknowledging Ukraine as a potential member of the EU. The European 
Parliament has also been quite consistent in its calls for a greater emphasis 
on ‘common values’ vis-à-vis Russia and the other Eastern neighbours, 
with further cooperation conditional on progress towards democracy, the 
rule of law and respect for human and minority rights in Russia. This can 
be seen in its numerous recommendations, statements and reports on 
Russia, for instance the 1998 Lalumiere report, the 2000 Oostlander report 
and the 2004 Bender report.29 On Ukraine, the evolution in the position of 
the European Parliament on Ukraine has been dramatic following the 
Orange Revolution. Their support spans across the political spectrum. 
However with Yuschenko’s affiliation with the centre-right EPP, this party 
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group took the initiative on the Ukrainian declaration, while the Socialists 
were less outspoken.  
To summarise, the evolution of EU policies towards Russia and 
Ukraine has seen a distinct ‘democracy twist’ in recent years compared to 
the early post-Soviet period. In the first period in the 1990s, a ‘Russia first’ 
policy was justified both on geo-strategic and democracy arguments. As a 
result the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Ukraine was a 
paler version of that for Russia. In the last year, as Russia’s de-
democratising trends contrasted with the dramatic Orange Revolution in 
Ukraine, this state of relations with the two large neighbours was reversed. 
The Action Plan for Ukraine is the most developed example of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy, and contains a strong emphasis on 
democracy. Meanwhile the four common spaces agreed with Russia a few 
months later in May 2005 can be viewed as a weaker derivative of the 
Neighbourhood Action Plans, notably lacking any substantial 
commitments on democracy, rule of law and human rights. The EU 
institutions and its member states have taken a somewhat fractious and 
bumpy route in the course of moulding this ‘democracy twist’, but the 
outcome is fairly clear. Democratic political criteria have been heavily 
influencing the policy evolution. 
Maghreb 
Arguably to a greater extent than in some other regions, European 
democracy and human rights policy in the Maghreb has exhibited some 
degree of convergence between different EU member states and 
institutions. While the traditional differences between European 
governments persist in this region, these look less overwhelming today 
than ten years ago when the Barcelona Process was established.  
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) represents one of the 
most strongly institutionalised of the EU’s foreign policy partnerships. 
During the decade since the EMP’s creation, a network of cooperation has 
developed with state and non-state actors in the Maghreb across a notably 
comprehensive range of policy areas. This cooperation has included a focus 
on democracy and human rights. The attention given to democracy and 
human rights under the EMP has slowly become less timid and subject to a 
greater degree of agreement amongst EU member states, the Commission 
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In 1995, the Barcelona Declaration enshrined a formal commitment to 
encouraging human rights improvements and democratic values. While 
this appeared to represent an early agreement between member states on 
the linkage between human rights and ‘soft security’ challenges, strong 
consensus remained elusive on any significant implementation of this 
commitment. However, in the intervening years, some genuine 
convergence has taken place. Against an historical context of major 
European rivalries and differences in the Maghreb, the absence of 
fundamental substantive disagreement on general strategic goals now 
appears significant. 
On the one hand, the engagement of northern EU member states in 
southern Mediterranean challenges has undoubtedly intensified. This 
evolution has represented both cause and effect of the Europeanisation of 
policy under the EMP. On the other hand, southern member states 
previously drawn almost exclusively to policies of ‘pro-regime stability’ 
have gradually adopted a focus on democracy and human rights. This 
change was initially unashamedly tactical: something of a quid pro quo for 
northern member states’ acquiescence to increased EU funding for the 
Maghreb. A decade on from the creation of the Barcelona Process, southern 
member states’ recognition of the desirability of encouraging political 
‘modernisation’ appears slightly more deeply rooted. In this sense, the 
EMP represents a clear example of ‘socialisation’ dynamics being generated 
through incrementally ratcheted-up commitments to institutionalised 
cooperation.  
The very ‘thickness’ of formalised EU cooperation with the Maghreb 
has produced an identifiable community of EMP experts in both Brussels 
and national capitals. The plethora of committees and dialogue forums 
responsible for managing the EMP does appear to have helped generate a 
greater degree of shared understanding around human rights and 
democratic reform concerns. If an ‘epistemic community’ can be said to 
exist anywhere within the EU’s own internal procedures of foreign policy 
cooperation, this must be one of the most convincing candidates for such a 
label. The routinely asserted problem of poor linkage between different 
elements of the EU machinery looks less marked under the EMP than in 
most other areas of European foreign policy.  
In part as a response to the 9/11 attacks, in 2003 the EU established 
new guidelines designed to enhance support for democracy and human 
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on this strengthened commitment would not have been possible some 
years previously. The new guidelines reflected notable activism on the part 
of the European Commission, and particularly of the then-external 
relations Commissioner, Chris Patten. Initial support came from the Dutch, 
Danes, Swedes and British governments, but it was agreed that real 
significance could be attached to the assent of the French and Spanish 
governments.  
France has increasingly seen merit in the pursuit of political reform 
initiatives in Algeria through the EU dimension; and even Paris has become 
increasingly exasperated with Tunisian president Bin Ali for resisting any 
degree of political opening. Notable similarities have become apparent in 
the human rights and good governance projects funded by different 
national donors and the European Commission in the Maghreb. There is a 
shared agreement on exploring ways of increasing the operationalisation of 
human rights and democracy strictures through the new Neighbourhood 
Action Plans, which includes broad agreement on the need to focus efforts 
more on a country-specific basis in the future. There also appears to be a 
degree of convergence around the notion of ‘positive conditionality’, 
through which additional rewards would be offered to states willing to 
cooperate on political reform. It is still the case that southern member states 
remain more cautious on the firm benchmarking of aid and trade benefits 
against specific reforms, but recent debates over the ENP have revealed a 
broad willingness on their part to support the basic principle of rewards-
based conditionality – certainly to a greater extent than in the past. Spain 
sees the provision of such ‘rewards’ as a means of ensuring that reformist 
Morocco – an increasing strategic focus for Madrid since the 11 March 2004 
bombings – receives additional funding.  
While elements of a more unified focus on democracy and human 
rights have developed in policy towards the Maghreb, there is also a 
commonality in the advocacy of very gradual political change. European 
speeches, from different national sources and from the Brussels institutions, 
are littered with similar references to the need for incremental 
‘modernisation’; the need not to ‘impose’ democratic change; the need to 
respect differences; and the need for change to ‘come from within’, to be 
‘home grown’. On this point, there has been little to distinguish the 
discourse of one member state from another, or Commissioners Patten and 
Ferrero-Waldner from Javier Solana, in the last three or four years. There 
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Commission to engage with Islamist organisations not formally sanctioned 
by incumbent regimes. In light of the sensitivities of democracy and human 
rights promotion in this region, member states have shared a desire to 
encourage the Commission to take lead role, to a greater degree than in 
most other areas of EU foreign policy.  
T h i s  s e e m s  t o  b e  r e f l e c t e d  i n  a  r e c e n t  p r o p o s a l  s k e t c h e d  b y  t h e  
Commission in its assessment for the 10th anniversary of the Barcelona 
Process to introduce: 
… a Democracy Facility that will serve to promote, support and 
reward those partners that also show a clear commitment to common 
values and to agreed political reform priorities. This facility, within 
the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), 
would go beyond the specific support that may be mobilised under 
regional or national action plan.30  
Consonant with this, convergence between member states also 
applies to the post-9/11 prioritisation of counter-terrorist cooperation and 
increased controls on migrants. In 2002, joint UK-Spanish proposals were 
forthcoming on these issues. In 2003, the UK joined forces with France, 
Spain, Portugal and Italy in a project aimed at enhancing the capacity and 
effectiveness of border guards and patrol vessels in the Mediterranean. 
During the 1990s, intra-European differences over Libya were one of 
the most commonly-cited cases of EU strategic disarray. Since the 1999 
agreement on trial conditions for the Lockerbie suspects, a broad 
commonality of approach to Colonel Q’adafi’s regime has taken shape. This 
appears for the moment to have involved all member states accepting that 
the prize of progress on non-proliferation with Libya justifies an absence of 
pressure on internal democratic reform and human rights concerns. 
Notwithstanding such convergence, differences naturally remain. 
These can be said to divide along a number of cleavages. 
Firstly, geography still plays a causal role. If variation between 
northern and southern EU member states is not quite as marked as 
previously, significant differences remain over the tactics advocated to 
advance human rights and democracy in the Maghreb. While all member 
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states espouse a philosophy of gradual political change, northern states – in 
particular, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands and the UK – advocate 
more ‘forward-leaning’ policy options in this field.  
This is seen in debates over the critical language used in EU 
responses to human rights abuses and democratic shortfalls. Southern 
member states have fought to dilute the critical tone of EU reaction to 
human rights abuses in the Maghreb. Their argument is that EU statements 
should refer to concerns of southern Mediterranean governments’ 
hindering the EU’s own cooperation, rather than broadening criticism to 
more general concerns over democratic reversals. The first is seen by them 
as offering the potential for positive EU leverage, the latter as counter-
productive. While supporting the policy of positive engagement with 
Colonel Q’adafi, Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands have pushed for 
more critical language in response to human rights concerns in Libya. 
These differences are probably less marked in the case of Morocco, where 
there remains a desire common across all EU actors to work with King 
Mohammed VI in deepening reforms – this despite signs that the King’s 
commitment to political liberalisation in some areas is accompanied by a 
firm unwillingness to allow reform in other areas.  
Arguably the main ‘tactical’ difference between member states still 
relates to economic liberalisation, with southern EU member states more 
reluctant to open their markets to, particularly agricultural competition 
from the Maghreb. These states often complain that northern member 
states disingenuously present themselves as paragons of economic virtue 
on this issue, in the comfortable position of simply not competing in the 
same sectors as Maghreb producers. Northern member states refer most 
commonly to this issue when lamenting southern member states’ 
preference for grand rhetoric rather than concrete substantive 
improvements that would really offer concrete benefit to the Maghreb. This 
economic variation is of relevance to the issue of democracy and human 
rights in so far as it reflects one difference in philosophy: the northern 
liberal states often place more stress on the value of economic reform as a 
tool for engendering political liberalisation; southern member states, and in 
particular France adhere rather more to a notion of cultural cooperation 
being more important in breeding consensual support for democratic 
norms. This difference should not be overstated; all member states would 
commonly espouse an element of both logics. The variation is rather one of 
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most potent area of EU political leverage; southern states would qualify 
EMP cultural dialogue as the EU’s really valuable tool in efforts to remould 
political values in the Maghreb.  
More recently, tactical differences can be seen in a north/east vs. 
south split over the essential aim of the European Neighbourhood Policy 
(ENP). Northern and the new Eastern European member states conceived 
the ENP primarily as a framework for boosting cooperation and political 
reform work in the eastern European states left out of the accession process. 
While southern member states pushed successfully to ensure the inclusion 
of the southern Mediterranean, differences remain over the allocation of 
resources between the eastern and southern dimensions of the 
Neighbourhood. Indeed, since May 2004, an east-south cleavage has been 
added to the longstanding north-south division within the EU – even if 
most observers judge the new Eastern European members to have adopted 
relatively low profile positions within the CFSP so far. Under the ENP 
action plans, the issue of benchmarking has become a source of difference. 
A number of northern member states, in particular the UK, have more 
firmly pushed for commitments to benchmark political reform; Spain and 
other more cautious states have sought to retain more discretion in 
decisions over the allocation of future resources to – and crucially, between 
– Maghrebi states. 
These debates also relate to the general level of commitment shown 
towards the Maghreb. The ‘5+5’ dialogue – grouping France, Spain, Italy, 
Portugal and Malta with Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia and Mauritania – 
has been relaunched, indicating a determination on the part of southern EU 
member states to push forward with deeper cooperation on controlling 
migration outside the scope of the European Union and the EMP. Northern 
member states may be engaged partners in the EMP now, but it is France, 
Spain and Italy who channel the significant shares of their bilateral 
development aid to the Maghreb. French aid remains oriented towards the 
francophone states of the EMP. Within debates over the EU’s 2007-13 
financial perspectives, the UK, Denmark and the Netherlands have so far 
resisted the prospect of significant increases to middle-income Maghreb 
states and have pressed instead for a larger share of resources to be 
directed at the poorest developing states. In this sense, despite their ‘softer’ 
approaches, southern EU member states argue their quantitative 
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greater than that of northern member states, and hindered by the latter’s 
insistence on prioritising EU funding elsewhere.  
Significantly, in the case of the Maghreb, the differences explained by 
geography compound those of ideological choice. In most places of the 
world, southern member states are more cautious on human rights issues 
by ideological inclination; in the Maghreb, they cite geographical proximity 
as a factor that compounds this standard difference. Thus, if Denmark were 
situated where Italy is, its policies in the Maghreb might be slightly more 
Italian, but not entirely so. An official view positing the opposite logic, 
namely that geography should give southern member states a more urgent 
interest in Maghreb political reform, has not been heard.  
A second cleavage relates to institutional function, and often cuts 
across national differences. A number of policy communities can be 
detected – functional groupings incorporating the respective responsables 
from different member states and the Commission – with common 
perspectives on EU approaches to the Maghreb. The trade policy 
community has been wary of political pressure and conditionality. The 
development policy community in a majority of member states has been 
wary of funding industrial restructuring work in middle-income states. 
Geographical desk officers remain more wary of undercutting diplomatic 
ties through ‘horizontal’ democracy and human rights initiatives that they 
judge to be insensitive to national specificities. The Middle East peace 
process policy community has been wary of the political dimensions of the 
EMP cutting across the primacy of peace process initiatives and 
negotiations. In all these cases, a balance of nationally- and functionally-
rooted perspectives co-exist.  
A third cleavage is structured around the contrasting ways in which 
different actors have interpreted the relationship between EU democracy 
and human rights policies in the Maghreb, on the one hand, and a number 
of exogenous contextual influences, on the other. Differences have deepened 
over the nature of the link between the EMP and the Arab-Israeli conflict; 
the impact of the Iraqi conflict on the rightful approach to human rights 
and democracy elsewhere in the Middle East; and the implications for 
European policies in the Maghreb of new US initiatives, from the Middle 
East Partnership Initiative, through the ill-fated (and apparently, European-
scuppered) Greater Middle East Initiative, to the Broader Middle East and 
North Africa Initiative now developing under the auspices of the G8. 
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sometimes cut across the north-south division within the EU. This is 
perhaps most notably the case in respect of Spanish policy under the 1996-
2004 Aznar government – which most dramatically conditioned the French 
decision even to support Mohammed VI rather than Aznar in response to 
Morocco’s occupation of Spain’s El Perejil island! The significant point here 
is that internal socialisation in the field of democracy and human rights has 
to some extent been offset by the way that differences over other issues 
have woven themselves into this area of policy.  
To summarise, a trend can be observed towards a somewhat greater 
harmonisation of EU policy objectives in the Maghreb. The significance of 
well-known and historically-rooted intra-European differences should not 
be understated. However, after a decade of gradual socialisation within the 
EMP, the underlying direction is towards a greater willingness to accept 
mutual compromise between the EU and its Maghreb partners with a view 
to gradually extending and deepening the application of EU economic and 
political norms in the Maghreb.  
Israel and Palestine 
EU aims and objectives vis-à-vis Israel and Palestine have been defined 
progressively over the decades. By the turn of the century, EU positions 
crystallised into a well-defined position in support of a two-state solution 
in the Middle East. Yet the Union has also articulated in detail its aims and 
preferences with respect to the internal and external conduct of both Israel 
and the Palestinians.  
A fundamental pillar of EU goals has been the importance of 
respecting human rights, democracy and international humanitarian law. 
Most EU declarations on the Middle East conflict since the 1970s have 
condemned Palestinian violence and terrorism, pointing to the violations of 
rights and law that such acts entailed. The member states have also 
condemned Israeli settlements in the occupied territories (OTs), whose 
construction contravenes the Fourth Geneva Convention governing the 
laws of occupation. With the collapse of the Oslo Process, the Union 
intensified its calls to halt and reverse the construction of settlements and 
the wall in the West Bank. The Union has also denounced the whole array 
of human rights and humanitarian law violations, ranging from Palestinian 
suicide bombings, to Israeli incursions, extra-judicial killings and forms of 
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Palestinian self-determination should be pursued only within the confines 
of international law. Since the late 1990s and increasingly over the course of 
the intifada, the Union has made frequent declarations on Palestinian 
reform in the areas of democracy, good governance and the rule of the law.  
In principle, a two-state solution on the one hand, and the respect for 
democracy, human rights and international law on the other are fully 
compatible. The respect for rights and law could and should be the 
necessary means to achieve a viable two-state solution. But has the EU’s 
pursuit of these goals been complementary or competing? If these goals 
have been competing, what are the Union’s priorities? Have short-term 
diplomatic victories on the conflict settlement front trumped democracy, 
human rights and international law objectives, hindering also the long-term 
goal of conflict resolution? 
The means by which the Union has pursued its goals in Israel-
Palestine have not relied on historical processes. European history has left a 
highly complex legacy in the region. It has created a degree of affinity 
amongst former European Israelis. Yet it has left deep scars and traumas in 
the region, ranging from memories of European anti-Semitism and the 
holocaust in Israel to the British colonial betrayal in Palestine.  
Relative to Eastern Europe and the Balkans, the EU cannot rely on its 
magnetic presence and power of attraction either. Neither Israel nor 
Palestine has ever seriously engaged with the idea of entering the EU. In 
the case of the Palestinians, the question is clear-cut. Neither have 
Palestinian elites nor the public ever expressed the desire to join the Union. 
The Palestinians would welcome a more active EU role in the region. But 
this role is viewed exclusively within the domain of foreign policy and is 
linked to their prime objective of securing viable statehood. As far as Israel 
is concerned, the picture is far more nuanced. At first glance it appears that 
the prospect of EU accession could have a strong hold amongst Israelis. A 
recent poll revealed that 85% of Israelis would back an application for EU 
membership.31 In recent years, prominent Israeli politicians, including 
Likud members such as Binyamin Netanyahu have aired the possibility of 
Israel’s inclusion in the Union. Yet scratching beneath the surface, these 
statements appear to stem more from a general desire to exit the turbulent 
Middle East and enter a European security community, than from a 
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thorough realisation of what membership would entail. Most Israeli 
analysts are well aware that full EU accession would not be in Israel’s 
political interests, in so far as it would require a radical transformation of 
the Zionist project (through the adoption of the Copenhagen political 
criteria). Hence, even in the hypothetical situation in which EU 
membership were on offer, it seems unlikely that Israel could be mobilized 
to pursue actively this goal. 
Other forms of passive EU influence have also had limited impact on 
the parties. The Union can only have a limited socialisation effect on the 
parties. Due to its aid-dependent relation with the Palestinians and the 
Palestinians’ restricted movement in view of their status, the likelihood of 
Palestine being socialised into EU structures, processes and norms is low. 
The potential for socialisation vis-à-vis Israel is much higher. Israel’s 
inclusion in a wide array of EU activities and programmes, its developed 
trade links with Europe, its visa-free travel to Europe and the high 
proportion of Israelis holding EU citizenship could have cumulative effects 
on Israeli society. However, these social processes remain too thin to have a 
strong discernible effect on Israeli politics.  
EU influence has instead relied primarily on its foreign policy 
instruments in the fields of aid, trade and cooperation, articulated through 
the EU’s contractual ties with the parties. Most recently, the Union has held 
out the promise of enhanced relations through the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).  
A close look at the EU’s relations with Israel and Palestine highlights 
an increasing divergence between rhetorical goals and conduct in practice. 
The spiralling violence on the ground during the second intifada could 
neither have been halted nor substantially ameliorated by the EU alone. 
However, while being unable to halt the violence, EU policy instruments at 
times deviated from the fulfilment of the Union’s stated goals. More 
specifically, alleged conflict settlement goals have trumped long-term goals 
aimed at democracy, human rights and conflict resolution.  
What explains these results? One hypothesis concerns the possible 
divisions within the Commission itself, coupled with the institutional 
immaturity of the Commission, as illustrated in the dispute with Israel over 
the preferential export of Israeli goods produced in settlements. The 
preferential export of settlement products and the Union’s failure to rectify 
the ensuing breach of Israel’s association agreement has put the 
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External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten and DG External Relations 
have been well aware of this fact, clarifying that the preferential treatment 
of settlement products is illegal. However, in an attempt to settle the matter 
expediently and in a non-adversarial matter, former Internal Market 
Commissioner Fritz Bolkenstein agreed in early 2004 with Israeli Trade 
Minister Ehud Olmert that the matter could be resolved through a 
‘technical arrangement’. Under the arrangement (that came into force in 
February 2005) Israel would name the locality of final substantial or partial 
transformation on the origin certificates of Israeli exports. In principle, this 
would allow member state customs to detect fraudulent exports and deny 
preferences. Yet unknowingly, the arrangement and its possible 
consequences could irreparably compromise the EU’s position towards 
Israel. Under the arrangement, the EU would entitle Israel to represent all 
localities as situated within the State of Israel. If the Community considered 
the arrangement as legally binding (or acted to that effect) the meaning of 
the association agreement would be reversed. If Israel can legally issue 
proof of origin for settlement products, then the EU would have recognised 
that these territories legally fall within Israel’s territorial scope. No EU 
political declaration to the contrary would alter this fact. Indeed, Israel’s 
occupation would have become enshrined in Community Law, which in 
turn, would have become inconsistent with the member states’ duties 
under international law. 
Other important causes of EU ineffectiveness vis-à-vis Israel and 
Palestine concern the differences between the Commission, the Council and 
the Parliament. The EP has typically called for extreme remedies against 
the violations of democracy, human rights and the rule of law by the 
parties. These have included the suspension of aid to the PA in view of the 
corruption within the Authority and the fear that EU money was being 
channelled to terrorist groups. It has also called for the imposition of 
sanctions and arms embargoes on Israel in 2002. Yet its calls have gone 
largely unheard. Particularly in its appeals for sanctions on Israel, the EP 
has contributed to obfuscating the fundamental EU dilemma, which 
concerns less the use of sticks and carrots and more the respect for 
international law in its bilateral relations with Israel. 
The Council has instead focused on the primary importance of the 
peace process over and above the prerogatives of human rights and 
international law, as if these two goals were not compatible. Over the Oslo 
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that these could upset the process. Hence, despite the growing internal 
complaints within the Palestinian territories, the Council (unlike the 
Commission) only began paying attention to Palestinian reform after the 
outbreak of the intifada. Since the end of the peace process, the Union can 
certainly report important successes in promoting Palestinian reform. 
However, its effective impact remains below potential. This is in part due 
to the sui generis context in Palestine. However, it is also linked to the 
inadequate or incomplete specification of EU conditions. In particular, 
while some areas have received disproportionate EU attention (such as the 
security sector, or the creation and empowerment of a prime minister), 
others have received none at all. The questions that arguably lie at the fore 
of Palestinian democracy have been largely neglected by EU actors. Two 
key issues are at stake: the relationship between the PLO and the PA and 
the persistent exclusion of Islamic parties from both organisations, despite 
the fact that they represent the only credible opposition forces in Palestine. 
This (deliberate) neglect opens issues of fundamental importance 
concerning the extent to which the Union genuinely prioritises democracy 
promotion in Palestine. Likewise, Israel’s ongoing expansion of settlements 
received only rare and soft-worded criticisms by the Council up until 2000. 
Yet both the inattention to Palestinian governance as well as to Israel’s 
conduct in the occupied territories ultimately hindered the very peace 
process that the EU attempted to foster.  
Since the eruption of the intifada, the Council and the EU Special 
Representative on the Middle East Peace Process have instead been 
preoccupied with day-to-day crisis management, and have prioritised 
efforts aimed at resuming the peace process. This has meant a primary 
focus on the reform of the security sector in Palestine. While security sector 
reform is certainly welcome, other areas of reform could have benefited 
from the same levels of attention by the Council. The EU’s reluctance to 
engage and support Islamic civil society, as well as non-violent groups and 
activities which however do not correspond to their concept of the peace 
process also demonstrates how the peace process has trumped democracy 
and human rights goals in Palestine. Also vis-à-vis Israel, the Council’s 
ambiguous attitude towards the disengagement plan may be hindering 
effective action. Viewing disengagement as an opportunity to re-launch the 
moribund peace process, the Council’s support for Sharon’s plan has 
diminished its criticisms of Israel’s expansion of settlements in the West 
Bank and its re-routing of the wall to encompass these.  212 | EMERSON, AYDIN, NOUTCHEVA, TOCCI, VAHL & YOUNGS 
 
Instead, the Commission has focused on its bilateral relations with 
Israel and the PA. Compared to other EU institutions, the Commission has 
borne the brunt of the deterioration of relations with Israel since 2000, and 
has therefore been adamant to use the opportunity of the ENP to expand 
and deepen bilateral ties with Israel. However, its pursuit of (and ultimate 
agreement on) an Israel Action Plan occurred alongside the Council’s 
criticisms of Israel’s raids in the Gaza Strip in the autumn of 2004, casting a 
cloud over the EU’s overall political message to Israel. As put by a German 
diplomat: “imagine if disproportionate use of force is being condemned by 
everyone, and at the same time the EU offers this magic plan to move Israel 
and the EU closer to each other – a plan which benefits the Israelis… at the 
bottom of this is how we can use for the best our leverage with Israel. After 
all, they will get everything but institutions”.32 
Likewise the Commission agreed on the ‘technical arrangement’ on 
the origin rules dispute, wishing to shelve the headache that has poisoned 
its ties with the Israeli government. In December 2004, the Commission 
called upon the Council to endorse the arrangement and expressed the 
intent to proceed with Israel’s inclusion in the system of pan-Euro-
Mediterranean cumulation of origin rules. Proceeding with these measures 
prior to an effective legal solution to the rules of origin dispute would not 
only magnify exponentially the problem in practice, but would also poison 
the EU’s rights to take legal remedies to halt Israel’s malpractice. 
Ultimately the Commission’s moves were halted by several member states 
in the Council. It remains to be seen how this ongoing saga will resolve 
itself.  
A third explanation of EU ineffectiveness, often flagged in the 
literature on EU foreign policy, is the division between the member states. 
It is a well known and oft-mentioned fact that member states such as 
Germany, Holland, Denmark and the UK have typically taken more pro-
Israeli positions, whereas member states such as France Italy, Spain and 
Greece have been more sympathetic towards the Palestinians. The 
accession of the eastern members also triggered a debate in Israel, raising 
the expectation that the eastern enlargement would tilt internal EU 
balances towards Israel. Indeed, there are some important differences 
between member states. Members such as Germany and Austria have been 
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particularly sensitive to Israeli accusations of anti-Semitism in view of their 
historical legacies. Members such as the UK, Holland and Denmark have 
instead tended to view the Middle East through transatlantic lenses, and 
have thus been reluctant to excessively criticise Israel (as well as moderate 
actors in the PA) and harm, in their view, the peace process. Members such 
as France, Italy and Spain have instead been associated more closely with 
the Arab world, rendering the states more sympathetic to the Palestinian 
cause.  
But without underestimating the importance of these differences, 
which have hindered effective EU action on several key occasions, member 
states have ultimately converged on their vision in the Middle East as well 
as on the policy instruments to pursue their objectives. All however, have 
been constrained politically in their pursuit of these objectives. To different 
degrees, all member states have been sensitive to criticisms of anti-
Semitism, all have valued political as well as economic ties with Israel and 
no member state has been willing to withhold financial, let alone 
humanitarian assistance to the Palestinians. With respect to the 
Palestinians, the priority to be ‘seen as doing something’ and to support the 
peace process at any price has often induced an outpouring of funds 
without prioritised attention to the goals of furthering democracy and good 
governance as ends in themselves.  
In conclusion, the nature of the EU’s credibility problem in the 
Middle East has principally stemmed neither from its inadequate 
instruments nor from its internal divisions. Rather, it has derived from the 
manner in which EU actors collectively have chosen to deploy the policy 
resources at their disposal.  
Findings 
Can this mass of detail be distilled into some structured conclusions? Has 
the EU become a real driver of democracy promotion in the last decade, 
through building up its instruments of action and extending the reach of 
Europeanisation into its wider neighbourhood? Or have the cleavages 
among its member states and between its institutions remained so 
important that its performance as promoter of democracy has been 
substantially curtailed? We structure our findings in the following order: 
•  Is the doctrine and discourse of the EU for democracy promotion as a 
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•  How does practice vary in function of the relationship between the 
EU and the partner?  
•  How damaging to the common purpose are the cleavages between 
member states? 
•  How are the traits of the different EU institutions to be characterised, 
and what are the consequences of the complex and immature inter-
institutional relationships? 
Doctrine and discourse 
Here there is no problem. The EU puts the values and norms of democracy 
and the rule of law at the top of its agenda for speeches and official 
documents. As a result of the accession process, it has had to work out how 
to apply these ideas in practice. The Copenhagen political criteria have 
been given pride of place, and the very detailed conditionality and 
monitoring of the accession process have meant that the institutions have 
learned how to establish effective norms judgementally even where the 
mechanisms of democracy are notoriously varied. The Copenhagen 
political criteria are carried over at the normative level from the accession 
process into the relationships with the non-candidate states of the wider 
European neighbourhood with varying degrees of intensity.  
By category of partner state 
In the wider neighbourhood, there is a hierarchy of categories, qualified by 
the nature of the relationship with the EU: the accession candidates, the 
future candidates of the Balkans that are nevertheless still engaged in post-
conflict state-building, the European neighbours that have membership 
aspirations, the Mediterranean neighbours and finally Russia with its geo-
strategic and inter-continental dimensions.  
For the accession candidates, the Copenhagen political criteria are 
clearly dominating the game. The role of the Commission is also pre-
eminent once the negotiation process has begun. The great conditionality 
machine is switched on. It becomes difficult for member states then to 
intervene in the process, given that the legal basis or other objective 
foundations for the Commission’s work are very solid (but we return to the 
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For the post-conflict cases in the Balkans, the game becomes less 
straightforward, even though the Copenhagen criteria still apply and the 
Commission has an important role as tutor in EU norms and executor of 
the conditionality machine. In this region, the post-conflict task of state-
building, as in Bosnia, Serbia and Montenegro and Kosovo, brings the 
Council, the High Representative Javier Solana and his special 
representatives into play. This sees roles ranging from heavy mediation in 
creating the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro to governing a 
protectorate with Paddy Ashdown exercising his position’s Dayton powers 
in Bosnia. These two functions – of Commission-led conditionality and 
Solana/Ashdown-led state-building – have led to unintended 
contradictions with respect to democracy promotion, or at the very least 
serious sequencing issues. The picture that emerges is that the security-
driven state-building processes may either stultify the development of 
democratic institutions in Bosnia, or unfortunately empower the ‘wrong’ 
domestic political actors, as in Serbia and Montenegro, where the State 
Union is most liked by the old-guard Yugoslav nationalists. Security 
trumps democracy for an interim period at least. 
For the European neighbours with unrecognised accession 
aspirations (Ukraine, Georgia, etc.), the EU has not been in the forefront of 
the recent democratic revolutions as actor. If anything, the EU has tended 
to be a little behind the game, welcoming the results but being studiously 
cautious in not promoting them. Of course the various official documents 
all laud democratic principles, but hints of deference to Moscow on the part 
of the Council and various member states have coloured the atmosphere. 
Even if this deference to Moscow seems now somewhat muted, another 
restraining factor rises in importance, namely the reluctance to the EU to 
contemplate continuing enlargement. The vital synergy between the goals 
of democracy and joining the EU risks being undermined by the 
unencouraging declarations of the Commissioner for external relations 
such as to Ukraine (“the door is neither open nor shut”). It may be that the 
drive for democracy in these states will be sustained because the cause is 
itself so strongly desired, and because the EU remains there as a presence 
and a model. But the Commission’s neighbourhood policy is weak in the 
specificity of the Action Plans so far, and especially so in the nature of the 
incentives on offer (with membership clearly not on offer). Enlargement 
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For the Mediterranean states, the neighbourhood policy brings the 
possibility that democracy promotion will achieve a higher standing than 
under the last decade’s Barcelona Process, when regime stability clearly 
trumped democracy as the priority. The discourse in the official documents 
has already tilted towards a more leading place for democracy, human 
rights and the rule of law. There are timid indications that some positive 
conditionality with respect to political criteria may be introduced in 
practice in the workings of the neighbourhood policy.33 The most reluctant 
member states seem to have become more open to the idea. This re-
calibration of EU policy comes of course at a time of other more dramatic 
changes in the region, partly driven by increasing disappointment of the 
lack of economic and social progress in the Arab world, and partly the 
response of the United States to 9/11. EU policy may therefore be moving 
with the tide. The EU is not demanding democracy with a strident voice, 
armed with massive sticks and carrots. Instead its most important and 
unique contribution may be in the very subjective quest for some kind of 
Euro-Mediterranean identity, and for a modern place for Islamic culture 
inside the democratic EU, which in turn may feed back through diaspora 
connections to the domestic politics of the Arab world.  
Finally comes the case of Russia in a class of its own, with the de-
democratising leadership of President Putin. The EU would like to see an 
ordered renaissance of democratic tendencies in Russia, and tends to 
believe that it is only a matter of time before this will happen. Russian 
democracy is seen as Europe’s security. But in the meantime Russia is still 
the big neighbour with strategic capabilities. These range from being the 
key to Europe’s energy supply security, through to its role as permanent 
member of the UN Security Council, and more broadly still as a strategic 
actor on the world scene, albeit a diminished one. EU criticisms of Russia’s 
non-democratic behaviour are muffled and mixed, so the conclusion has to 
be that strategic considerations trump democracy for the EU in its policies, 
as now evidenced by the May 10th agreement on four common spaces, with 
democracy receiving no more than a token mention. Yet the role of the EU 
as civilisational model and reference for Russian elites and civil society has 
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considerable resonance, and perhaps this may become sharper as they 
watch what is happening in Ukraine.  
Cleavage damage 
Not all the traditional cleavages between member states are so damaging. 
The cleavage between north and south over their natural priorities based 
on geography seems to be fading away. More precisely the EU is 
repeatedly seeing the north and south taking leading positions in favour of 
their respective geographic neighbours, but succeeding also in persuading 
the EU as a whole to embrace their concerns in extensions to prior EU 
external policies. For example, Finland led the Nordic member states in 
persuading the EU as a whole to embrace its idea of a northern dimension 
policy. When the idea of a neighbourhood policy was first advance by 
some northern member states for some northern neighbours, the south 
easily sustained the case for the Mediterranean to be similarly included. In 
addition, the post 9/11 situation has meant that the security threats 
emanating from the Arab neighbourhood now transcend their regional 
origins.  
The syndrome of post-colonial sensitivities translating into reluctance 
to impose political conditionality towards the neighbours seems also to be 
fading away. France and Spain seem to be ready for the EU to be more 
assertive in the Med, after a decade of disappointing experience with the 
Barcelona Process. The case of Austria taking a softer line over its Croatian 
neighbour and former Hapsburg territory has been noted, although this has 
not been a constraint on EU conditionality because of the unanimity rule as 
explained below. In the Balkans, special representatives in the protectorates 
such as Paddy Ashdown in Bosnia have not been inhibited from exercising 
neo-colonial gubernatorial powers with gusto, which nevertheless has 
meant prioritising security over the fostering of Bosnian democracy. 
The reverse syndrome of the former occupied states taking a harder 
line over the democratic shortcomings of the former hegemon is more 
sharply in evidence in the Baltic states and the former Comecon states now 
in the EU. All these states attach the highest importance to sound relations 
with Russia, but they also take a much less benign attitude to Russian 
political behaviour that is deemed to be out of line with European norms. 
These states are typically saying words to the effect: “we know Russia, and 
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the European Parliament are notably vocal in criticising Russia, compared 
to France and Germany who are at the other extreme in stressing their 
understanding for President Putin over Russia’s internal difficulties. This 
has resulted in manifest confusion of messages from the EU to Russia over 
whether the development of cooperation between the two parties will be 
harmed by Putin’s de-democratising tendencies.  
The cleavages left still by World War II may also enter the picture 
here, with Germany taking an exceptionally friendly line towards Russia, 
and personally so at the level of Chancellor Schroeder towards President 
Putin. The shadow of World War II is perhaps now only in the background, 
whereas strategic energy security is in the foreground, with current plans 
for a further major gas pipeline to go directly from Russia to Germany 
under the Baltic Sea. The gas pipelines become an umbilical cord between 
Russia and Germany, but this links significantly to the entire EU gas 
network. Gas seems to trump democracy. Germany has consistently taken 
the line in the EU foreign ministers meetings of softening or avoiding 
criticisms of Putin. It may be speculated that Schroeder’s special 
relationship with Putin translates into a unique political influence. 
Certainly they can socialise together in the German language and because 
Putin knows Germany from his DDR/KGB days. Could this mean Putin 
turning to adopt political positions at home and abroad more in line with 
democratic norms? The evidence is not there so far.  
The legacy of World War II is more clear cut in the case of EU policy 
towards Israel over its infringements of international law in the expansion 
of settlements. As noted above, the EU has a strong legal obligation to hold 
Israel accountable for its illegal trade practices, claiming preferences for 
products originating in settlements. Yet most member states, first and 
foremost Germany and Austria (as well as the UK and Denmark), have 
rejected any measure that is remotely perceived as being confrontational. 
Concern for a propaganda barrage from Jerusalem over alleged anti-
Semitism has trumped concern for international law and human rights.  
The deepest cleavages affecting the foreign policies of the EU come 
from divergent visions for the EU itself as well as divergent world views. 
The ongoing drama of the ratification of the Constitution, alongside the 
issue of Turkey’s candidacy, has brought to the surface a semi-dormant 
issue of fundamental importance. Is the EU to remain open to any 
European democracy, and thus go on enlarging to 35 or even 40 member 
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point, for example after the Bulgarian and Romanian accessions in 2007. 
The arguments favouring a stop are basically twofold. The first is about the 
possible institutional ungovernability of an over-enlarged EU. The second 
is about Europe’s cultural identity (even if God and Christianity were left 
out of the Constitution, there are still those who would veto Turkey’s 
accession on grounds of religious culture). These arguments have a special 
flavour in France, where they combine with a concern that France has less 
and less influence and control over the European construction. The French 
position is further special in that these various considerations have led the 
government to pass an amendment to the French Constitution, requiring 
that all further enlargements of the EU (beyond Bulgaria and Romania) be 
ratified by popular referendum. What is going to be the staying power of 
the EU’s political conditionality in negotiations with Turkey, if at the end 
there would probably be a simple ‘non’ from France? How will this affect 
also the European motivation of Ukraine? The credibility of the EU’s 
conditionality becomes dependent on the non-credibility of the opposition 
to further enlargement. As pointed out above, Commissioner Ferrero- 
Waldner has explicitly discouraged the accession aspirations of Ukraine, 
Moldova and Georgia. The alternative vision of the EU is that it should 
strive for a united and democratic Europe. The UK, for example, supports 
Turkish candidacy with the supplementary argument about Turkey’s role 
model as a secular democracy of Muslim culture. Poland supports 
Ukraine’s aspirations similarly as a factor to consolidate democracy in the 
whole of Eastern Europe. The jury is still out in the contest between these 
two visions of Europe, to prioritise Europe’s power and identity or the 
extension of European democracy. 
The cleavage in world views was dramatically highlighted by the Iraq 
war. While the argument of principle was about whether this was a just 
war or not, there were collateral impacts on the EU’s relations with Russia. 
Of course the divide over Iraq was such that the EU had no position at all. 
However the collateral diplomacy saw France enjoining first Germany and 
then Russia in its opposition to the war. For France strategic diplomacy 
trumped concern over Putin’s de-democratising tendencies.  
Institutions and decision-making rules 
The member states have remained the principals. The Commission and the 
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have been the agents. Of the two, Solana has remained the most closely 
controlled of the agents, since he has few institutional powers of his own. 
He belongs to the world of foreign ministers and diplomats, which gives 
first priority to immediate matters of strategic security. Democracy and 
values always feature in the discourse, and in the long-run security and 
democracy are viewed as being almost synonymous. Yet in terms of how 
day-to-day energies are expended, democracy promotion is often in the 
background.  
The Commission, on the other hand, is an agent that has been 
acquiring such extensive mandates and instruments of action that it partly 
turns into a principal in its own right. This is certainly relevant to 
democracy promotion where the huge conditionality machine of the acquis 
and related incentives is seriously deployed, as in the accession process, or 
wherever in the neighbourhood where the partner states have serious 
accession aspirations. In the latter case, even though the Commission may 
be discouraging future membership candidates from applying, it has still 
designed a neighbourhood policy as a derivative of the accession process. 
This results in the whole package of EU political norms being placed at the 
top of the agenda in the Action Plans of the neighbourhood policy The 
determined neighbour, for example Ukraine, that wants indeed to be more 
than a ‘neighbour’, has therefore a system to work with, which facilitates its 
voluntary compliance with the Copenhagen political criteria.  
This leads on to the question whether Ukraine’s Orange revolution 
stands to influence political developments in either Russia, or Belarus, or 
both. For Belarus this question is indeed being asked.34 Conversations with 
some Russian politicians today reveal cautionary sentiments, such as the 
following: if Ukraine’s new experiment with democracy succeeds, this will 
indeed have an impact on Russia in due course; if it fails this will also have 
an impact in consolidating non-democratic practice.35 Civil society in 
Russia and Belarus will surely be encouraged. The political elites who think 
in more geo-strategic terms will be reflecting on the loneliness of their last 
remaining non-democratic regimes. A recent report by the Russian Council 
of Foreign and Security Policy concluded that most if not all of the Western 
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CIS space (Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, South Caucasus states) would aspire 
to membership of the EU in the foreseeable future.36 It went on to conclude 
that it was not a viable option for Russia to go it alone, and let its Western 
frontier become the border of European civilisation, and that if Russia was 
therefore to aim at some kind of more integrationist model with the EU, it 
would have to converge on the EU model of democracy. At this level of 
thinking, it is of little consequence whether EU leaders get their speeches 
towards Russia precisely in line. Russian society and elites are thinking 
about deeper and longer trends in the mapping of European society and 
politics. For this exercise, the EU is an inescapable reference, whether or not 
it is an ‘actor’.  
Does the unanimity rule in important matters of foreign policy, which 
severely constrains the actions of the institutions, have the effect of limiting 
or strengthening the objective of democracy promotion in the 
neighbourhood? Interestingly the case studies show that it can work both 
ways, either to impose a lowest common denominator, or a highest 
common factor. It depends essentially on who is the demandeur, the EU 
itself or the partner state, or more concretely, whether it is the EU wanting 
to impose punitive measures or the partner state seeking to gain accession 
or a breakthrough in negotiations.  
Where the EU or a group of member states wants to impose punitive 
sanctions, but with some member states resisting such action, then the 
unanimity requirement yields a lowest common denominator result (i.e. 
the actions of the partner states will have to be uncontroversially and 
gravely reprehensible to achieve unanimous support for sanctions, as for 
Libya in the days when it was supporting terrorist acts). Where however 
the partner state regimes are less strongly criticised, it will be difficult to 
achieve unanimity to impose sanctions. This has been the case with the 
Barcelona Process in general, where the southern member states were 
unwilling to try to play the political conditionality card, although this 
position may begin to change now. It has been specifically visible over 
Israel’s settlement policy, which led to discussion of sanctions in the 
Council of foreign ministers through possible suspension of the Association 
                                                      
36 Sergei Karaganov (ed.), “Otnoshenia Rossii y Evropeiskovo Soyuza: 
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Agreement. This was blocked by a group of member states, especially 
Germany. 
In the contrary case of accession aspirations of states such as Turkey 
and Croatia, where these states are the demandeur, the negotiations only 
proceed beyond vital checkpoints (opening of negotiations, or actual 
accession) if the highest demands from among the member states are met. 
This was seen in 2004 as Turkey was obliged to deliver on sufficiently 
impressive conditions to overcome the reluctance of the least enthusiastic 
member states. More recently this model was clearly at work over Croatia, 
where the arrest and surrender to The Hague of an indicted war criminal 
was the condition imposed by some member states. Croatia’s best friends 
and neighbours, Austria and Slovenia, were prepared to be more lenient on 
this condition, but they could not prevail because of the unanimity rule.  
However, strong conditionality policies can overreach themselves 
and turn counterproductive. In the Croatian case, public opinion is 
seriously divided over whether the indicted war criminal is a hero or a 
villain, and the tough EU line may re-empower the very same nationalist 
politicians that the Europeanisation process is supposed to disempower. In 
the Turkish case the decision by the French president to subject the final 
ratification of accession to approval by referendum may cast doubt in 
Turkish minds as to whether any reasonable conditions could satisfy the 
French. In this way the credibility of EU conditionality bargaining may be 
undermined.  
Dysfunctional instruments 
One of the unintended consequences – and indeed casualties – of the EU’s 
institutional tensions and immaturity is the emergence of serious 
bureaucratic constraints on the effectiveness of the technical instruments of 
democracy promotion. The Commission has since the early 1990s been 
endowed with huge increases in programmes of technical assistance to all 
the neighbours – the accession candidates, association agreement partners 
of the CIS or Balkans or the Mediterranean partner states of the Barcelona 
process. These instruments have suffered from a combination of high and 
low politics between the institutions. In line with their concern to restrain 
the entry of the Commission into the domain of high politics, the Council 
has typically responded to new needs for the EU to act with big budgetary 
allocations for technical assistance grants. Yet at the same time it has been THE RELUCTANT DEBUTANTE| 223 
 
very reticent in granting the Commission staff resources at the level of 
these programmes, while also imposing on the Commission onerous 
tendering and management committee procedures.37 The motives here 
have been a mix of concern to restrain the growth of the Commission’s 
institutional role, and commercial concerns over the award of contracts 
between member states. At the same time the European Parliament, 
anxious to enter the foreign policy field from which it was initially totally 
excluded, had to build on its partial powers in the budgetary domain, 
where it has made common cause with the Court of Auditors over matters 
of financial control. The European Parliament ‘succeeded’ in sacking the 
entire Commission of President Santer in 2000 over allegations of financial 
irregularity. The findings were in the event of trivial proportions,38 yet this 
led to ever-increasing severity of financial procedures, and highly risk-
adverse management behaviour on the part of Commission civil servants, 
with the overall result of severely hampering operational effectiveness of 
democracy promotion actions. By contrast, comparable programmes of the 
US and bilateral EU programmes such as those of Denmark, Sweden and 
the UK are seen as positive models of their kind. 
The problems that have arisen are multiple: slow disbursement, high 
costs of administration for the EU institutions and even more serious 
problems of imposing burdens for project preparation and reporting that 
deter applicants. It is common knowledge within the EU and the partner 
states that many potential project managers (consulting companies, 
research institutes, NGOs) will look to the EU programmes as a last resort, 
after trying more user-friendly sources of funding first after European or 
US bilateral programmes. Whereas the rationale of EU action is to exploit 
                                                      
37 For example, to help Gorbachev, the European Council decided in December 
1990 to commit €500 million for technical assistance to aid reform of the USSR. This 
was to be the biggest technical assistance package in the world, for which the 
Commission had to try and start with zero management resources, and it took 
years after the collapse of the Soviet Union for the Tacis programme to reach a low 
cruising speed.  
38 The most celebrated and only hard piece of evidence was the case of the 
Commissioner for scientific research, Mme Cresson, who was found not to have 
followed routine procedures in appointing her dentist to a part-time advisory 
position. Should Mme Cresson’s dentist stand between the EU and the historic 
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synergies and economies of scale, the EU’s financial regulations go in the 
opposite direction, leading to diseconomies of scale.  
These issues involve much technical detail and so should not be 
pursued here. Other sources have documented the problems thoroughly.39 
Yet there is an issue of systemic importance. The EU has been emerging as 
foreign policy actor quite rapidly over the last decade. It might be 
supposed that this evolutionary process was a benign one with regard to 
the efficiency of the instruments of action gradually accruing to the EU. 
Closer inspection shows the process to be more problematic. Partial or 
heavily constrained transfers of competences from member states to new 
and immaturely formed institutions can turn out to be seriously 
dysfunctional. The rational solution might be a maturing of the institutions 
in the sense of giving the executive wider room for manoeuvre, but this 
would mean that the member state principals would lose even more 
control over their agent. When the choice is between loss of power by the 
member states and enhanced efficiency of an EU programme, such as for 
democracy promotion, or the winning of power by the European 
Parliament through imposing overwhelming burdens of financial control 
procedures, the priority seems to be power.  
Conclusions 
This paper began with a review of some paradigms and syndromes that 
seem to characterise the roles currently being played by the EU institutions 
and member states. This provided the setting for a series of case studies of 
current EU policies from Russia round Europe’s eastern and southern 
periphery to Morocco. In a final section we attempt to draw together 
general findings from this detailed material. Our conclusions are: 
1.  The EU has undoubtedly become important as a presence, integration 
model and democratic reference in the wider European 
neighbourhood. This flows from the fact that the EU is now an 
integrated space for almost 500 million people encompassing 
                                                      
39 Striking a Balance – Efficiency, Effectiveness and Accountability: The Impact of the EU 
Financial Regulation on the Relationship between the European Commission and NGOs, 
report of F.M. Partners Limited on behalf of a group of NGOs: Open Society 
Institute (Brussels), Concord, The Platfor m  o f  E u r o p e a n  S o c i a l  N G O s  a n d  t h e  
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virtually the whole of Western and Central Europe, with high 
standards of democracy as the priority criterion for membership. At 
this level the EU does not need to try actively to shape its 
neighbourhood. It simply exists, and is an object of gravitational 
attraction for its neighbours.40 However when neighbouring states 
seek accession, then the EU sets democracy as the sine qua non test, 
and a hugely powerful political conditionality machine is deployed. 
The relative coherence with which EU actors have pursued political 
conditionality in the case of its would-be members follows from the 
objective of transforming these countries from outsiders to insiders. 
Here democracy is number 1. 
2.  By comparison with this enlargement game, the EU’s performance as 
a foreign policy actor aiming at the promotion of democracy is very 
mixed. The distinction between enlargement and foreign policy, or 
between the internal and the external is thus crucial. The enlargement 
process sees the EU play to its legal and institutional strengths, 
whereas its foreign policy activity sees the EU and its member states 
reveal a whole set of divergent preferences, ambiguities and 
institutional cleavages. Clarity and strength of purpose with respect 
to democracy promotion in the neighbourhood suffer as a result. The 
case studies illustrate how the objective of democracy promotion can 
be trumped by several other priorities, such as strategic security, 
energy supply security, strategic diplomacy, conflicting visions for 
the future of Europe and world views. Here democracy is not so 
often, or so clearly number 1. Several of these competing priorities are 
similar to those found in the case of the US.41 
3.  However the distinction between internal and external, while 
categorical in principle, is in practice a fuzzy affair, since the EU’s 
neighbourhood policy is inviting convergence on EU norms and 
                                                      
40 As set out in Michael Emerson and Gergana Noutcheva, “Europeanisation as a 
Gravity Model of Democratisation”, paper presented at the CEPS-Stanford 
Conference on Democracy and the Rule of Law, 4-5 October 2004, and published as 
CEPS Working Document No. 214, November 2004.  
41 Mathew Spence, “Policy Coherence and Incoherence: The Domestic Politics of 
Democracy Promotion”, paper presented at CEPS-Stanford Conference on 
Democracy and the Rule of Law, 4-5 October 2004, Stanford University, 4-5 
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standards, and using ambiguous phrases, such as deeper integration, 
without quite specifying what they mean. Quite a number of 
neighbouring states are declaring their long-term accession 
ambitions, without this being acknowledged by the EU. Indeed there 
is mounting evidence of resistance to continuing enlargement, which 
the very recent French and Dutch referenda results now dramatically 
confirm, and which should in principle weaken the credibility of the 
EU’s political conditionality at least for states with long-run 
aspirations for membership. On the other hand, this weakening of 
enlargement prospects could induce the EU to invest more heavily in 
its neighbourhood policy, precisely because the automatic gravity 
model may otherwise run out of steam.  
4.  As executor of technical assistance for democracy promotion, the 
EU’s performance is seriously hampered by cumbersome 
management procedures, which nevertheless amount to more than a 
merely technical matter, and more fundamentally reflect awkward 
and immature inter-institutional relationships. The fact that the EU is 
only an emerging foreign policy actor, with seriously constrained 
mandates accorded to the executive Commission, turns out to be far 
from a benign state of affairs, but one that impedes executive 
effectiveness.  
Summary Features of the Case Studies 
Balkans.  Bulgaria – Standard accession case. The Commission was 
mandated to negotiate tough and credible political conditions, which after 
awhile became effective. The EU institutions and member states were coherent, 
keeping to unified positions. 
Croatia – Alternative accession case. The Commission is mandated to 
negotiate tough political conditions, but the closest neighbours (Austria, 
Slovenia, Hungary) are willing to settle for softer conditions (concerning an 
indicted war criminal). The rest of the member states stick to a principled line, 
and the unanimity rule for accession procedures means that the highest 
standard prevails.  
Bosnia – Protectorate case. There has been a strongly unified position of 
all the external actors – Special Representative, Commission, EU member states 
and the US. However the protectorate regime still gives precedence to security 
and state-building over democracy. The gubernatorial powers of the Special 
Representative crowd out domestic democracy.  THE RELUCTANT DEBUTANTE| 227 
 
Serbia & Montenegro – State-building case. Solana was mandated to 
exercise a strong mediation role to prevent state disintegration, but at the cost of 
imposing a dysfunctional state union. Strategic security has been the priority. 
The Commission was then confronted with the uphill task of trying to make the 
Union work.  
Turkey. Once candidate status was granted in 1999, the Commission was 
empowered to play a strong and effective political conditionality role. But 
underlying divergences persist among member states (over religion and the 
desirability of continuing the enlargement process), which casts a shadow over 
the credibility of the forthcoming accession negotiations. However the recent 
years of EU political conditionality seem to have the effect of ratcheting up the 
quality of Turkish democracy, to the point of leaving now little chance of 
reversal.  
Russia.  Unified EU positions during the Yeltsin period give way to 
divergences under a de-democratising Putin. The egregious case of Berlusconi 
standing as Putin’s advocate over Chechnya led the Commission and Parliament 
to push for a more principled position. But this was undermined by Chirac’s 
priority for having Putin as a diplomatic ally. The four ‘common spaces’ 
documents agreed in May 2005 are almost silent on matters of democratic 
principles.  
Ukraine. New member states pushed the EU (Solana) into a mediating 
role during the Ukrainian orange revolution. Parliament warmly endorses 
Ukraine’s EU aspirations, but the Commission and Solana do not go beyond 
minor revision of ‘neighbourhood policy’ Action Plan, and so the EU’s political 
conditionality may not develop strongly.  
Maghreb.  Southern member states initially favoured aid on politically 
soft terms, but over time there has been some convergence of positions among 
member states and with the Commission in favour of a cautiously more 
assertive line on democracy. Disappointment over lack of progress in many 
Arab partner states has led to some rising interest in ‘positive conditionality’.  
Israel-Palestine.  A principled doctrine about human rights and 
international law has been reasonably coherent as between the EU institutions 
and member states, and the instruments of action have been considerable. But 
institutional immaturity, the inhibitions of several member states, and the 
collective tendency in practice to view higher-order priorities (the peace process) 
as incompatible with genuine democracy and international law have often 
undermined the EU’s own objectives.  228 | EMERSON, AYDIN, NOUTCHEVA, TOCCI, VAHL & YOUNGS 
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